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In Enneads III, 7 (45), Plotinus speaks of eternity as 
Nous insofar as It involves self-motion (i.e., 
contemplation)_ is also called "life." In Its contemplation 
Nous 
is never other and is not a thinking or life that goes 
from one thing to another but is always the self same 
without extension; if one sees all this, he sees 
eternity in seeing a life that abides in the same and 
always has the All present to it, not now this and then 
again that, but all things at once, and not now some 
things and then again others, but a partless 
completion ••• It is something which abides in the same 
in itself but does not change at all but is always in 
the present.2 
Hence, Nous 
remains in its being just what it is. That, then, which 
was not and will not be but is only, which has being 
which is static by not changing to the 'will be,' nor 
ever having changed, this is eternity. The life, then, 
which belongs to that which is and is in being, all 
together and full, completely without extension or 
interval, is that which we are looking for, eternity.3 
lHere and elsewhere in this study we shall ref er to 
portions of the Enneads as follows: III, 7 (45), 3, 13-23, 
where III refers to the Ennead, 7 to the treatise, (45) to 
the chronological position of the treatise according to 
Porphyry's ordering, 3 to the chapter, and 13-23 to the 
lines within that chapter. 
2III, 7 (45), 3, 13-23. The translations are my 




But in Enneads III, 7 Plotinus also describes time as 
life. In Nous, which Itself is at rest and eternal, 
there was a restlessly active nature which wanted to 
control itself and be on its own, and chose to seek for 
more than its present state. This nature moved and time 
moved with it; and so, always moving on to the 'next' 
and the 'after' and what is not the same but one thing 
after another, the soul made a long stretch of journey 
and constructed time as an image of eternity.4 
Thus, Soul making the world of sense in imitation of that 
other world (of Nous and eternity) and moving with a motion 
which is not that which exists There but like it, "first of 
all put itself into time and then handed over that which 
came into being the material universe as a slave to time, by 
making the whole of it exist in time and encompassing all 
its ways with time. 11 5 The result is that Soul presents 
one activity after another in ordered succession and thus 
produces the succession along with the activity so that 
Soul's present life is not like that which came before it. 
So the life ( in Soul) is different and this "difference" 
involves a different duration. So the spreading out of life 
involves time; life's continual progress involves continuity 
of time, and life which is past involves past time. Hence, 
"time is the life of soul in a movement of passage from one 
way of life to another"6 and 




eternity is life at rest, unchanging and identical and 
already unbounded and time must exist as an image of 
eternity ••• Thus we must say instead of the life There 
in Nous, there is another life having the same name as 
this power of Soul.7 
The preceding remarks clearly indicate two main 
points. First, in Plotinus' thought "life" (zoe} is crucial 
to a proper understanding of both eternity (and, hence, the 
entire realm of Nous, and even Its source, the One-Good} and 
time (and, hence, the entire realm of Soul and thereby the 
physical universe}. Accordingly, his doctrine of zoe is an 
integral part of his theory of reality. Second, any 
presentation of Plotinus' thought, if it is to be adequate 
and complete, must take into account his theory of z6e. 
The purpose of this study, then, is to examine those 
texts in which Plotinus speaks of "life" in order to make 
explicit what this concept means. Furthermore, because 
"life" is so intimately bound up with all levels of reality 
in Plotinus' system, an examination of this concept will 
help to provide a better understanding of what "to be real" 
means for Plotinus and thus will provide an additional 
helpful insight into his entire Weltanschauung. 
Although there is abundant secondary literature on 
Plotinus' thought, little work seems to have been done on 
zoe specifically as it appears in his Enneads. This 
conclusion was reached after first consulting Bert Marien, 
7rbid., 45-49. 
4 
"Bibliografia Critica degli Studi Plotiniani" (Bari: G. 
Laterza and Figli, 1949; in V. Cilento, Plotino Enneadi, 
Vol. 3, Part 2, pp. 391-622). There we found that no work 
had been done ex prof esso on zoe in the Enneads prior to 
1949. 
Furthermore, little work has been done since 1949, as 
a careful examination of the appropriate volumes of J. 
Marouzeau, Juliette Ernst, et al. (eds.), L'Annee 
Philologique (Paris: "Les Belles Lettres," 1949 sqq.) made 
obvious. In fact, only one such work has been found. 
Grigorios Kostaras in Der Begriff des Lebens bei 
Plotin takes up explicitly the problem of life in 
Plotinus.8 His work is divided into five key chapters. 
In Chapter One ("The Concept of Life") he explains that the 
foundation and source of life lie in the Soul. 
life, he argues, are to some extent 
Soul and 
identical.9 
Similarly, life and movement are closely related, with 
movement having its source in the soul as well. Kostaras 
further identifies three different movements of the Soul 
(creating, perceiving and moving spiritually) and to these 
he connects three corresponding types of life: physical 
(biological), logical and spiritual. The human being may 
8Grigorios Ph. Kos tar as, Der Begrif f des Lebens bei 
Plotin (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1969). Hereafter, Kostaras, 
Begriff. 
9Ibid., p. 2s. 
5 
choose between these different types of life, of course, but 
should pursue the highest of these: the spiritual life.IO 
In Chapter Two {"The Life of the Body") Kostaras 
examines the first of these types of life: physical or 
biological life. First, he notes that through its 
relationship to the physical world {which is the soul's 
"empirical factor") and through its turn from unity to 
multiplicity, the soul introduces to matter the forms of 
transcendent reality and thereby gives life to the physical 
world.11 Next, he takes up the soul's relationship to the 
body and explains it as the formation of the other {the 
physical) through the One {the Soul), which takes place in 
the so-called biological movement of the soul .12 Third, 
he discusses the foundation of the life of the cosmos, 
which, he explains, is a complete and living organism whose 
parts are associated with one another in harmony and through 
logos. 13 
In Chapter Three {"The Life of the Soul") he turns to 
the second type of life: logical or mental life. He 
distinguishes between the finite and the infinite soul in 
order to describe the soul's turning from spiritual to 
sensual concerns and its subsequent return to unity. 14 
l0ibid., pp. 30-37. 
11Ibid., pp. 39-46. 
12Ibid., pp. 46-54. 
13Ibid., pp. 54-66. 
14Ibid., pp. 67-78. 
6 
Al though his remarks are not at all clear he seems to be 
attempting to distinguish the higher or "infinite" part of 
any soul (whose life he earlier called "logical" or 
"mental") from the lower or "finite" part (which he 
described in chapter two) as well as from the hypostasis 
Nous. 
In Chapter Four ( "The Life of the Spirit") Kos tar as 
discusses the third and highest type of life: spiritual 
life. He begins by describing Nous as the "true world," in 
which this "real life" occurs. It is the life of spirit as 
"self-moving unity of thought in the being and of the being 
in thought. 11 15 Finally, in the fifth chapter ( "Life as 
Good") Kos tar as examines such topics as Plotinus' view of 
man, wisdom as the human ideal, the highest goal of human 
life and the means of achieving it.16 
To the reader of Kostaras' work there appear several 
serious difficulties. First, Kostaras never satisfactorily 
( that is to say, explicitly and accurately) defines what 
"life" means. What he seems to off er as a definition, 
namely, "unity of the unending separation," is neither 
useful nor fully intelligible.17 Second, although he 







p. 135: " ••• das 
Teilung ist." 
Leben die Einheit der 
7 
body, he does not clearly articulate how the soul animates 
the body.18 Third, his treatment of the World Soul's 
relationship to the cosmos is both scant and facile. He 
does not explain at all the manner in which the World Soul 
gives life to the cosmos. Similarly, he leaves unexplicated 
the way in which Plotinus' logos doctrine (which he mentions 
but does not define) pertains to the World Soul's governance 
of the cosmos.19 Fourth, in his discussion of the Soul he 
seems to suggest that it is not genuinely a separate and 
distinct living hypostasis. 20 Fifth, he seems at 
different points to ascribe true life to both Soul and Nous 
despite the fact the Nous is clearly the higher level of 
reality and being.21 Finally, although he makes the 
rather insightful statement that life and movement are 
closely related he never adequately explains how these two 
key concepts are related.22 
Although there are other serious difficulties with 
Kostaras' work (not the least of which are his attribution 
of various decidedly un-Plotinian doctrines to Plotinus 23 
18Ibid., pp. 46-54. 
19Ibid., pp. 54-86. 
20Ibid., pp. 67-86. 
21Ibid., pp. 21-37 and 87-101. 
22-,-Ib1d., pp. 91-95. 
2 3For example, Kos tar as seems to misunderstand the 
nature of Nous when he argues (p. 29) that It does not 
involve rest,'but only motion (Der Nous ist nicht statisch, 
sondern bewegt sich .•• ). What is surprising is that he then 
cites III, 9 (13), 9, 2-3, which explicitly indicates that 
in Nous there is both kinesis and stasis. 
8 
and his almost total neglect of Platonic, Aristotelian and 
other influences on Plotinus' theory of life), our chief 
problem with his study is summed up best by the following 
comment of John Rist. "Perhaps the difficulty is that the 
discussion Kos tar as offers us is too much a paraphrase of 
Plotinus and not an explanation of what he means. n24 It 
shall be the task of our study to attempt to overcome this 
and the other difficulties that seem to plague Kostaras' 
treatment of zoe. 
There are many other studies, done since 1949, which, 
though they do not mention zoe in their titles, are devoted 
to topics linked to life by Plotinus (e.g., Nous, 
contemplation, energeia, dynamis, kinesis,) or contain 
discussions of passages in the Enneads furnishing us with 
key texts on life (i.e., IV, 7 [2], 8, 5-11; VI, 9 [9]; III, 
8 [ 3 0 ] , 8 ; 10 ; VI , 7 [ 3 8 ] , 13 ; 15 ; 1 7 ; 18 ; I , 4 [ 4 6 ] , 3 - 4 ) . 
In sampling such secondary literature the following 
questions were kept in mind: Does the work deal with a 
topic which is other than, yet relevant to, life in the 
Enneads? Secondly, does the work discuss a passage from the 
24John Rist, review of Der Begriff des Lebens bei 
Plot in, by Grigorios Ph. Kos tar as in The Classical World, 
LXIV, 1970, p. 125. The following reviews of Kostaras' book 
seem to concur with Rist' s unfavorable assessment: H. R. 
Schwyzer in Gnomon, XLVI, 1974, pp. 615-616; Wolfgang 
Hormann in Gymnasium, LXXVIII, 1971, pp. 565-566; E. W. 
Platzeck in Antonianum, XLVII, 1972, pp. 175-176; and Erich 
Lamberz in Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie, 56, 1974, 
pp. 194-199. 
9 
Enneads which is part of a key text? The selective survey 
which follows illustrates that few if any works thus 
approached contained discussions of zoe. 
Phillippus Pistorius in his study on neoplatonism 
refers to the Intellectual Principle (Nous) as a "living 
existent" and as a "creative force" in the universe.25 
Furthermore, in his discussion of the Soul he refers to it 
as the principle of life (psyche). In both instances no 
discussion of what life is in itself takes place. 
In his study of Plotinus, Joseph Katz emphasizes that 
the reversion process is an important facet of the 
relationship of the hypostases to the One-Good. 26 What is 
surprising, however, is that he makes no reference to life 
in that discussion even though, for Plotinus, Nous in Its 
moment of epistrophe, as well as in Its moment of prohodos, 
is, in fact, primal life. 
Although he devotes considerable space to a discussion 
of the dynamic aspect of Plotinus' universe, as expressed by 
his doctrines of prohodos and epistrophe, Leo Sweeney does 
not mention life in his article on the basic principles in 
25phillippus Pistorius, Plotinus and Neoplatonism 
(Cambridge: Bowes and Bowes, 1952). Hereafter, Pistorius, 
Plotinus. 
26Joseph Katz, Plotinus' Search for the Good 
(Columbia University, New York: King's Crown Press, 1950). 
Hereafter, Katz, Good. 
10 
Plotinus' philosophy.27 But, for Plotinus, life in its 
most fundamental .aspects (and on its most pure level, Nous) 
involves both procession and reversion. 
Emile Brehier in his helpful book on the thought of 
Plotinus briefly mentions life in his chapter on the 
One.28 There he notes that "life" designates "the dynamic 
current which . proceeds from the good, in advance of all 
distinct determination. When this current is determined and 
is limited, life becomes Intelligence. 11 29 He concludes 
this brief discussion by stat~ng that "for Plotinus, life is 
not yet a hypostasis. The word only calls attention to the 
vague, boundless substratum of Intelligence properly so 
called. 11 30 What he does not make at all clear, however, 
is what life is in itself and how it is related to the 
Intelligence (or Nous). 
Wenceslao Eborowicz, in his elaborate two-part article 
explicating the Plotinian theory of contemplation, fails to 
27Leo Sweeney, S. J., "Basic Principles in Plotinus' 
Philosophy," Gregorianum 42 (1961): pp. 506-16. Hereafter, 
Sweeney, "Principles." Furthermore, no mention of zoe 
occurs in one of his more recent articles, "Are Plotinus and 
Albertus Magnus Neoplatonists?" in Graceful Reason: Essays 
in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy Presented to Joseph 
Owens, C. S.S. R. , ed. Lloyd P. Gerson, Papers in Medieval 
Studies 4 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval 
Studiesi,1983), pp. 177-202. 
21:jErnile Br~hier, The Philosophy of Plotinus, transl. 
by Joseph Thomas (Chicago: The University of Chicago· Press, 
1958). Hereafter, Brehier, Plotinus. 
29Ibid., p. 141. 
30Ibid. 
11 
point out that life on any level intimately involves 
theoria.31 Such an omission is especially obvious in the 
section in which he attempts to define Nous, the level of 
reality on which both contemplation and life are found in 
their purest states.32 
In his illuminating article on the origin and history 
of the triad of being, life and thought, P. Hadot provides a 
very helpful preliminary discussion of the nature of life in 
Plotinus. 33 Although many of Hadot' s remarks are helpful, 
two points are especially noteworthy, despite the fact that 
he articulates them all too briefly. First, he notes that 
movement is nothing other than life.34 What precisely 
this movement entails and how it is found on other levels of 
reality will be a point of considerable attention in our 
study. Second, he finds credible the thesis that Nous as 
prohodos {or "pre-intellectual life," as Hadot puts it) is 
life.35 This point too shall be examined in detail in our 
thesis. 
In an interesting article examining the three major 
31w. Eborowicz, "La Contemplation Selon Plotin," 
Giornale Di Metafisica, Part I: No. 1, Vol. 12 {1957), pp. 
472-518 and Part II: No. 4, Vol. 13 {1958), pp. 45-82. 
32Ibid., Part II, pp. 57ff. 
33P.Hadot, "Etre, Vie, Pensee chez Plotin et Avant 
Plotin," Les Sources de Plotin {Vandoeuvres-Geneve: 
Fondation Hardt, 1960), pp. 107-157. Hereafter, Hadot, 
"Etre." 
34Ibid., p. 132. 
35Ibid., p. 135. 
12 
Plotinian terms for consciousness (antilepsis, 
parakolouthesis, ·synaisthesis) Edward Warren does not 
explain its very important relationship to zoe. 36 This 
omission is especially glaring in his treatment of 
synaisthesis since he notes there that a human being's 
noetic life in Nous is eternal and that all of man's higher 
activities are perpetually active, but he does not go on to 
explain the nature of life itself. 
Although John Rist in his valuable book on Plotinus' 
thought points out that the One is beyond life and that life 
is a trace of the One37 and devotes an entire chapter to 
"happiness" ( eudaimonia) in which he frequently refers to 
the happy life, he does not define what life is in 
itself.38 Furthermore, in his article comparing the One-
Good with Aristotle's God he argues that Nous (the Divine 
Mind) is not like the One in part because Nous does not live 
the same life.39 This remark is troublesome because it 
seems to suggest (erroneously, as we shall argue later in 
this study) that the One somehow has life. In any case, he 
again fails to indicate what is meant by "life." 
36Edward W. Warren, "Consciousness in Plotinus" 
Phronesis Vol. 9 (1964), pp. 83-97. 
37J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality 
(Cambridge: University Press, 196 7), p. 27. Hereafter, 
Rist, Road to Reality. 
38rbid., p. 149. 
39Y:--M. Rist, "The One of Plotinus and the God of 
Aristotle" The Review of Metaphysics Vol. 27, No. 1 · (Sept., 
1973), pp. 75-87. 
13 
In John Deck's study of contemplation in Plotinus 
considerable attention is devoted to many passages of 
treatise III, 8 (30), which contains one of our key 
texts.40 Deck explains that for Plotinus life and 
knowledge are coordinate and that Nous, "which is its own 
knowledge, its own theoria, is the first life, living 
through itself. 11 41 Although such a statement is helpful, 
his subsequent remarks are brief and do not adequately 
explain how life and knowledge are related and, more 
importantly, what specifically constitutes primal life. 
In the informative preface to his translation of the 
Enneads, A. H. Armstrong makes the rather controversial 
statement that the One "is Life and Power, an infinite 
spring of power, and unbounded life." 42 That the One-Good 
is not life is a point that we shall defend later in this 
study. For now it will be sufficient to say that Armstrong 
does not offer any definition of the term "life," even 
though he ascribes it to the highest reality. 
Similarly, Armstrong offers little explanation of zoe 
in his study of Plotinus, even though he does mention it 
40John Deck, Nature, Contemplation and the One 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967). Hereafter, 
Deck, Contemplation. 
41Ibid., p. 26. 
42X:--H. Armstrong, Plotinus, Vol. 1 





with reference to sou1.43 Furthermore, he devotes an 
entire chapter (Cb. 3) to the One and the spiritual life 
without ever making clear how the experience of mystical 
union with the One is the highest form of human life. 
Similarly, his chapters on Nous as emanation (Ch. 4) and as 
mind (Ch. 5) contain no helpful explication of these two 
significant features of life. 
More useful, although much too brief, is Armstrong's 
article on life, movement and eternity as they relate to 
Nous.44 He presents an interesting argument that 
Plotinus' explanation of the eternal life of Nous is neither 
fully consistent nor completely coherent. What he fails to 
do, however, is to present an adequate and complete 
discussion of the nature of life itself. Instead, he argues 
that the inner life of Nous is characterized by eternity, 
which consists of the successive exploration of Its 
intelligible content.45 In our study we shall argue that 
such a view of eternity is inaccurate and that life on the 
level of Nous is identical with Its simultaneous 
contemplation of intelligibles. 
43A. H. Armstrong, The Architecture of the 
Intelligible Uni verse in the Philosophy of Plotinus 
(Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1967), pp. 83ff. Hereafter, 
Armstrong, Architecture. 
44A. H. Armstrong, "Eternity, Life and Movement in 
Plotinus' Accounts of Nous." in Le nJo-platonisme. Actes du 
Collogue de Royaumont 9-13 Juin 1969. (Paris: Ed. du CNRS, 
1971), ~P· 67-74. Hereafter, Le neo-platonisme. 
4 Ibid., p. 73. 
15 
Henry Blumenthal, in two carefully wrought articles, 
makes no mention of zoe. 46 This is unfortunate since in 
the first article he refers to the kin~sis and the 
intellection of Nous, while never noting the fact that Nous 
is life precisely because of its self-kinesis which is 
intellection. In the second article he points out that all 
souls are one (and yet also somehow different) without 
indicating that one way in which they are similar is that 
they are life principles. 
The remarks of R. T. Wallis on life, though brief and 
scattered throughout his lucid work on Neoplatonism, are 
nevertheless useful as far as they go.47 In one such 
passage he hints at a very important dimension of Plotinus' 
theory of life. "A closer approach to later Neoplatonic 
teaching is his [Plotinus'] suggestion that life should be 
equated with the second hypostasis in its unformed stage 
(i.e., with procession) and Intelligence with the stage of 
reversion, when it has received form and limit. 1148 It is 
this suggested equation of life with both moments of Nous' 
46H. J. Blumenthal, "Soul, World-Soul and Individual 
Soul in Plotinus," in Le n~o-platonisme, pp. 55-66 and "Nous 
and Soul in Plotinus; Some Problems of Demarcation," in Atti 
del Convegno Internazionale sul Terna: Plotino e iT 
Neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente (Rome: Accad. Noz. 
dei Lincei, 1974), pp. 203-19. Hereafter, Atti. 
47R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism (London: 
Duckworth & Co., Ltd., 1972). Hereafter, 
Neoplatonism. 




emanation from the One that our study shall attempt to 
explicate fully. 
Although he cites relevant passages from III, 8 (30) 
and discusses contemplation in his book on the hermeneutics 
and philosophy of Plotinus, P. G. Castillo does not mention 
life. 49 Specifically, he discusses theoria as it is found 
in the intelligible world (i.e., perfect contemplation) and 
as it is related to Gnostic thought, but fails to explicate 
its important connection with primal life and ultimately 
with human life. 
As the above sampling of secondary literature reveals, 
little significant work has been done on z6e in the Enneads. 
Accordingly, our study will be mainly based on portions of 
the Enneads themselves in which life is discussed. Before 
we describe our manner of proceeding in the chapters which 
are to follow, let us first enumerate ( in chronological 
order) all the places in the treatises of the Enneads in 
which z6e (life) or some derivative expressions occur.SO 
49pablo Garcia Castillo, Plotino: Hermeneutica y 
Filosofia (Salamanca: Instituto de Ciencias de las 
Educacion, 1984), pp. 96-107). 
50Multiple instances of zoe in a single line are 
indicated by the number in parentheses to the right of the 
citation. We are following the Greek text as found in Paul 
Henry and H. R. Schwyzer, Plotini Opera, Vols. I-III, 
"Oxford Classical Texts" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964, 
1977, 1982). The translations in this study are my own, but 
I have been helped significantly by the advice of Leo 
Sweeney, S. J. and also by Curtis Hancock, as well as by the 
following editions and translations of the Greek text: 
17 
I, 6 (1), 5, 30 ( 2 ) II, 5 (25), 3, 19 
34 37 ( 2 ) 
35 39 ( 2 ) 
7, 11 ( 2 ) 
III, 6 (26), 6, 15 ( 2) 
IV, 7 ( 2) , 2, 5 24 
26 
IV, 8 ( 6) , 1, 4 50 
49 
IV, 5 (29), 6, 28 
IV, 9 ( 9) , 9, 1 
9 III, 8 (30), 8, 11 
15 12 
16 13 ( 2 ) 
17 17 
48 18 ( 2) 
51 19 ( 2 ) 
20 
v, 1 (10), 7, 18 21 
22 
VI, 5 ( 23) , 12, 1 24 
2 ( 2 ) 27 ( 2 ) 
9 28 
36 29 ( 2 ) 
9, 33 





10, 2 21 
(50continued) 
1) Armstrong, A.H., Plotinus, Vols. 1-5. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966-84. 
2) Idem, Plotinus, London: Allen & Unwin, 1953. 
3) Brehier, Emile, Plotin Enneades, 6 vols. in 7, 
Paris: "Les Belles Lettres," 1924-38. 
4) Harder, R. (Continued by W. Marg, R. Beutler and 
W. Theiler), Plotins Schriften, 5 vols. in 11, 
Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1956-67. 
5) Cilento, Vincenzo, Plotino Enneadi, 3 vols., Bari: 
Laterza, 1947-49. 
6) Creuzer, F. and G. H. Moser (eds.), Plotini 
Enneades cum Marsilii Ficini Interpretatione 
Castigata, Oxford: Typographicum Academicum, 1835. 
7) MacKenna, Stephen ( revised by B. S. Page), The 
Enneads, 4th ed., New York: Pantheon Books Inc., 
1969. 
18 




24 VI, 8 (39), 15, 25 
31 30 
37 
v, 8 (31), 4, 1 16, 35 
35 37 
36 ( 2 ) 
VI, 8 (39), 15, 25 
VI, 6 (34), 18, 12 ( 2 ) 30 
13 37 
14 




19 ( 3 ) VI, 2 (43), 7, 2 
23 3 ( 2 ) 
26 ( 2) 4 
28 ( 2 ) 5 
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From the above texts we have selected the following 
key texts because they contain important and different 
information on what Plotinus means by life. We shall study 
them in the following order: 
1 ) IV, 7 [ 2 ] , 8 5-11 
2 ) VI , 9 [ 9 ] , 9 
3) III, 8 (30], 8; 10 
4) VI, 7 (38], 13; 15; 17; 18 
5) I, 4 (46], 3-4 
Our procedure with each of these key texts shall be as 
follows. 
1) State its context. 
2) Give a literal translation or paraphrase of the key 
text. 
3) Provide a commentary in order to make clear the key 
text's meaning. Specifically, this will 
involve tracing the movement of thought (i.e., making 
explicit the argument within the text) .5l 
Reflecting on the meaning of zoe in itself and in its 
relationship to other essential concepts found in the 
key text, drawing inferences so as to explicate what 
is only implicit, and utilizing other texts in the 
Enneads whenever useful and relevant. In addition, 
51For a profitable discussion of the reasons why 
such explicitation of Plotinus' arguments is both necessary 
and useful see Wallis, Neoplatonism, pp. 43-44. 
4 ) 
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other authors, whether classical or contemporary, 
will be consulted wherever truly helpful in explaining 
zoe in Plotinus. 
Summarize the discussion and draw appropriate 
conclusions. 
After we have examined all five key texts in this way, we 
shall, in a final chapter, summarize the conclusions issuing 
from these key texts and note how they fit into Plotinus' 
philosophy as a whole. Finally, we shall provide a thorough 
bibliography. 
CHAPTER II 
TEXT A: ENNEAD IV, 7 (2), sS-11 
The key text that we shall examine in IV, 7 ( 2) is 
found in Chapters s5 to 11.l Before turning to this 
text, however, let us describe the treatise as a whole. 
According to Porphyry, IV, 7 : "On the Irnrnortali ty of the 
Soul," is the second treatise that Plotinus wrote and, 
hence, belongs to his early period, during which he produced 
works of "a slighter capacity, not yet attaining to the 
dimensions of his full vigor."2 In this treatise Plotinus 
lThe reference to Chapter s5 indicates that 
Chapter 8 of Treatise IV, 7 is divided into several parts: 
8, 81 , s2, etc. That division is at least as old as 
Marsilius Ficinus, who divided Chapter 8 into six distinct 
sections as demanded by the sense of the text itself. The 
original Greek version of IV, 7 is incomplete in that a 
large portion of the text is lacking. This gap is filled by 
turning to Eusebius' quotations ot Plotinus in the 
Preparatio Evangelica, XV, 22, pp. 49-67 (for Chapters 8-
84) and xv, 10, pp. 1-9 (for Chapter as). Additional 
information on the curious history of this text is found in 
I 
Paul Henry and H. R. Schwyzer, Plotini Opera (Paris: Desclee 
De Brouwer, 1951, 1959), Vol. 1, pp. ix-xxv and Vol. 2, pp. 
ix-xxvi. 
2porphyry, "On the Life of Plotinus," Chapter 6, 
lines 30-31. In A. H. Armstrong, Plotinus, Vol. 1 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966-67), p. 
15, hereafter: Porphyry, "Life." 
Porphyry's remarks notwithstanding, it should be noted 
that Emile Br~hier, in Plotin Enn~ades, (Paris: "Les Belles 
Lettres," 1924-28), Vol. IV, p. 179, (hereafter, Br~hier, 
22 
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presents his own theory of the soul's immortality and 
evaluates views opposed to it. 
We shall proceed by first giving the context of the 
key text, to be followed by the key text in paraphrase and 
translation, then by commentary and by conclusions. 
In the first chapter Plotinus makes clear that if one 
identifies man with his soul alone and not with the 
body/soul composite, the question of man's immortality must 
be settled by an examination of the nature of the human soul 
itself. This examination is pursued for the remainder of 
the treatise, which may be divided into the following four 
sections. First, Plotinus examines and criticizes the Stoic 
position that the soul is a body (Ch. 2-83). Next, he 
takes up the Pythagorean thesis that the soul is a harmony 
This is followed by a cluster of nine 
arguments against the Aristotelian definition of soul as the 
entelecheia of an organized body (Ch. as, 1-43). Finally, 
Plotinus gives his own view on soul as ousia (Ch. as, line 
43 - Ch. 14), in part by systematically collecting several 
scattered references to soul found in the Platonic 
(2continued) 
Enneades) describes IV, 7 as the most elementary and yet 
also the most scholarly treatise written by Plotinus. 
Hence, even in this early stage of his writing Plotinus' 
philosophical sophistication is evident by his use of 
numerous commentators to aid his defense and interpretation 
of Plato's theories. 
3This thesis is also examined both by Plato (Phaedo, 
8Sc-88e and 92a-9Sa) and by Aristotle (De Anima I, 4). 
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corpus.4 This presentation constitutes our key text. 
TEXT A. IV, 7 (2), 85 (line 43) - 11 
[l] What then is its ousia? If soul is neither a body 
nor any condition of body, but rather a doing and 
making, and one whose multiplicity is contained in it 
and comes from it, what sort of ousia is it beyond its 
being present to bodies? Obviously [it is]5 that 
which we say to be genuine ousia. Since everything 
which would be called corporeal is a becoming and not an 
ousia, because becoming and perishing never belong to 
what is truly being [Nous], it [soul] is preserved by 
its participation in the being [of Nous] to the extent 
that it participates in It. --
85, 43-50: 
,,,, .,. , I , - E' <:' \ I -
J. LS ovv OVO'La atrr7JS ; L OE µ:rJTE uwµ.a, 
, '0 , - I: <:' \ \ , \ \ \ \ µ:rJTE 1Ta OS uwµ.a-ros, 1Tpa,,,,s OE Ka, 1TOLTJO'LS, Ka, 1TOl\/\a 
' , , " ' 'i: , .... , , ' \ , 1' 
45 Ka, EV av-rn Ka, E<,, aV'T'T}S, ovu,a 1rapa -ra uwµ.a-ra ovua. 
, , , "H <:' -, ., ., ,I.. " , I .,. 
1TOLa TLS EO'TLV ; O'T}I\OV O'TL 'TJV ..,,aµ.Ev OVTWS ovu,av E LVaL. 
,rr, \ \ , -~' ,, , , , .... ' ' 
1 0 fJ,EV yap YEVEO'LS, al\/\ OVK ovu,a, 1rav TO uwµ.aTLKOV 
l \I > " I \ > \\ I # Eva, I\EYOLT av, y,voµ.Evov Ka, a1TOI\I\VfJ,EVOV, OV'TWS 
<:' \ > <:' I I# \ I,/, <:' \ - I/ r I 
OE O VOE'TTOTE ov, µ.ETal\'T}'f'EL OE TOV OV'TOS uq,1:,0µ.Evov, 
0 , " , - _\ R' so Ka ouov av av-rov fJ,E'TCJ.l\aµ.,-,av71. 
4p1otinus uses Timaeus, 27d, to distinguish between 
that which is born and perishes and that which really is 
(Ch. 85, lines 44-50 and Ch. 9, lines 1-2). He has in 
mind Phaedrus, 245c-e, when he defines the soul as the 
principle of movement (Ch. 9, lines 3-9). He employs 
Phaedo, 105d, to argue that it is impossible for what has 
life essentially to become non-living (Ch. 9, lines 10-23). 
He echoes Sophist, 249a, when he affirms the primacy of life 
(Ch. 9, lines 24-25). Finally, he reiterates one of the 
main themes of the Phaedo when he notes that soul in its 
proper nature is imperishable and always tending to its 
original state (Ch. 9, lines 26-29). See the presentation 
in Brehier, Enn~ades, Vol. 4, pp. 185-86. 
5The use of brackets (i.e., [ ] ) in the key text or 
in the movement of thought in this and subsequent chapters 
is meant to indicate that the bracketed phrases or sentences 
are not part of the very translation or paraphrase itself 
but are my interpolations as transitions, summaries, or 
inferences. 
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[Plotinus opens Chapter Nine with a brief description 
of Nous.] 
[2] This other nature, namely, Nous, possessing being 
by itself, is all true being and neither comes to be nor 
perishes. If It should be destroyed, all other things 
would be destroyed and would no longer come to be from 
It. It also provides preservation to them, both to all 
the others and to this [physical] All preserved and 
ordered by soul. [ 3] Soul is indeed a principle of 
movement by furnishing movement to other things and is 
self-moved; giving life to the ensouled and thereby 
living body, it has a life which is from itself and 
which it never loses. For not all things are subject to 
a life brought in from outside, because this would 
involve an infinite regress. [ 4] There must be some 
one primally living nature, necessarily indestructible 
and immortal, inasmuch as it is the principle of life 
even for all other things. 
9, 1-13: 
'H ~J • 1 .J. 1 • , , A ., , 7 
o,. E"'Tt:pa y,V<r£S, 7J Trap aV'T7JS EXOVO'a 'TO E£Vat, 
,... I II II a II I II J I\\ 'II, \ 
TTaV 'TO OV'TWS OV 1 0 OV'TE" ywe-ra, OV'TE" a'TT0/\1\V'Tat. 7J -ra 
~\ \ I t I \ 1 'I\ ,r I I 
W\l\a TTav-ra otxrJUE-ra,, Kat ovK av va-repov yevo,-ro -rov-rov 
) \ \ f .. f , A f A _!I'\ \ 
a'TTOI\WI\O'TOS 1 0 TTapt:XH aV'TO LS O'W'TT}ptaV 1 'TO tS 'TE WV\OtS 
\ A~ A \ ~ \ ,/, A ,. / \ / 
Kat -repoe -rep Travn ota y,VXTJS aepc,,oµt:Vep Kat KEKoaµ71µ£Vep. s 
'ApxTJ yap KtV~O'€WS ijSe xop7Jyovaa 'TOLS IDo,s Klv71-
., <;.' \ , l: f A / \ ,. \ A , ,/, / 
(7LV, aV'TT} OE t:s t:aV'TTJS KLVOVµEV'T}, Kat c,,WTJV -rep t:µy,vxep 
I '-' '-' A ., '-'' , f A ., .. ., 
awµan owovaa, av'TTJ oe Trap eaV'TT}S t:xovaa, 71v oVTro-re 
, ,, \ - , f ... .,, 0 ' \ ~ \ , Q.'TTOI\I\VO'W 1 a'TE Trap EaV'TT}S EXOVO'a. V yap O'TJ Trav-ra 
, A ,. A A 11 , JI 7 ~\ \ \ <;.' A E'TTaK-rep c,,WrJ x.p71-ra,. 7J HS a'TTEtpov E"£0'LV' W\l\a OEt 'Ttva 10 
.1. , , ,. A 1 .. , , , ll , , 0 , y,va,v 7rpw-rws c,,waav e va,, 71v avwl\Eupov Kat a ava-rov 
7 ~ A t l: ) / fl ) \ ,. A \ A _!I'\\ 
ova, OE£ Es avayK'T}S, a-rE apxrJV c,,WTJS Kat 'TOtS WV\OtS 
oJaav. 
[ 5] Consequently it is necessary to grant in full a 
divine and blessed status to that which has life and 
being of itself [i.e., Nous]: primally being and 
primally living, its ousia having no part in change, 
neither coming to be nor perishing. For from what would 
it come to be or into what would it perish? [6] And if 
the name 'being' is to be attributed truly to Nous, it 
must not be the case that Nous is sometimes being and 
sometimes not being. Likewise, whiteness, itself a 
color, is not sometimes white and sometimes not white. 
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And if whiteness were identical with being, then 
whiteness [ precisely because of its being whiteness] 
would always be. But it is only whiteness. [ 7] But 
that which has being of itself and primally will always 
be being. This being, primal and everlasting, is not 
dead like a stone or wood, but must be living and 
enjoying a pure life insofar as it remains [undescended 
and thereby] alone and by itself. [8] [However] if it 
descends as soul and mixes itself with something worse, 
it has an impediment to the best; but it does not lose 
its own nature and takes up its primal state by 
returning to itself. 
9, 13-29: 
ltI:'f 0 ~ \ \ \ 0 ""' fl \ \ I £IV a 017 KaL TO HOV a1rav KaL TO µaKapLOV 
!~ A 0 ~ - y - I > - \ " t > A I wpvu a, aei i:,wv 1rap atJTov Ka, ov 1rap aVTov, 1rpwTws 
" \ Y- I Q \- • , I ,, ,, 
ov ,ca, i:,wv 1rpwTws, µeTa,-,Ol\'7S KaT ovuiav aµo,pov, OVTE ts 
1 11 
' \ \ 
1 n '0 \ " \ I " y,voµevov ov-re a1TOI\I\Vµevov. o EV yap av Ka, yevo,To, 17 
t I > I\ U \ t ~ - > - \ 0 I \ - II 
OS n a1TOI\OL'TO ; n.a, H CJH E1Tal\'7 EVELV 7"'T/V TOV OVTOS 
1TpoU17yoplav, avTo ov 1TO'TE: P,E:V elvai, 1TO'TE: OE: OVK elvai 
~ , C'f'"} \ \ \ I l \ \ .,.. l \ \ 
CJE'7UH. ~,:,; KaL TO I\EVKOV, av-ro 'TO ')(pWµa, ov 1TO'TE µev 
\ I \ ~\ ' \ I t ~\ \ " ,1_ \ \ \ \ I\EVKOV, 1TO'TE CJE OV I\EVKOV' Et CJE ,ca, ov ,,v TO I\EVKOV /J,E'Ta 20 
- \ \ l .1. .. ', .>\\' , " \ \ , TOV I\EVKOV E va,, ,,v av ae,. a/\1\a µovov EXE£ TO I\EVKOV . 
.-ri ~· " \ " ,1_ \ > t - \ I " ~.:, a av -ro ov u 1rapov 1rap aVTov ,ca, 1rpw-rws, ov 
,,., T ... I '" I '''" ,, an Ev7'at. OVTO 'TOLVVV 'TO ov 1rpw-rws KaL aEL ov ovx, 
I fl \ 10 " t_ I\ > \ \ \ Y - 1' ~ - \ VEKpov, W<nrEp I\L OV 'T/ ~VI\OV, al\l\a i:,WV ELVaL CJEL, KaL 
{wfi Kaf:laprj. KEXPi,a6a,, oao;, (L)J av,ou µ€V'{J µ6vov. 25 
" ~· " 0- I ' I~ \ ti \ \ 0 0 a.v uvµµix 71 xe,pov,, E/J,1TOOLOV µev EXELV 1rpo,; Ta 
" II \ \ , - ,1.1 > \ \I ap,u-ra - oVT, ye µ17v 7"'T/V av-rov .,,vuw a1TOI\WAEVa, -
> _\ Q - ~\ \ > I I > \ \ < A 
aval\a,-,ew oe T'7V apxa,av KaTau-rau,v e1r, Ta a.VTov 
ava8paµ6v. 
[In Chapter Ten Plotinus concentrates on soul.] 
[ 9] That the soul is akin to the di vine and eternal 
nature has been demonstrated by making clear that it is 
not a body. And it has neither shape nor color nor is 
it able to be touched. However, one can certainly show 
that it is without these characteristics by the 
following. [ 10] Agreeing that all di vine and true 
being is endowed with good and rational life, we must 
examine next what kind of nature our own soul has. [11] 
Let us the ref ore take [ an individual human] soul, not 
one which is in the body and takes hold of irrational 
and wild desires and attracts to itself all other 
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passions, but one which is turned away from all of them 
and has, as far as possible, no association with the 
body. [ 12] This analysis makes clear that evils are 
appendages to the soul and come [ not from within the 
soul but] from elsewhere, and that by its becoming 
clean, the best things, prudence and other virtues, are 
[then] its property. 
10, 1-13: 
"O ~ \ - 8 I ,I.. I \ • ·'-· \ ' -TL OE TTJ ELOTEp(f .,.,vuE, UVYYEVTJS TJ 'f'VXTJ Ka£ T7I 
a.'8l<t>, 8ijJ\ov µlv 1TOLEL Kat, TO µ~ uwµa avr~v 8e8Eix8a,. 
1T \ \ ·~ \ - " ·~ \ - > ,J.. I O > \ .n.at f.L'TJV OVOE uxr,µa EXEL OVOE xpwµ.a ava'f''TJS TE. V /J-'TJV 
_>\ \ \ \ > - ~ II ~ I •o \ I ~ \ a/\1\a Kat EK TWVOE EUTL oEtKVvva,. µ.ol\oyovµ.evov O'TJ 
t .,. \ ..., 8 I \ .-. # II y .-. J o-
5 'TJ/J-LV 1TaVTOS TOV ELOV KaL TOV OVTWS OVTOS <:,WT} aya '[/ 
-o '",J.. -~-· \ - ,,_ KEXP'TJU a, KaL E/J-'f'POVL, UK01TE£V OE£ TO /J-ETa TOVTO a1To T'TJS 
~/J-ET£pas if,vxijs, ol6v JUT, 'T'TJV tpvuw. Aaflwµ.ev 8l if,v~v 
\ \ t , , 0 I ~\ I \ 8 \ /1-TJ TTJV ev uwµ.aTL Em vµias Ql\oyovs Ka, vµ.ovs 1rpou-
, f1 - \ '8 ~\ \ > ~ l:. I _> \ \ \ \ -/\a ovuav Kat 1ra 'T/ a/\1\a avaoe5 aµ.EV7Jv, =a T'TJV Tavra 
> ,o/, I \ 0 I f' I \ - -
10 a1T0Tp...,.,aµ.EV7JV KaL Ka ouov OLOV TE /1-'T/ KO£VWVOVUaV T'f) 
I "H \ ~-, - • o- \ \ -awµ.aTL. TLS KaL O"f/1\0V 1TO£E£, ws 1rpoc, 7JKa, Ta KaKa T'!J 
r/roxfi Kat, llio0ev, Ka87Jpaµ.b71 Bl avTfj bvml.pxE, Ta 
II ,! I \ f ~\ \ , I t - 11 
ap,ura, 'f'POV7JULS Ka, 'T/ U/\1\"f/ apET'TJ, OLKELa ovra. 
[13] [Plotinus then argues (lines 13-30) that man's 
soul differs from the superior realities primarily because 
of its entanglement with the body. Hence, the true nature 
of the human soul (i.e., it is akin to the divine and is 
immortal) is discerned only when it is viewed in its pure 
state without association with the body. 
continues:] 
Plotinus then 
[14] Let him examine the human soul, then, as separate 
[ from the body], or rather, let him see himself as 
separated [from his body] and he will believe himself to 
be immortal, when he beholds himself to be in the 
intelligible and the pure [higher region of Nous]. [15] 
He will see an intelligence which seesnot some 
sensible and mortal things, but which has intellection 
of the eternal in the eternal. He will see all things 
in the intelligible, having himself become an 
intelligible and luminous world, illuminated by the true 
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good, which pours out onto all the intelligibles the 
light of its truth. [16] [Hence,] it will seem to him 
that this indeed was often well said: 'Greetings to 
you, I am to you an immortal god' ; 6 when ascending to 
the divine he looks intently at his resemblance to it. 
[ 17] If purification brings about in us knowledge of 
the highest [realities], the knowledges which are within 
[us all along] will appear, for they truly are 
knowledges. It is not by going outside of itself that 
soul sees temperance and justice, but it sees them by 
itself in its intellectual reflection upon itself and 
upon its primal state, as if seeing statues standing 
within itself, inasmuch as, having been accumulated with 
rust through time, it makes them clean again.7 
10, 30-47: 
£KOTTE£ s~ &.cf,eAwv, µii.AAov Se o acpEAWv 
,cal 1Tt,aTeVae:, 0.0&.vaTo~ Elva,, 0Tav £avr0v 
iavrJv lSl-rw ao 
(J I > EaG7J-ra, o 
T{j> VOTJT{j> Ka, EV T{j> KalJap{j> YEYEVTJ/J.€VOV. "OrpE-ra, yap 
- • - , , (J , ·~· - (J - , vovv opwv-ra OVK a,a 1JTOV 7"1, 0VOE TWV VTJTWV TOV'rWV, 
aAAa &.,Slw 7"() &.tS,ov KaTavoovv-ra, 'ITcf.v-ra TO. EV TW . . 
""' I \ ' \ \ \ ,,/.. \ VOTJT'fl, Koaµov Kat av-rov vo11-rov Ka, .,,w-rEivov YEYEVTJ- as 
µ&ov, a.A110elq. Ka-raAaµ:rr6µoov -rfj 'ITapa TOV aya0ov, o 
wiimv EmAcf.µ1re, -ro'is VO'T)To'is d.>.~IJE£av · ws 'IToAAcf.Kis 
> - ~ Ii; - ~ \ \ - > - e I > > \ av-rep OO~a£ TOVTO 01) KallWS E£p'T)a a£" xaipET, EYW 
~· • - e ' " f3 ' ' e - · f3' , ' o v µ iv eo s aµ po-ro s 'ITpos -ro HOV ava as eL; T1JV 
, , , t , , , E' ~' r '(J - • 1rpos av-ro oµoioT1JTa a-rEviaas. , o T/ Ka apa,s 'ITotn EV-•o 
, - ,, " ',, - .,~ .,. yvwae, -rwv apu;,wv nvai, Kat a, E1T£aT'T)µa, EVoov ovaa, 
1 ,I._ I d ~\ \ Iii 1 "" / t o· \ ava.,,awov-ra,, a, 01) Kat, OVTWS E1T1,GT'T)µat E£GLV. V yap 
~' "i: ~ - • ·'-· ' .I. , (J "' ' O'T) Es-W 1rov opaµovaa 7J ,,,.,X7J uw.,,poavv7Jv Ka opff Ka, 
~ I _1\\t t \ t t ,.. t - / 
o t, Ka£ 0 a V V 1) V, WV\ a VT'T) 1rap avrr, EV -rr, KaTaV07JUEt 
45 iav-rijs Kat TOV O 1rp6-rEpov ~v WGTTEP &.ycf.Aµa-ra EV av-rfj 
·~ , • - " • ' , , - \ , (J ' ,opvµeva .opwua oia v1ro xpovov wv 'ITE'ITll'TJpwµEva Ka apa 
1TOt1JUap.£VTJ " 
[18] [Plotinus concludes Chapter Ten (lines 47-52) by 
noting that the soul is best understood as a mass of living 
6Empedocles, Fr. 112. 
7 See Plato, Phaedrus, 
explanation of this point see 
n. 1, pp. 384-385. 
247 d-e. For helpful 
Armstrong, Enneads, Vol. IV, 
29 
gold which comes to be aware of its true nature only after 
it has knocked off all that had encrusted it. Thus 
purified, this living gold comes to be alone with itself and 
thereby realizes that it needs no beauty brought in from 
outside. It is supreme in itself, if only it would be left 
alone by itself. In Chapter Eleven, Plotinus continues his 
examination of the unalloyed soul by explaining that its 
chief characteristic is immortality.] 
[19] Who having an intellect would deny that this sort 
of existent [soul] is deathless? It has life of itself 
which it does not lose. [20] For how can that which is 
not acquired not be always possessed, considering [for 
example] the way that heat is always linked to fire. I 
do not mean that heat is brought into fire but that, 
although not to the fire, then [at least] to the 
[combustible] wood underlying [ and feeding] the fire. 
For by [the complete combustion of] this [wood] even the 
fire is destroyed. [ 21] Soul does not have life in 
this way [as burning wood has fire and heat], as though 
soul were like wood underlying [the fire consuming it]. 
Soul manifests a life [intrinsically] belonging to 
itself [just as heat intrinsically belongs to fire]. 
11, 1-9: 
llEpl 7'0iOV7'0V xp~µa7'0S 7'ls av aµ<f,,c,f.3TJ7'0lTJ VOVV 
II f t •e f "'.Q I \ >{:. f - Y, I EXWV, WS OVIC a ava7'0V ; i 1rapEan JLEV E':, EaV7'0V ':,WT], 
<I t f'f > \ f 0 - \ t t / I 
TJV ovx o,ov 7'E a1T0I\EC1 aL" 1TWS yap 0VIC E1T,ICTTJ7'0V YE 
1' t ~t ~ fl # r """ \ t 0 I 
ovc,av ova av 0VTWS Exovc,av, ws 7''f' 1TVpi TJ EPJL0TTJS 
t • A' ~' , r , , r 0 1 - 1 
5 1rapE<17'i , EYW OE ovx WS E1TalCT0V TJ epµ0TT]S T'f' 1rvp,, 
,,,, f!I , ' \ - , ~,, \ - f , - ' 
al\/\ 07',, E, Ka, µ:'} 7''f' 1rvp,, a/\1\a 7"[J V1T0ICEiµEVTJ 7''f' 1rvp, 
.,, "' I \ \ c;:- -- \ , \ - 'H c;:- \ ,/, \ , 
VI\T]. .1 aVTr, yap ,cm ouil\VETa, 7'0 1rvp. oE 'f'VXTJ ovx 
fl \ y \ II f <I\ \ .,. f A 0 
0VTW TTJV ':,WT]V EXEi, WS VI\T]V JLEV ovc,av V1T0ICELC1 a,, 
y \ I:' \ t t t A I \ ,/, \ ) I:' AC. 
.,,wTJV oe E7T aVTTJ YEV0JLEVTJV TTJV 'f'VXTJV a1roaEL.,,a,. 
[22] For life is an ousia, and the soul is an ousia of 
a sort that is living through itself -- it is precisely 
for this sort of ousia that we are searching -- and one 
must admit that it [the self-living soul] is immortal; 
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otherwise, one must analyze the composite further and 
further back until one comes to the element which is 
immortal and self-moved, for it is not proper for this 
[final element] to share in death. [23] Or if one says 
that life is a passive quality brought into matter, one 
will in virtue of this very passive quality's coming 
into matter be compelled to admit that this passive 
state itself is immortal, [ since it is] unreceptive to 
the opposite of what it carries. [241 But the soul is 
one living nature in energeia. 
11, 9-18: 
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COMMENTS 
We shall begin our analysis of this key text by 
showing the sequence of its principal arguments (i.e., its 
movement of thought). 
a. The ousia of soul [i.e., of World Soul and 
individual souls]8 is not a body and hence is not 
8rn the first five treatises chronologically there 
is no explicit mention of the Soul (i.e., the All Soul) as a 
separate hypostasis or level or reality. As Dominic O'Meara 
(Structures HiJrarchi ues dans la ens~e de Plotin [Leiden: 
E. J. Brill, 1975 , p. 41, hereafter: O'Meara, Structures) 
argues, prior to IV, 8 (6), there is no direct reference to 
the All Soul but only to the demiurgic World Soul and to 
individual souls. It is not until IV, 8(6), 6, 5-6; 7, 1-7 
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intrinsically involved with physical matter and becoming, 
but is a doing and·a making. This ousia is preserved to the 
extent that it participates in another and higher nature, 
namely, in the being of Nous (#1).9 
b. [ Plotinus now gives relevant data on Nous. His 
argument here and in #c below, although it applies to both 
Nous (#2, #4) and soul (#3), parallels Plato's argument 
(Phaedrus, 245c-246a) for the immortality of the soul.] 
Because there cannot be an infinity of things, each of which 
has a life that comes from another, there must be some one 
reality, namely, Nous, which is primarily self-living and 
immortal and thereby the principle of life for all the other 
lesser levels of reality. Nous preserves all other things 
through Soul. This single, primally living nature is 
(8continued) 
that Plotinus explicitly argues that the All Soul is the 
immediate source of the World Soul and of individual souls 
and that it occupies a position in the intelligible world 
while forming and ordering the sensible universe. In 
treatises prior to IV, 8(6) Plotinus seems as yet unaware of 
the All Soul as such and hence relies on Nous to perform the 
function of vivifying World Soul and individual souls. 
Some indication of this initial hierarchy (i.e., the 
One-Good, Nous, World Soul and individual souls, physical 
matter) istobe found even as early as the first treatise. 
There, in the context of Plotinus' discussion of the source 
of beauty, we learn that first there is the beauty which is 
also the Good or the One. From the One immediately comes 
Nous, Itself beautiful, which in turn gives Its beauty to 
soul (i.e., World Soul). Everything else is beautiful by 
the forming of this soul (I, 6 [l], 6, 25-32). 
9Here and throughout our study the number in 
parentheses--e.g., (#1)--will be used to refer to the 
corresponding portion of paraphrase/translation given 
earlier. 
32 
identical with all true being and as such always remains in 
its original state.of primal life and primal being and hence 
is truly divine (#2}. 
c. Soul is also the source of movement to the 
sensible uni verse and is itself self-movedl0 and has life 
from itself [since it is the logosll of Nous, which Itself 
l0c1early this argument is inspired by Plato's 
Phaedrus {245c-a} and Laws {Bk. 10; 889-a-899c}. How 
precisely Plato influences Plotinus on this point will be 
explained further in our comments below. 
llThroughout this study we shall simply 
transliterate and leave untr.anslated the difficult Greek 
word \oyo~. Although this term is not explicitly mentioned 
in the key text, we must briefly examine its meaning in 
order to make clearer the relationship of soul to Nous. 
This notion is best understood by means of two complementary 
studies, Donald Gelpi, "The Plotinian Logos Doctrine." 
Modern Schoolman 37 (1960} 301-315 {hereafter, Gelpi; see 
also Logos as a Cosmological Principle in Plotinus, M. A. 
Thesis, St. Louis University, 1958} and Gary Glirtler, S. J., 
Human Consciousness and Its Intersubjective Dimension in 
Plotinus, Ph.D. Dissertation, Fordham University, 1978, Chs. 
8-9. Hereafter, Giirtler, "Human Consciousness." 
According to Gelpi, logos functions in Plotinus' 
thought as the ontological explanation of the bi-directional 
relationship between a higher reality {the producer} and a 
lower reality { the product}. This relationship may be 
specified in a twofold fashion. First, logos denotes the 
relation of a hypostasis to its products. Logos is a kind 
of principle or formative plan within the hypostasis and 
accounts for the formation and development of all the lower 
realities which proceed from the hypostasis (see IV, 3[27], 
9-16; III, 2 [47]; III, 3 [48]; II, 3 [52], 16-17; see 
Wallis Neoplatonism, p. 689}. Second, logos denotes a 
product's relation to its producer. Specifically, an item 
is a logos insofar as it is the higher precisely as existing 
on a lower level--and thus the lower is a logos of the 
higher--because the former has become more multiple and, 
hence, less real (see I, 2 [19], 3, 27-30}. At the lowest 
level of reality a logos is that which comes upon matter and 
brings to it, among other perfections, unity, form, and 
beauty (I, 6 [l], 2, 13-24; IV, 7 [2], 2, 22-25; v, 9 [5], 
9, 9} • 
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is Primal Life because (we infer here) It is self-moved 
also]. In other words, by furnishing its own self-initiated 
movement to physical bodies soul gives them life. World 
Soul is the principle of movement of the sensible All and 
individual souls are the principles of movement of 
individual sensible beings. Soul is the first principle of 
motion for the sensible universe. But, it is Nous that is 
the ultimate first principle of all motion. As such Nous is 
a life without generation or corruption; a life that is 




d. [Next Plotinus takes up the soul in its 
. j ·O 
relation I i,;, 
to what is below it.] Even if soul were to mix with~ ~1 \ ~-
I o/' 
something worse like the body, which would be an impediment, \ v:, 
\, 
it would not destroy soul's real nature, namely, to be self-
moved, divine and to have a good and rational life, which it 
could take up again by returning within itself (#8-#10). It 
is not by looking to things outside it, but rather by 
intellectually reflecting upon itself, that the soul becomes 
(llcontinued) 
The above account of logos Gary Giirtler calls 
"extensive" because it explains the relationship of beings 
distinct from one another. In other words, it explains the 
"vertical" relationship between distinct levels of reality. 
But, Giirtler adds, from another point of view logos is 
"intensive" because it accounts for the unity-in-diversity 
needed at each level of reality. Viewed in this way, logos, 
as the principle uniting the forms constituting each 
hypostasis, explains the "horizontal" relationship among 
beings within a hypostasis. We shall have more to say about 
logos, in both its extensive and intensive aspects in Text 
C: III, 8(30). 
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purified and thereby recognizes its true nature. Thus, 
purified soul is itself an intelligible world because it 
comes from and is illuminated by, the intelligible and 
eternal region of Nous and ultimately by the true good, the 
One. Such careful examination of a soul devoid of all its 
bodily associations reveals that its very ousia is to be 
alive, immortal, and self-moved (#11-#19). 
e. The relationship between soul [i.e., World Soul 
and individual souls] and life may be compared to the 
relationship between fire and heat. As heat is always with 
fire, so life is always with soul because life follows from 
the ousia of soul just as heat follows from the ousia of 
fire. The further relationship between fire and its 
substratum ( the combustible material) is not analogous to 
soul's relation to life since in the case of any burning 
thing even the very fire itself is eventually destroyed once 
it fully consumes its substratum. Life, however, neither 
departs from, nor is ever extinguished by, its presence with 
soul (#20-#22). 
f. The soul is immortal, then, because it manifests a 
life which belongs to it intrinsically [because life is 
self-movement], just as heat intrinsically belongs to fire. 
Since life itself is an ousia, and soul has life, soul too 
must be an ousia which lives in itself. Thus, even if we 
were to suppose that life is only a passive quality which 
matter receives, this very passive quality would then be 
what is immortal and hence ousia and soul. 
is a living nature·in energeia (#23-#24). 
35 
Soul, however, 
Having presented Plotinus' movement of thought we must 
now elucidate several important issues in order to 
understand the meaning of life (z6e) in this key text: a) 
life as self-movement; b) the nature of the ousia of soul; 
c) the life of soul as praxis and poiesis; d} the precise 
relationship between soul and Nous; e) the metaphor of fire 
and heat; 
and life. 
f) the meaning of energeia in relation to soul 
a) Life as self-movement 
In text A (#3-#4) Plotinus' argument, particularly in 
respect to the life of the soul, reflects the influence of 
Plato. Let us, then, begin our comments by examining 
Phaedrus, 245c5-e6.12 
All soul is immortal; for that which is ever in motion 
is immortal. But that which while imparting motion is 
itself moved by something else can cease to be in 
motion, and therefore can cease to live; it is only that 
which moves itself that never intermits its motion, 
inasmuch as it cannot abandon its own nature; moreover 
this self-mover is the source and first principle of 
motion for all other things that are moved (245c5-9}. 
12In the Laws (Bk. 10; 889a-899c} Plato provides a 
more detailed proof of the soul's immortality. After 
explaining the nine types of physical kinesis he posits the 
motion of soul as a tenth type of kinesis and argues that 
its incorporeal self-motion is necessary for all the kinds 
of corporeal motion. In this way the Laws complements the 
Phaedrus by arguing that there must be more than one soul 
which is the cause of the corporeal or cosmic motions. 
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Plato next argues that a first principle by definition must 
be ungenerated an~ indestructible. Hence, the self-moved, 
as the first-principle of motion, cannot come to be nor 
perish. Otherwise no motion would be possible (245dl-e2). 
Plato immediately states the following: 
And now that we have seen that that which is moved by 
itself is immortal, we shall feel no scruple in 
affirming that precisely that is the essence [ousia] and 
definition · [logos] of soul, to wit self-motion. Any 
body that has an external source of motion is soulless; 
but a body deriving its motion from a source within 
itself is animate or besouled, which implies that the 
nature of soul is what has been said (245e2-6).13 
In the first section (i.e., 245c5-9) of the above 
passage, Plato argues that all souls are immortal (= ever-
13The translation I use here is by R. Hackforth 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), pp. 63-64. 
The Greek text itself is taken from Platonis Opera, Vol. 2, 
ed. John Burnet (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950). 
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living) because they are ever-moving. For motion to be 
possible there must be an ultimate cause of motion. Such a 
cause must be itself a first and independent mover. For 
only the presence of such a primal mover can explain how 
things which are not self-moved can nevertheless be in 
motion. 14 
Would it be proper here to call the soul as first 
mover an efficient cause? While it is Aristotle who is to 
be credited with the first comprehensive and explicit 
treatment of the notion of ~fficient causality, it seems 
that we can discern already in Plato's thought the concepts 
and spirit, if not the specific terminology, of Aristotle's 
theory. 1 5 The theory of (efficient) causality shows up in 
three areas of Plato's philosophy: the soul's causing its 
14A further point is noteworthy here. W. K. C. 
Guthrie (A History of Greek Philosophy [Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1975], hereafter: Guthrie, 
History, Vol. 4, pp. 420-421) points out that the doctrine 
that all motions arise from conscious awareness of an end is 
elaborated in the Laws (Book 10) and the Timaeus. "It 
brings out the importance," he notes, "for Plato of eros, to 
which he devotes so much attention in the Symposium and 
Phaedrus, for in its widest sense it is, as 'desire for the 
good' (Symposium, 204e), another name for self-motion of the 
soul and so of all motion and change in the universe." We 
shall examine further the views of Plato and Plotinus on 
~ and its relationship to z6e in Text B: VI, 9(9). 
15on this point see Guthrie, History, Vol. 4, pp. 
349-350. 
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own operations (e.g., knowing), the production of the 
sensible universe,,and the motion of material things.16 
Although the Demiurge is the most striking example of 
(efficient) causality in Plato's thought, it is not the only 
one. Indeed, there are as many (efficient) causes in the 
sensible uni verse as there are living things. The reason 
for this is that soul, whether it be the World Soul or an 
individual soul, is the self-moving cause of motion in the 
sensible world .17 Accordingly, from these considerations 
we may infer that in Plato to say that soul moves itself 
means that soul is able efficiently to cause or actually 
does efficiently cause its own activities or operations, the 
16These two latter aspects are due to the agency of 
the Craftsman or Demiurge. The working of this agent (who 
is not a soul but a subsistent intellect) are described 
principally in the Timaeus ( 28c-30b), where the Demi urge 
takes hold of the chaos of matter and molds it into a 
rational, orderly and beautiful world using the Forms as its 
model and having its own goodness as its only motive 
(Timaeus 28a-c; Philebus 26e). Furthermore, the Demiurge 
must not be viewed as simply a dramatic and fictional device 
invented by Plato to explain this very difficult issue. The 
fact that Plato speaks of the Demiurge in other dialogues 
(which themselves are not nearly as dramatic or metaphorical 
as the Timaeus) with seriousness suggests that he did posit 
it as a real being and, hence, saw it as a genuine efficient 
cause of the sensible universe (see, for example, Republic, 
Book 6, 507c and Book 7, 530a; Sophist 265c; Statesman 270a; 
273a-b). Helpful discussion of this point is provided by W. 
D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1951), hereafter: Ross, Ideas, pp. 127-128; J. B. Skemp, 
The Theory of Motion in Plato's Later Dialogues (Cambridge: 
University Press, 1942), hereafter, Skemp, Motion, pp. 67-
69. 
l7see, for example, Laws, Book 10, 894e-895a. 
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primary and most proper of which is the intellection of the 
Forms. 18 
Moreover, what moves itself ( heauto kinoun) must be 
ever-moving and, hence, ever-living since it is not reliant 
on anything else to cause its motion and life. If it was 
moved by, or alive because of, another it would come into 
being and pass out of being (and thereby would be dependent 
on another) and could not be a first principle. 
Consequently, as Plato notes in the second section (i.e., 
245e2-6) of the above passage, because what moves itself is 
ever-living, the very ousial9 and logos20 of soul are 
self-kinesis. 
18That intellection is soul's proper and, 
highest activity is a point made frequently by 
especially in Phaedrus 24 7b-24 8b; Republic, Book 4, 






l9The term ousia, whose multifaceted Aristotelian 
meaning and usage we shall examine later in our comments, 
seems to have had no precise philosophical sense in Plato's 
time. Joseph Owens suggests that before Aristotle this term 
was vague and applicable to every type of Being and 
Becoming. In Aristotle it takes on one precise meaning 
after another. These meanings are not drawn out of any 
preconceived notion designated by the word, but develop 
successively as the various things denoted by the term 
are studied. 
(The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, 3rd 
ed., [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 
1978], hereafter: Owens, Being, pp. 151-152). 
More specifically, Plato seems to use the terms ousia 
and on synonymously (see, for example, Freidrich Ast, 
Lexicon Platonicum [Berlin: H. Barsdorf, 1908], Vol. 2, pp. 
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Now let us make clear how Plotinus incorporates this 
Platonic argumentation into text A. Plotinus' presentation 
(#1-#7) is a more difficult and complex version of Plato's 
basic argument that life and movement in the sensible world 
depend on the life and self-motion of the soul. Plotinus' 
text here (especially #3-#4), however, is not without its 
exegetical difficulties. Specifically, it is at first 
difficult to determine whether the phrase "one primally 
living nature, necessarily indestructible and immortal" 
(19continued) 
491-493 and Leonard Brandwood, Word Index of Plato [Leeds: 
w. S. Maney and Son, 1976], p. 679). According to Owens, 
Plato uses ousia in the Timaeus (35b; 37a) and in the 
Philebus (26d; 27d; 53c; 54a-c) to denote the term of the 
process of generation, and hence the term takes on the 
notion of a completely developed Being (Owens, Being, n. 62, 
p. 151). See also R. G. Bury, The Philebus of Plato 
(Cambridge: University Press, 1897), pp. 210-211; D. 
Peipers, Ontologia Platonica. Ad Notionum Terminorumque 
Historiam Symbola (Leipzig: Teubner, 1883), pp. 88ff; G. R. 
G. Mure, Aristotle (London: E. Benn, 1932), p. 60. We shall 
take ousia to mean, for Plato, simply "what anything is" 
(Phaedo, 65d; 92d; see also Cratylus, 386d-e), the true 
essence of anything, or that which the mind seeks without 
the aid of the senses (Cratylus, 186a-b). 
20Although the term logos has a variety of meanings 
in Plato ( see Theaetetus, 20lc-210b), the most apt 
translation of this term in the present context is 
"definition" (i.e., the explicit statement of the meaning of 
a particular reality). In other contexts logos may mean 
either 1) "word" or "speech" (i.e., the mirroring of thought 
in speech), or 2) enumeration of the elements or parts of a 
thing. Helpful examination of Plato's use of this term is 
to be found in F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1935), pp. 143-163 and 
Paul Shorey, What Plato Said (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1933), pp. 285-286. 
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refers to Nous, to soul or to both. 21 The resolution of 
this ambiguity is, suggested in our movement of thought, 
where (#c) we note that Nous and soul (i.e., World Soul and 
individual souls) are related to one another as ultimate 
cause of motion and life to proximate cause of motion and 
life. More precisely, the soul is in this text (as it is in 
Plotinus' thought in general) subordinate to Nous, insofar 
as it is a logos of Nous, that is, soul is Nous on a lower, 
more multiple level of reality. As such soul is the vehicle 
by which Nous animates and constitutes the sensible 
world.2 2 Thus, we may understand that both soul and Nous 
are referred to in #3-#4 but in a specific relation to one 
another, as lower reality (soul) to higher reality (Nous), 
2lwe have already seen that Plotinus seems to show 
no awareness of the All Soul (but only of the World Soul and 
of individual souls) prior to the sixth treatise 
chronologically (IV, 8). In fact, even when the All Soul is 
explicitly mentioned it is still sometimes difficult to 
distinguish it from Nous or from the World Soul. This 
difficulty in Plotin~s discussed at length by Henry 
Blumenthal, both in "Soul, World-Soul and Individual Soul in 
Plotinus," Le n~o-platonisme. Actes du Collogue de 
Royaumont 9-13 Juin 1969 (Paris: Ed. du CNRS, 1971), 55-63 
and in "Nous and Soul in Plotinus: Some Problems of 
Demarcation,il Atti del Convegno Internazionale sul Terna: 
Plotino e il Neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente (Rome: 
Accademia Nazionale Dei Lincei, 1974), 204-219. Hereafter, 
Blumenthal, "Soul" and Blumenthal, "Nous," respectively. 
22It is possible that section#4 of the key text 
refers to Nous. However, given our understanding of logos 
in Plotinus' system, it is more likely because more 
illuminating that both Nous and soul are meant here. The 
relationship of soul to Nous, insofar as it is taken up in 
this key text, is explicated in a later segment of our 
comments. 
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in which the former is the channel through which the latter 
works in animating.and constituting the sensible world. 
Plotinus' argument here, though somewhat terse and 
initially opaque, contains implicitly very important 
information on the nature of life. 23 Making this 
argumentation more explicit will reveal at once how Plotinus 
is indebted to Plato and yet transcends him. 
Plotinus' comments on the nature of soul 
(specifically, the World Soul and every individual soul, as 
each is a logos of Nous and the channel through which Nous 
animates and orders the sensible universe) indicate that 
there is life where there is self-motion and that life is 
intellection.24 
With this understanding of the close association of 
self-motion with life, it becomes clear that in text A 
Plotinus both follows Plato and transcends him. He follows 
Plato in his argument on the necessity of soul and by 
accepting his definition of intellection as a kind of 
23Although his argument here touches on the life of 
N2B.§ it seems principally to be concerned with explaining 
the life and irnrnortali ty of soul. Accordingly, we shall 
defer until our next key text (VI, 9 [9], which concentrates 
on life as the energeia of Nous) a full and complete 
discussion of the life of Nous. 
24Accordingly, if soul is life by 
self-motion, which is intellection, we may 
later key texts (III, 8 [30] and VI, 7 [38]) 
affirm, namely, that the life of a higher 
~, of which soul is a logos) is even more 
even more closely linked with intellection. 
virtue of its 





kinesis -- the self-motion of the soul. He transcends Plato 
by describing th~ life and self-movement of soul as 
subordinate to, because a logos of, another and higher 
reality (i.e., Nous). Suffice it for us to say here, then, 
that for Plotinus in text A, to be life is to be self-motion 
and noesis. Hence, as we ascend to greater and greater 
levels of intellection we may expect to find greater and 
greater levels of self-motion and life.25 
b) The nature of the ousia of soul 
Plotinus sets up his own, Platonically inspired 
treatment of soul after dismissing as incorrect the 
Aristotelian definition of soul as the entelecheia of the 
body (Ch. as, lines 1-43).26 For Plotinus soul is an 
25This central theme will be developed in various 
ways in subsequent key texts. For example, in VI, 9 (9) we 
will see that because the One is beyond kinesis It is 
therefore beyond life, intellection and being. In III, 8 
( 30) kinesis will be implied in Plotinus' argument that 
since there are degrees of intellection there are degrees of 
life. Moreover, kinesis will relate to the way in which 
Plotinus explains how contemplation is productive, both as a 
praxis and a poiesis, on all levels of reality. In VI, 7 
(38) we will see kinesis to be important in Plotinus' 
explanation of the production of Nous, particularly in 
regard to how Nous as intellection is Primal Life, which is 
productive of the plurality of Forms. In III, 7 (45) 
Plotinus will employ kinesis to explain how the life of Nous 
is distinguishable from the life of Soul: the former is a 
kinesis which is eternity, the latter is a kinesis which is 
time. Finally, in I, 4 (46) kinesis will be implied in 
Plotinus' explanation of human moral conduct as the result 
of the human soul's correct intellection of truth and 
virtue. 
26Briefly, Plotinus' arguments against Aristotle 
Anima Bk. I, Chs. 4-5 and Bk. II, Ch. 3) are as follows: 





existent which is intrinsically independent of physical 
matter and as such, is a genuine ousia (#1). But what is an 
ousia? Although often translated as "substance," this term 
is more properly translated as "entity," since "substance" 
applies to only one, relatively restricted sense of ousia in 
Aristotle, to whom we now turn for an initial definition of 
ousia. Ousia as an ontological term may ref er either to 
that which is reality or being, to the component which 
causes reality or being as act, or to the component which 
causes reality or being as potency.27 
(26continued) 
corresponding part of the soul (lines 7-9); b) the theory 
could not explain sleep (lines 9-11); c) nor the opposition 
of reason and desire (lines 12-14); d) nor the existence of 
thought independent of the body (lines 14-18); e) nor the 
preservation of images independent from sensible things 
(lines 19-23); f) nor the direction of desire towards a 
noncorporeal object (lines 23-25); g) nor the propagation 
of the vegetative soul of one plant by another (lines 25-
35); h) in addition, the soul itself would be divisible, 
since it is the entelecheia of the body, which itself is 
divisible ( lines 35-38); i) finally, the theory does not 
explain how some animals change themselves into other 
animals (lines 38-43). 
Br~hier notes that Aristotle was himself aware of some 
of these difficulties, especially #d and #i (EnnJades, Vol. 
IV, "Notice," p. 184). It is also noteworthy that even at 
this early stage of his writing Plotinus utilizes his 
predecessors effectively and always for his own purposes, 
even to the point of turning their own arguments against 
them. 
27For Aristotle ousia signifies being per se or in 
the primary sense, where it has a logical as well as an 
ontological usage. As a logical term ousia refers to the 
subject of predication, and this in a primary sense: the 
individual thing (tode ti) which is the subject of a 
proposition; or, in a secondary sense, the genus or species 
predicated of a thing. As an ontological term ousia must be 
considered in three senses. Primal or original ousia is 
45 
Plotinus follows this Aristotelian definition only 
partially since in.his system not all reality involves being 
or entity. His metaphysics, in short, is not an ontology 
(where to be real is to be) but a henology (where to be real 
is to be ~>- 28 Since reality for Plotinus involves 
primarily unity and not being, ousia has a limited 
(27continued) 
that which is reality or being: the individual thing itself 
(tode ti) orthe Unmoved Movers (Separate Intelligences) of 
the Metaphysics. Primary ousia is that which causes reality 
or being as act: the substantial form energeia or 
entelecheia and to ti en einai and accidental form. 
Secondary ousia is that which causes reality as potency 
precisely insofar as it receives primary ousia. It is 
either primary matter (with respect to substantial form) or 
substance (with respect to accidental forms). Secondary 
ousia is so called only through extrinsic denomination --
i.e., because it is a real component of a primal entity 
(Categories, Ch. 5: Metaphysics, Bk. V, Chs. 7-8: Bk. VII, 
Chs. 1-6, 17: Bk. VIII, Chs. 1-2, Bk. IX, Chs. 6-10). 
I am indebted to Leo Sweeney, S. J., who provided much 
valuable information on these various meanings of ousia. 
Helpful discussions of these points may also be found in 
OWens, Being, pp. 137-154 and in his article, "Aristotle on 
Categories," Review of Metaphysics, 14 (1960), pp. 73-90. 
Other valuable sources are G. A. Blair, "Meaning· of 
'Energeia' and 'Entelecheia' in Aristotle," International 
Philosophical Quarterly, 7 (1967), pp. 101-117 and L. M. 
DeRi jk, The Place of Categories of Being in Aristotle's 
Philoso~hy (Assen: van Gorcum, 1952). 
2 For helpful discussion of this and related points 
see Sweeney, "Principles," pp. 506-516. Also consult E. 
Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical 
Institute of Medieval Studies, 1952) pp. 2lff: Cleto 
Carbonara, La Filosofia di Plotino (Napoli: Libreria 
Scientifica Editrice, 1954), pp. 400-409: Br~hier, Plotinus, 
Ch. VIII, pp. 132ff: Jean Trouillard, "Un et fttre," in Les 
Etudes Philosophigues 2 (1960) 185-196. 
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application insofar as beings {ousiai) make up only part of 
reality. 29 
In his earliest treatises 30 Plotinus provides us 
with a somewhat limited view of the ousia of soul. Soul is 
a logos and is related to, and comes from, a higher reality, 
Nous. 31 In general, it is that reality which links the -
higher {and intelligible) level of Nous with the lower {and 
sensible) level of the material world.32 
More specifically, soul is a one33 and a many.34 
There is one soul, namely, the World Sou1,35 which 
functions as a demiurge and makes the sensible world into 
one enormous living organism.36 There are also many 
29Being involves form and determinateness. The One, 
however, is pure unity {thereby without form or 
determination) and, hence, beyond being. Being, then, 
occupies only a part of reality. Furthermore, since 
ultimate reality is unity, any deviation from unity {i.e., 
any involvement in multiplicity) is likewise a step towards 
unreality. Plotinus makes this and related points in the 
following texts: VI, 9 (9), l; V, 5 (11), 5. 
30we shall confine our research here to the first 
five treatises {as ordered chronologically by Porphyry). 
31I, 6 (1), 6, 25-32. 
32I, 6 (1), 1, 1-6; 2, 1-11; 4, 1-4; 5, 48-50; 6, 
13-15 and 40-41. See also O'Meara, Structures, pp. 33-34, 
40. 
3 3 IV, 7 { 2 ) , 12 , 13-14 • 
3 4 IV , 2 { 4 ) , 2 • 
35Iv, 7 (2), 13, 9-20; III, 1 (3), 8; v, 9 (5), 6; 
14. 
36p1otinus' description of the World 
part" as Nature indicates that World Soul 
lower and higher parts {V, 9 [5], 6; 14). 
{ 6 ) , 3 and V , 2 { 11 ) , 1 • 
Soul ' s "lower 
is made up of 
See also IV, 8 
An individual human soul 
In IV, 7 (2), 14 and III, 
Elsewhere and later {e.g., IV, 
likewise is made up of parts. 
1 (3), 8 it is tripartite. 
3 [27], 7 and II, 1 [40], 5) 
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individual souls, each of which comes from the same source 
(i.e., from World.Soul and, ultimately, from Nous}, has a 
life of its own, is incorporeal, indivisible, and an 
ousia. 37 These souls animate the individual existents in 
the sensible world. 38 In this way both World Soul and 
individual souls of necessity lead a double life, so to 
speak, partly in the intelligible realm and partly in the 
sensible realm.39 The level of reality which soul 
occupies, then, expresses both its intelligible nature 
(since it comes from Nous} and its causal and demiurgic 
function with respect to the sensible ( since it forms and 
vivifies physical matter}. In general, the ousia of World 
Soul and of individual souls may be described in a twofold 
way. First, it belongs to the intelligible nature and to 
the divine order (tes theias moiras). 4 0 Second, it is the 
demiurge of the sensible universe.41 
Reflection on the above remarks yields the fallowing 
more specific formulation of soul's ousia. Since every 
ousia qua ousia is an image of Nous, Soul (because it is an 
ousia} is an image of Nous in all Its respects including 
( 36continued} 
it is made up of only two parts. See Rist, The Road to 
Realit~ 1 p. 85, n. 6 for helpful discussion of this point. 
IV, 7 (2), 14. 
38III, 1 (3), 8. 
3 9 IV, 7 ( 2 } , 13. 
4 0 IV , 1 ( 21 } , 1 , 5 • 
41 I , 6 ( 1 } , 6 , 2 9 - 31 ; IV , 7 ( 2 } , 2 , 2 2 - 2 5 ; V , 9 ( 5 } , 
2, 15-18; 3, 26-36. 
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~ergeia, self-kinesis, noesis and life. In each case, 
then, (whether it .is the World Soul or an individual soul), 
the ousia of soul consists of at least the following: a) a 
natural tendency to govern, form and thereby vivify physical 
matter; b) a genuine relationship to Nous as Its image and 
logos; and c) an intrinsic possession of life and, hence, 
immortality because life is self-motion. 
c) The life of soul as praxis and poiesis 
The fuller meaning of soul's natural tendency to 
govern, form and thereby v~vify physical matter may be 
explained in terms of praxis and poiesis (#1). Two 
questions present themselves on this issue: what do praxis 
and poiesis mean in these early treatises and what is their 
application to life and soul? 
In I, 6 ( 1) World Soul is described as that which 
makes (poiei) bodies beautiful by forming or shaping them 
(rnorphouseis). In fact, it makes ( poiei ) everything it 
grasps and masters beautiful, as far as each thing is 
capable of participation (metalabein).42 In IV, 7 { 2) 
World Soul is that which makes (poiei) contraries in one and 
the same thing (e.g., a living thing is part solid and part 
liquid, partly dark and partly light, etc.).43 
Furthermore, World Soul is eager to make (poiein 
42I, 6 (1), 6, 27-32. 
43Iv, 6 (2), 4, 29-34. 
49 
speudei) and to be a demiurge (demiurgoi) and this explains 
the zeal with whiGh it stretches towards the sensible. It 
is this eagerness to stretch towards physical matter that 
characterizes one of the World Soul's two aspects. Though 
linked with Nous as Its image and logos the World Soul 
nevertheless inevitably turns outward and downward and adds 
the sensible universe to its concern.44 
In what sense, then, is the World Soul both a praxis 
and a poiesis? It is a praxis (a doing or acting) insofar 
as it inevitably looks to what is below it (i.e., physical 
matter, ultimately, which the World Soul forms and 
administers). As far as the nature of the World Soul is 
concerned this praxis is a natural and inevitable one. It 
is also, however, a turning away from unity towards 
multiplicity and hence unreality. It would seem, then, to 
be better for World Soul if this praxis never took place, if 
it did not "act" in this way or "do" this sort of thing. 
The World Soul, however, is not simply a praxis but 
also is a poiesis ( a making or production) as well. It 
behaves in a manner proper to its nature, namely, by being 
demiurgically related to, and thereby producing, ordering, 
and governing, what is below it. Its demiurgic function (or 
poiesis) ameliorates its turning towards multiplicity ( or 
44Iv, 7 (2), 13, 8-13. See also VI, 9 (9), 1, 17-
20, where soul as demiurge is that which imparts unity to 
all things by fashioning, forming and ordering them. 
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£raxis) by showing that the World Soul's very nature is to 
be productive and is thus something quite positive, since it 
imparts unity, intelligibility, and reality to that which 
has none of itself, the sensible world. 
When dealing with an individual soul Plotinus seems to 
distinguish praxis and poiesis much less clearly. For him, 
active souls, insofar as they act by making according to 
correct logoi, act of themselves whenever they do, in fact, 
act, but in everything else they are hindered in their own 
action and are passive rather than active. 45 Both action 
and making, praxis and poiesis, seem to be proper and 
natural manifestations of the individual soul's life as a 
self-kinesis provided they are carried out properly (i.e., 
in conformity with Nous). 
Obviously, the distinction between praxis and poiesis 
in the early treatises is not easily discerned because it is 
not yet fully developed here.46 The classic dictionary 
45III, 1 (3), 10, 4-7. 
46In later treatises, especially III, 8 ( 30), 2-4, 
the terms po1es1s and praxis are more fully developed. 
There they are used to describe two kinds of results in the 
sensible world. These can be actions or "makings," which 
occur either by knowledge or contemplation of the true 
realities (poiesis) or by physical production of sensible 
things (praxis). For further details on this distinction 
see Deck, Contemplation, pp. 93-209. We shall have more to 
say on this topic in text C: III, 8 (30). 
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distinction4 7 between these terms seems to be ignored or 
at least de-empha&ized ( or perhaps blurred) to the extent 
that both terms seem to refer to World Soul's (or to an 
individual soul's) relationship to what is below it. We 
can, however, venture the following additional analysis 
here. As we shall only discover in a later key text (III, 8 
[ 30]), praxis and poiesis are kinds of contemplation or 
intellection. We have already seen in our first area of 
commentary that intellection is kinesis. Praxis and 
poiesis, then, are further ways of expressing how soul is a 
self-motion and a life. Specifically, a living being's 
praxis is any self-originated and self-caused doing or 
acting and its poiesis is any self-originated and self-
caused making or production. 
d) The precise relationship between soul and Nous 
Even in these early treatises, the World Soul's ousia 
is described as both active and productive of lower and, 
therefore, less unified reality. World Soul is also 
intimately related to its immediate source, Nous. Let us 
47The Liddell-Scott Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1968) defines praxis as "a doing ... an 
acting .•. action ..• exercise" (p. 1459) and poiesis as "a 
making ••• fabrication •.• production" which is opposed to 
praxis (p. 1429). We learn there also that poiesis is 
derived from poieo, which is used, curiously enough, in two 
general senses: "to make" and "to do" (pp. 1427-9). 
Likewise, J. H. Sleeman and Gilbert Pollet in Lexicon 
Plotinianum (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1980) define praxis as 
"action" (column 888) and poiesis as "creation, production, 
doing, action" (column 861). 
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now examine the precise nature of this relationship. 
specifically, we a.re concerned with how World Soul (or any 
soul for that matter) can be said to have life of itself 
when it comes from and depends upon Nous, which also has 
life of itself. 
Nous is identical with true ousia and comes from the 
one, who is above being.48 In addition to generating 
world Soul and individual souls, Nous generates the sensible 
universe. 49 One way to view the relationship of Nous to 
world Soul is in terms of the function each has. in the 
sensible uni verse. Nous, through the World Soul, is the 
maker and demi urge of the uni verse. While the World Soul 
imparts form and pattern upon the basic elements (i.e., air, 
earth, fire, water) in the universe, Nous provides to World 
Soul the logoi according to which this forming or patterning 
is to take place. 50 Nous, while remaining with 
intellectual being (i.e., the Forms) and living the purely 
intellective life, works through World Soul by providing it 
with the archetype and model according to which it will 
produce and inform the sensible universe.51 
48v, 9 (5), 3, 1-4. Later, in v, 4 (7), 1, 9-10 
Plotinus uses Plato's phrase epekeina ousias (Republic VI, 
509b9) to describe the One/Good as beyond ousia. This also 
seems to suggest that the level of reality immediately below 
the One/Good, namely, Nous is genuine ousia itself. 
49 --v, 9 (5), 9, 3-14. 
5 Ov, 9 ( 5 ) , 3, 2 4-3 5. 
51 I , 6 ( 1 ) , 6 ; 9 ; IV , 7 ( 2 ) , 2 ; 13 • 
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Plotinus describes an individual soul's relationship 
to Nous in these. early treatises in moral and aesthetic 
terms. 
soul? 
For example, what is the worst state for the human 
One in which it has become ugly (i.e., dissolute, 
unjust, lustful, cowardly, jealous, etc.) by thinking mean 
and mortal thoughts and by living a life of bodily 
sensations and pleasures.52 The human soul's ugliness and 
hence its poor life is identical with its inclination to the 
material body it animates and the material world it 
inhabits. 53 Its purificatiqn and subsequent beauty, on 
the other hand, are identical with its becoming bodiless, 
intellectual ( noera), and thereby wholly di vine. 54 Only 
by becoming form and logos does soul achieve unification 
with Nous (#14-17). Only then is it truly sou1.55 
Such is the source of the human soul's genuine life: 
unification with Nous. Only when the human soul is raised 
to the level of Nous (by turning from the sensible outside, 
to the intelligible inside itself) does it increase in 
beauty and enjoy true life.56 What exactly does this 
mean? The human soul, when raised to Nous, will view 
(eisetai) the Forms (ta eide), through which all else is 
52 1 , 6 ( 1 ) , 5, 25-31. 
531 6 (1), 5, 48-50. 
54 ' 6 (1), 6, 13-18. I, 
551 , 6 (1), 6-9. 
561 , 6 ( 1 ) , 6. 
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beautiful by means of the products and ousia of Nous.57 
It will be united with Nous and will see what Nous sees and 
thereby truly live. 
In these early treatises we see that the ousia of Nous 
is genuine and primal because it is identical with Nous' 
union with Its content, the Forms. This union occurs 
through contemplation, which is life on the level of Nous. 
In Nous this union is not merely intimate but also 
entitative. 58 Specifically, Nous lives by looking at the 
One and having present to itself a multiplicity of Forms, 
which are the One precisely as Nous and as Nous is able to 
apprehend and understand It. World Soul and individual 
souls live by looking to Nous and, more specifically, by 
looking to the Forms within Nous. 59 Each soul lives by 
seeing itself in Nous and thus is dependent on Nous. Each 
soul's life is its own, however, because each soul is Nous 
57I, 6 (1), 9. 
58I, 6 (1), 9, 37. 
59p1otinus commonly makes use of the metaphor of 
vision as a way of expressing the indeterminate active power 
(dynamis) as the first moment of every hypostasis. See, 
for example, I 6 (1), 7, 2-12; VI, 9 (9), 4, 16-29; 9, 46-
56; 10, 4-14; v, 1 (10), 6, 41-48. 
This "looking" will also be described as contemplation 
(IV, 8 [6], 3, 21-31). Deck (Contemplation, p. 4) notes 
that outside of III, 8 (30) contemplation explicitly as 
such, designated by the nouns theoria, and the cognate thea, 
and expressed by the verb theorein, "contemplate," is 
mentioned only occasionally. There is a discussion of 
contemplation in Nous in v, 3 (49), 5 which parallels that 
of III, 8 ( 30) and a fairly extensive treatment of the 
"contemplation" of the One by the "individual" soul in VI, 9 
(9), 11. 
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on a lower level of reality and thus lives not as Nous does 
but precisely as soul. 
The items that issue from the One, then, are in a way 
all part of a single living continuum. Each level of 
reality is a part of this continuum but also holds its own 
proper place in it. Each part is continuous with the rest 
insofar as it receives the influence and power of the higher 
(by being a logos and thereby actually being the higher on a 
lower level) • 
The difficulty in explaining soul's life, then, lies 
in the fact that each level of reality in Plotinus's system 
has a significance and a nature of its own but (except for 
the highest level, the One) cannot explain itself fully 
without reference to what is above and superior to it. 
At this point in our study the following conclusions 
about the life of soul, whether it is the World Soul or an 
individual soul, seem justified. Once it is produced by 
Nous each soul has a life of its own and is self-living 
because each soul images Nous by being a self-kinesis, a 
noesis, an ousia, and energeia. Thus, in order to live 
fully and well each soul must rely on Nous, to which it is 
entitatively and monistically related. In other words, soul 
is a logos of Nous. 
logically distinct 
As such, soul participates in various 
perfections which characterize Nous: 
ousia, life, energeia, noesis, and especially, self-kinesis. 
And this is to say that soul is self-kinesis and thereby 
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life because self-kinesis constitutes life. 
e) The metaphor of fire and heat 
Perhaps another way of understanding the relationship 
between World Soul (or an individual soul) and life is to 
see it as analogous to the relationship between fire and 
heat (#20-#21). 60 This metaphor, among others, is often 
used by Plotinus to describe the way in which Nous proceeds 
60Although fire is discussed by many of the 
Presocratics (e.g., Anaximander, Anaximenes, the 
Pythagoreans, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and the Atomists), it 
functions most prominently in the system of Heraclitus. 
There it is the primary cosmic constituent: the archetypal 
form of matter. The world order as a whole can be described 
as a fire, portions of which are being extinguished while 
other portions are being rekindled. It always has been and 
always will be in this condition. See Kathleen Freeman, 
trans., Ancilla to the Presocratic Philosophers, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1970), fragments #30-31, pp. 26-
27. 
G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, in The Presocratic 
Philosophers (Cambridge: University Press, 1960), pp. 199-
201, point out that the pure cosmic fire was probably 
identified by Heraclitus with aither, the bright fiery stuff 
which fills the luminous sky and surrounds the world. This 
aither was widely regarded both as divine and as a place of 
souls (see, for example, Aristotle, De Caelo, Bk. 1, Ch. 12, 
line 284all). However, even the lower and mundane sort of 
fire, since it consumes fuel and emits smoke with such 
regularity, embodies the rule of measure in change which is 
found in the world process. Hence, it is naturally thought 
of as the very constituent of things which actively 
determines their structure and activity. 
Fire also plays a fundamental role in Stoic thought, 
especially in their physics. There it is seen as "the hot" 
-- the element with the most active dynamis. Fire is also 
strongly linked with life (Stoicorum Veterum Fra enta, 
[hereafter: SVF] ed. H. von Arnim Stuttgart, 1964 , II, 23) 
insofar as the principle of life, both in individuals and in 
the cosmos as a whole, is a kind of intelligent, fiery 
breath (SVF, II, 787). 
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from the One.61 What concerns us here, however, is not so 
much the particulaf context in which the discussion of fire 
and heat takes place as the information to be gained 
regarding the relationship of fire and heat itself. 
What is fire? For Plotinus it is the most beautiful, 
subtlest, and finest of bodies, and thus has the rank of 
form (eidos) in relation to the other elements. Though not 
admitting anything else into itself, it warms 
everything. 62 Fire has impulses (i.e., to give off heat), 
as does everything else which is subject to its structure 
and which moves according to it.63 
These "impulses" may be explained further in terms of 
energeia. Plotinus' understanding of this term here may be 
summarized in this way. If a component in a mixture loses 
its einai (i.e., what it is and should be), then it is no 
longer in act or in energeia. Energeia, since linked with 
einai, denotes a determinate nature or entity (ousia) which 
is in act.64 
Thus, there is in every thing both the energeia of its 
ousia and the energeia which goes out from its ousia. The 
first energeia is the thing itself, while the second 
energeia is what necessarily follows from the first and is 
61v, 1 (10), 6, 34-37. 
62r, 6 (1), 3, 19-26. 
63rrr, 1 (3), 7, 20-21. 
64rv, 7 (2), a2, 1-5. 
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in this sense distinct from the thing itself. In fire, 
then, there is the, heat which is one with its ousia and the 
heat which goes out from the fire by virtue of the fact that 
the fire, while remaining unchangeably what it is, operates 
(energountos) according to its ousia.65 
Fire, then, both possesses heat intrinsically (because 
heat is its ousia) and also gives off heat to other things 
(because heat is also its energeia). In fact, the energeia 
of fire is to fire in the same way that the content of Nous' 
thought is to Nous itself. 66 In this way life belongs to 
World Soul and to individual souls. Each soul possesses 
life intrinsically (because life is soul's ousia) and also 
animates what is non-living (because life is also soul's 
energeia). 
f) The meaning of energeia in relation to soul and life 
As seen, the explanation of the relationship between 
fire and heat involved reference to energeia. A full 
explanation of soul's relationship to life in Plotinus' 
early treatises likewise involves energeia. For Plotinus 
soul is alive and immortal because it has life as part of 
its very ousia. Soul is neither material (#21)67 nor is 
65v, 4 (7), 2, 27-33. See also v, 1 (10), 3, 10. 
66v, 9 (5), 8, 11-15. 
67Iv, 7 (2), 2-82. In his criticism of the Stoic 
position on the human soul Plotinus utilizes several 
traditional Aristotelian lines of argument, a thorough 
account of which is found in Br~hier, Enneades, Vol. 4, 
"Notice," pp. 179-181. Briefly, Plotinus' arguments in IV, 
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its life a mere condition imposed upon matter (#23).68 On 
the contrary, the . soul is a single nature which .lives in 
energeia (#24). 
c67continued) 
7 are as follows. a) The soul cannot be a simple body, 
since the four known elements and even the fifth added by 
Aristotle do not possess life in themselves. It cannot be a 
combination of simple bodies either, for if these were mixed 
together accidentally the result would not have life. Even 
if these were mixed together in some regular and orderly 
way, the cause of this regularity and order, and not the 
simple bodies themselves, would be the soul. Finally, the 
soul is not a combination of simple bodies in the way that 
the Atomists maintain, since there is no prevailing sympathy 
between the bodies ( Chs. 2-3 ) • b) Since, as the Stoics 
admit, each elementary body is composed of matter and form, 
if the soul is an elementary body like pneuma, then it 
cannot be in virtue of its matter, which is without quality, 
but must be in virtue of its form. Furthermore, soul must 
be an intelligent pneuma or fire (Ch. 4, lines 1-15). c) 
The soul cannot be a simple body because the effects of a 
simple body are themselves simple (Ch. 4, line 16; Ch. 5, 
line 7). d) One of soul's functions is to make the body 
grow. But a body can only make another body grow by growing 
itself. However, if the soul is a body and in growing must 
acquire other bodies, how will it preserve its identity and 
its memory? (Ch. s, lines 7-24). e) The soul is found 
complete in each part of the body (in generation where the 
same seed produces two offspring, soul is complete in each 
of them). But something in which a part is identical to the 
whole must by nature transcend quantity and matter (Ch. 5, 
lines 24-52). f) If the soul is a body, one cannot explain 
perception, memory, sensation of pain, thought, and the 
virtues ( Chs. 6-Bl). g) If the soul is a body, and the 
union of body and soul would result in soul's disappearance 
in the resultant mixture (Ch. 82). h) The origin of soul 
is inexplicable, since the more perfect cannot spontaneously 
issue from the less perfect. (Ch. a3). 
68p1otinus rejects the argument that life is a 
passive quality or condition imposed on matter. Even if 
this argument were true, he argues, the source of this 
quality or condition must necessarily be immortal and hence 
be soul, if an infinite regress is to be avoided. This 
argument closely parallels one presented by Simmias in the 
Phaedo, namely, that the soul is a harmony (Phaedo, 8.Sc-88e~ 
92a-9Sa). Here Simmias states the theory as a potential 
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How does Plotinus understand energeia?69 As we 
stated previously_, , a component which loses its einai (i.e., 
c68continued) 
objection to the view that the soul and the body are two 
distinct entities. One may describe the "harmony" (i.e., 
the being-in-tune) of a lyre in various ways -- that it is 
invisible, incorporeal, noble, and divine. All of these are 
also attributes of soul. But, even if it has all these 
characteristics, the harmony of a lyre cannot survive the 
destruction of·the lyre itself. Hence the question: "Is it 
not possible, and perhaps even reasonable, to maintain that 
the soul is merely the blending, adjustment, or harmony of 
the bodily elements?" If it is such, how can it survive the 
destruction of that of which it was the harmony? 
Plotinus answers with several criticisms, the most 
notable of which are as follows. First, soul is something 
prior; harmony is clearly something secondary or posterior. 
The plausibility of the theory of recollection ( that the 
soul must have preexisted in order to be able to remember 
general terms in this life) demands this priority (IV, 7 
[2J, a 4 , 11-12>. 
Second, the soul rules, guides, and occasionally 
conflicts with the body. If there are two distinct and 
often conflicting springs of action in man, it is obvious 
that he is a union of two distinct entities, body and soul, 
each having a distinct nature, pulling him in different 
directions. A body is something with a definite nature, so 
that once animated it will exert a pull in a definite 
direction. Since there is also a pull in a contrary 
direction it is inconceivable that the soul is no more than 
the activity of the body; it must be something whose 
distinct nature is the origin of the contrary pull. (IV, 7 
[2], a4, 12-13). 
Third, the soul is an ousia and harmony is not (IV, 7 
[ 2], a4, 14). Fourth, if the mixture of bodies of which 
our body is composed is regulated by any sort of conformity 
or harmony, this is nothing more than heal th (IV, 7 [ 2], 
a4, 14-16). Finally, it is necessary that the soul which 
is a harmony have another soul, in order to account for the 
production of the harmony in the first place. This is 
obvious in the case of musical instruments, which require a 
musician to produce the harmony in their strings (IV, 7 [2], 
a 4 , 16ff). 
69My comments on energeia rely considerably on 
Curtis L. Hancock, Energeia in the Enneads of Plotinus: A 
Reaction to Plato and Aristotle (Ph.D. Dissertation: Loyola 
University of Chicago, 1985). Hereafter, Hancock, Energeia. 
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what it is and should be) is thereby no longer in act or in 
energeia. Energeia, since it is linked in this way with 
einai, denotes a determinate nature or entity (i.e., 
ousia). 79 
Furthermore, energeia justifies one of Plotinus' most 
basic realizations, namely, that something lower in reality 
and perfection is dependent on that which is already 
perfected (i.e., has its own nature or einai). This 
priority he explains in terms of the relationship of act 
(energeia) to potency (dynamis).71 Since energeia denotes 
7 0 IV, 7 ( 2 ) , 8 2 , 1-5 • 
71In his criticism of the materialist thesis of the 
Stoics Plotinus points out that they misunderstand the 
nature of cause and effect. For Plotinus a product cannot 
have greater perfection than that which produced it. To 
deny this fact is to deny the truth of one of the most basic 
principles of his thought, namely, that what is prior is of 
greater reality and perfection than that which is subsequent 
(IV, 7 [2], a3, 7-25; V, 9 [5], 9). 
In his criticism of the Stoics Plotinus expresses this 
basic principle in terms of energeia and dynamis. Whatever 
is in potency (i.e., is capable of being produced) requires 
something in act (i.e., something which is already real) to 
produce it (i.e., to bring it into act). 
This formulation follows Aristotle's Metaphysics IX, 
8, where he points out several ways in which energeia is 
prior to dynamis. It is prior both logically, since "being 
capable of something" is more complex than "being 
something," and ontologically, since something is in potency 
only if it can become something in act and this it can do 
only if there is something else already in act (i.e., 
something already real) to bring it to act. 
The priority of act to potency is necessary if the 
metaphysician is to explain the relationship of all beings 
to their ultimate causes. This priority is especially 
important to Aristotle, for whom the ultimate explanation of 
things lies in their ends or final causes. But, of course, 
energeia is the end to which dynamis is directed and not the 
other way round. 
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a perfected nature, the priority of the superior to the 
inferior is likewise the priority of something in act to 
something in potency. As a result, the relationship of 
energeia to dynarnis is essential to a correct understanding 
of the relationship between the higher and the lower 
realities. 72 
Accordingly, since energeia denotes a complete and 
perfected nature, which is an ousia, it is obvious that the 
World Soul, and every individual soul as well, is an 
energeia. This conclusion is justified by the fact that 
each soul is a product of Nous, which is the highest ousia 
and which is identical with all being. As a result of this 
relationship, the World Soul and every individual soul is 
Nous, but on a less unified and hence lower and less perfect 
level of reality.73 
Finally, because the soul is a genuinely spiritual 
existent, thus transcending all physical things, it is not 
simply the entelecheia of the body.74 The soul for 
Plotinus is authentic ousia, unlike the soul of Aristotle's 
7 2 IV, 7 ( 2 ) , 8 3, 7-2 0. 
73rv, 7 (2), as, 4o-so. 
74see note 24 above. Plotinus presents several 
arguments against Aristotle's view that the soul is the 
entelecheia of the body. These criticisms indicate that, 
for Plotinus, entelecheia and energeia are not synonymous. 
For a discussion of this topic see G. Bruni, "Note di 
polemica neoplatonica contro l'uso e il significato del 
termine entelecheia," Giornale Critico della Filosofia 
Italiana, 39 (1960), pp. 205-236, and G. Verbeke~ "Les 
Critiques de Plotin contra l'entelechisme d'Aristote: Essai 
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system, which is ousia only in a limited sense. Though both 
Plotinus and Aristotle call soul ousia (and, hence, 
energeia), the latter maintains that the soul is in act only 
as the substantial form of the body. Plotinus, however, 
concurs with Plato in affirming that the soul is an 
independent being with no real need for the body. 
The soul is indeed one nature which lives in energeia 
(#24).75 This means that each soul's life (whether it is 
the World Soul's or an individual soul's life) is 
simultaneously soul's energei~ as well. Life, then, is the 
ousia, the act or energeia and the self-kinesis of each 
soul. This fact makes each soul to be genuinely immortal 
and independent of matter. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
We will now summarize the data Plotinus provides on 
zoe in our key text. We are fortunate in that our very 
first key text has provided us with what seems to be the 
central insight in Plotinus' conception of life: 
motion. 
Since self-motion primarily is cognition, 
self-
for 
Plotinus, self-motion is self-cognition, a cognition which 
(74 continued) 
d'interpretation de l'Enneads, IV, 7, 8, 5", in Philomathes, 
Studies and Essays in Memory of Philip Merlan, (The Hague: 
Nijhoff, 1971), pp. 194-222. 
7~see also IV, 7 (2), 12, 13-14. 
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the self (e.g., Nous or the World Soul or an individual 
human soul) causes. To be alive, then, is to be efficiently 
causing one's own cognition. 
possesses a soul, which is 
Every living existent 
the principle of these 
operations. Accordingly, soul's very nature is to be self-
moving and self-acting. Hence, if self-kinesis is the very 
ousia or nature of soul, then soul qua soul is deathless. 
Self-motion and immortality belong to the individual 
soul as well as to World Soul, for the individual soul 
participates, or is a logos of, the World Soul, which in 
turn is a logos of Nous ( #1-#8). By holding this view 
Plotinus shows his indebtedness to Plato, for whom the life 
of the soul is self-motion, the prime manifestation of which 
is intellection. 
Next, Plotinus shows that life is to soul as heat is 
to fire. This analogy is helpful because it provides an 
additional and very vivid way of viewing the nature of the 
necessary connection between soul and life. In both cases 
heat and life intrinsically (and hence necessarily) belong 
to fire and to soul, respectively. Each of the latter is an 
ousia and by its very nature is constantly present to the 
former (#20). 
Plotinus further argues that it is necessary to 
isolate that component in man which lives in itself and, 
hence, is soul, lest the analysis deteriorate into an 
infinite regress of caused causes. The composite which is 
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man must be examined and dissected until the one element in 
him which is the source of his life (i.e., his soul) is 
discovered. When this component is found it will be seen to 
be immortal, because it is self-living and self-moved (#22). 
Furthermore, it is not enough and, in fact, is 
misleading to speak of life as merely some sort of passive 
quality or condition of matter. Even if this view were 
correct, we would still be compelled to look to something 
else beyond the passive quality or condition -- namely, that 
which imposed this quality or condition upon the matter. 
And unless that cause was itself self-living the 
investigation would have to continue until just such a cause 
was found. Only the self-living can be soul. In short, the 
soul is immortal because it has life as its ousia or 
essential constitution and because this life is actual or in 
energeia (#23-#24). 
To complete our analysis of zoe in the first key text 
let us answer the following questions: a) what is life on 
the level of World Soul? b) what is life on the level of an 
individual human soul? c) what is life in itself? 
The World Soul, itself an ousia, lives principally 
because it participates in the highest ousia, Nous, which is 
identical with all being. Hence, by participating in Nous 
the World Soul is Nous but on a less perfect (because less 
unified) level of reality. 
Life on the level of World Soul is both a doing 
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(praxis) and a making (poiesis). It is a praxis because it -
inevitably looks to physical matter, which is below it, and 
informs and administers it. It is a poiesis because it is 
demiurgically related to and thereby produces, orders, and 
governs what is below it. World Soul's life, then, is its 
looking above (to Nous), thus producing and looking to what 
is below (i.e., the physical universe). 
Life on the level of an individual human soul is 
likewise both a praxis and a poiesis, though it is not 
entirely clear how it is the latter. A human soul's life is 
apparently a praxis because it is capable of acting 
according to correct (i.e., rational) rules or logoi of 
conduct. Its life is also a poiesis, since the human soul 
animates and moves a body as wel 1 as produces and makes 
various artifacts. These products may be evaluated as to 
their beauty or usefulness, for example, by assessing the 
extent to which their production was carried out in 
conformity with correct logoi. 
The key component of the human soul's life, however, 
is to be found in another aspect of its relationship to 
Nous. The human soul's pure and good life is achieved when 
it has become bodiless (i.e., purified of all external 
concerns and all associations with physical matter) and 
thereby intellectual. The human soul truly lives, then, 
when it is unified with Nous and leads the purely 
intellectual life of knowing the One as Nous is able to know 
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It, as a multiplicity of perfect and eternal Forms. 
Life in its elf ( in these very early treatises) is 
self-motion, an ousia, an energeia, and identical with an 
intellectual awareness (noesis) of the One, which cannot be 
known in Its perfect simplicity but rather must be 
apprehended as a plurality of forms. 
Life itself is an ousia because the life of Nous is 
identical with the ousia of Nous. And the ousia of Nous 
consists in an eternal production and contemplation of the 
Forms. Because life is an ousia it always .remains 
unalterably what it is (i.e., self-moved) and cannot admit 
its opposite. For this reason what has life intrinsically 
(i.e., as its very ousia) cannot lose its life and hence is 
immortal. 
We are left with one final question. As we ascend to 
greater and greater levels of intellection and likewise of 
life, do we discover that the One is also a life? We must 
await our study of subsequent texts to determine whether 
Plotinus explicitly answers this question. By virtue of 
what we have discovered thus far we may infer that the One 
transcends life because It is neither (any sort of) kinesis 
nor energeia. Plotinus, however, does not explicitly state 
this here, but fortunately there seems to be sufficient 
evidence in our next key text, VI, 9 (9), to support such a 
conclusion. 
CHAPTER III 
TEXT B: ENNEAD VI, 9 (9), 9 
We shall now examine our second key text, Chapter Nine 
of VI, 9: l "On the Good or the One," which is the ninth 
treatise Plotinus wrote.2 It is thus another of his early 
treatises, written before his association with Porphyry and 
the f irst3 in which Plotinus takes up the relationship of 
soul to the One as such.4 
lAl though there are numerous instances of the term 
zoe in several chapters of VI, 9 ( 9), only chapter nine 
yields new and different information on zoe and, hence, 
constitutes our key text. However, we ~all wherever 
necessary and appropriate refer to relevant data from those 
other chapters. 
2porphyry, "Life," Vol. I, p. 17, lines 66ff. 
3some brief remarks on the Primal Reality 
earlier, in V, 4 (7), which Porphyry entitled: 





4According to Fritz Heinemann, Plotin: Forschungen 
iiber die plotinische Frage, Plotins Entwicklung and sein 
System (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1921), Plotinus in his first 
five treatises (IV, 7; IV, 2; I, 2; I, 6; I, 3, according to 
Heinemann's ordering) calls his primal reality the Good 
solely. It is not until VI, 9, 6, 57-58 (ninth both for 
Heinemann and Porphyry) that Plotinus explicitly equates the 
Good and the One (calling the One "the Good above all good 
things"), having earlier in VI, 9, 5 implicitly suggested 
such an identification. 
For additional information and a critique of 
Heinemann's position, see Armstrong, Architecture, pp. 23-
26. See also P. Henry, Recherches sur le "Praeparatio 
Evangelica" d'Eusebe et !'edition perdue des oeuvres de 
Plotin publiee par Eustochius, (Paris, 1935), pp. 117-129; 
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In order properly to introduce Text B let us first 
briefly survey the treatises which precede it. After this 
we shall summarize relevant points in chapters of VI, 9 
which are prior to the key text, give the key text in 
translation, followed by comments and conclusions. 
After discussing the immortality of the soul in IV, 7 
(2) (Text A), Plotinus next takes up destiny (III, 1 [3], 
8). He points out that any soul (i.e., both the World Soul 
and individual souls) is truly free (and fully living) only 
when outside the influence of the body and all external 
causation. Next, in IV, 2 
information on the ousia of soul. 
simultaneously a one-and-many if 
( 4), 5 Plotinus gives 
Each soul must be 
it is properly to 
administer what is below it. Accordingly, the World Soul 
gives life to all parts of the universe (and the individual 
soul to all parts of the body) while directing everything 
with wisdom (phronesis). 
But what is the source of this wisdom? Plotinus' 
answer is found in V, 9 (5), entitled: "On Nous, the Forms 
and Being. "6 Each soul's wisdom comes from Nous, which 
Itself is perfect life, perfect self-kinesis and perfect 
(4continued) 
E. R. Dodds, "The Parmenides of Plato and the Neoplatonic 
One," Classical Quarterly, Vol. XXIII (1928): pp. 136-
139; Rist, Road to Reality, p. 248, n. 3; Wallis, 
Neoplatonism, p. 45; Brehier, Enneades, Introduction, Vol. 
1, pp. xviii-xxvi. 
5Iv, 2 (4), 2, 39-55. 
6v, 9 ( 5 ) , 2 , 2 o-2 7 ; 6 , 1-1 o ; 1 o , 1-15 • 
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energeia.7 Moreover, Nous is a one-in-many: a 
multiplicity of Forms, each of which is both a knower and a 
known. Though the One-Good above Nous always remains in 
complete unity, Nous knows the One-Good as unity and thereby 
produces this multiplicity of Forms and ultimately all lower 
realities. Nous, then, knows the One by contemplating It 
and also Itself as that one-many. 
In the next treatise (IV, 8 [ 6]), 8 "On the Descent 
of Souls into Bodies," Plotinus describes the relationship 
between the Soul and the physical world (and between the 
human soul and the body it inhabits). By turning within 
itself the human soul sees its ultimate destiny: living the 
highest life and being at one with the di vine (i.e., Nous 
and, ultimately, the One). Though it is better for any soul 
to live in the intelligible world, the World Soul's nature 
makes it necessary for it to descend and give life to the 
world of sense and body. However, not even the human soul 
enters into the body completely. By its higher part soul 
always remains united to the intelligible world and, 
unaffected by earthly concerns, 
life.9 
7v, 9 (5), 10 1-15. 
Bv, 9 (5), 4-5. 
leads an undisturbed 
9As we noted in Chapter Two, prior to IV, 8 (6) 
there is no direct reference to the All Soul as such but 
only to the demiurgic World Soul and to individual souls. 
In IV, 8 (6) Plotinus first explicitly argues that the All 
Soul is the immediate source of the World Soul and of 
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The seventh treatise (V, 4 [ 7] ) , entitled, "How That 
which is After the.First Cornes from the First; and About the 
one," yields helpful data on the Primal Reality ( the One-
Good) and on Nous.10 The Primal Reality is simple, first, 
and transcends being (ousia). It necessarily produces Nous 
and all subsequent realities because It is all perfect and 
all powerful. Though absolutely simple, the Primal Reality 
has everything in and with Itself, including, curiously 
enough, life itself.11 
(9continued) 
individual souls and that it occupies a position in the 
intelligible while forming and ordering the sensible. 
Accordingly, in my translation of this and all subsequent 
texts I will capitalize the first letter of Soul when it 
refers to the hypostasis (i.e., All Soul) and to the World 
Soul. I do not capitalize soul when Plotinus is speaking of 
an individual soul (e.g., a human soul). 
10v, 4 (7), 1, 1-36. 
llin V, 4 ( 7), 2, 16 Plotinus makes the surprising 
remark that the One has life. On the face of it this seems 
to be contrary to his frequently repeated conviction 
throughout the Enneads (especially in III, 8 [30], 10, 3 and 
30-31), and even in the first chapter of V, 4 itself, that 
the One transcends life. 
Even this exceptional remark, however, seems not to 
violate Plotinus' general position on life as currently 
understood in our study. Eliminating the possibility that 
this remark is a haphazard one, no inconsistency within his 
system results if Plotinus' affirmation is through extrinsic 
denomination. 
Extrinsic denomination (sometimes also termed "analogy 
of attribution") consists in attributing something to an 
object (which itself does not possess the attribute 
intrinsically) because it has a relationship to something 
which possesses the attribute intrinsically. In any analogy 
there is both difference and sameness. In extrinsic 
denomination the two subjects being compared are truly 
different but some term is attributed to both of them. 
Hence, they are similar in name and different in reality. 
For example, a certain food may be called "heal thy" not 
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In the next brief treatise (IV, 9 [8]), Plotinus 
discusses whether. all souls are one.12 Each soul is 
itself a unity and all souls ( including World Soul) come 
from and are one with their immediate source, the All Soul. 
Treatise VI, 9 ( 9) whose ninth chapter contains our 
key text, is divided into eleven chapters, the first eight 
of which provide the following relevant data. All beings 
are real and are being ultimately because of their 
unity. 13 Nothing could be if it were not somehow one. 
(llcontinued) 
because it itself possesses heal th, but because it is one 
cause of heal th in other things. For Plotinus, then, the 
One is not formally life but may be extrinsically 
"denominated" as such because It is the cause of life in all 
else. We must be careful, however, not to apply too 
rigorously the theory of analogy to the elements of 
Plotinus' thought since, as a strict monism, it ultimately 
admits only identity (i.e., reality) and negation (i.e., 
unreality) and shuns similarity and diversity. 
Valuable treatments of analogy are found in Leo 
Sweeney, S. J., A Metaphysics of Authentic Existentialism 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), 
hereafter, Sweeney, AMAE, pp. 142-151; and H. A. Wolfson, 
"The Divine Attribut~in Albinus and Plotinus," Harvard 
Theolo1ical Review 45 (1952), pp. 115-134. 
2 IV , 9 ( 8 ) , l ; 4 , 1-8 • 
13This is true of beings in the intelligible world 
and in the sensible world. The observations Plotinus makes 
here express the central principle of his thought, namely, 
unity. Leo Sweeney, S. J. (Principles," pp. 506-516) 
formulates this principle as follows. "'Whatever is real is 
one.' That is to say, to be real is to be one. Any item is 
real because of its unity and a fall into multiplicity is 
likewise a fall into unreality" (p. 511; see also V, 5 [32], 
5, llf; and VI, 6 [34], 1, lff). "So true is this," Sweeney 
continues, "that the more unified something is, the more 
real it is, with the result that what is totally simple is 
the Prime Reality -- namely, the One, the absolutely first 
and highest hypostasis" (p. 511). 
Sweeney identifies two other principles as basic to 
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For example, an army or a choir or a flock is only as long 
as it is one. Even a house or a ship is, and is real, only 
(13continued) 
Plotinus' thought. The second basic principle "inserts a 
dynamic aspect into Plotinus' universe, since it is bound up 
with the position that whatever is genuinely real must by 
that very fact cause subsequent realities, which turn back 
to their source because of dependency upon it and desire for 
it" (p. 511). 
We may formulate this second principle thus: Whatever 
is one is also good. It is obvious, Sweeney points out, 
that 
It is an immediate sequei of his first principle, for 
that which is one is not only real but also is perfect 
and powerful. Now whatever is perfect and powerful 
automatically overflows and thereby produces another 
(but lesser) reality, which depends upon and tends back 
to its cause in love. Such is the twofold status which 
'good' signifies when predicated of an item -- a reality 
and unity insofar as it is both the source of 
subsequents and the object of their love and tendency. 
(p. 512) 
Accordingly, the more unified something is, the more perfect 
and more powerful it is, and the more appropriate it is to 
designate it as good. Thus, what is totally simple is not 
only the Supreme Reality but also the Supreme Good. 
Plotinus' third basic principle follows from the 
second since it "is concerned with determining what 
relationships exist between the Good and Its products or, 
more generally, between cause and effect or, even more 
generally, between what is prior and what is subsequent" (p. 
512). This third principle is best expressed as follows: 
Whatever is prior is of greater reality than that which is 
subsequent. The relationship of prior to subsequent, then, 
is simultaneously a relationship of higher and lower in 
actual values. Accordingly, what is prior is more unified, 
more perfect, more powerful and more independent than what 
is subsequent (see V, 9 [5], 9, 13-14; VI, 9 [9], 6, 16f; V, 
2 [11], 2, lf; II, 6 [17], 1, 56f; III, 8 [30], 5, 13f). 
Therefore, what is absolutely first is also in perfect 
possession of unity, perfection, power and independence. 
This is the highest level of reality, the One-Good. 
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if it has unity.14 Thus, the unity which constitutes the 
reality not only of choirs, ships, and houses but also of 
liQ£§ and Soul, in each case leads us back to the One, by 
which they are all real (Ch. 1).15 Because Being (Nous) 
has life and intelligence, It is not dead. But, despite Its 
14such a listing of unities most likely has its 
origin in Stoic writings, possibly from Posidonius (See SVF, 
II, 336). Andreas Graeser in his helpful study (Plotinus 
and the Stoics [Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972], pp. 72-75) 
reports that to some interpreters 
Plotinus appears to make use of a Stoic opinion that 
differentiated between three different degrees of unity: 
there are things that are 'one' (a) in the sense of 
something that is nvwµ {vov (i.e. , organisms and 
living beings); there are others that are 'one' (b) in 
the sense of being ouva.n,oµEva (i.e. , ships and 
towers, etc.); and finally there are unities consisting 
of OLE/';Euyµ{va or 6Lao1:nx61:a (i.e., armies and 
choirs). This classification, as found in Sextus 
Empiricus, Adv. Math. 9, 78 ... , is almost unanimously 
assumed to be Posidonian, al though it has been 
objected ... that on the basis of Plutarch, De Def. Or. 
426A this way of looking at things as uni ts seems to 
have been that of Chrysippus ( SVF, II, 367), or that 
Chrysippus must have distinguished at least roughly 
between nvwµ{va and OLEO,nxorn. It is difficult 
to demonstrate, however, what Posidonius' position 
actually was. 
On this topic see R. E. Witt, "Plotinus and 
Posidonius," Classical Quarterly XXV (1931), p. 203; A. H. 
Armstrong, "Emanation in Plotinus," Mind 67 (1937), pp. 61-
66; J. M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy, (Cambridge: University 
Press, 1969), p. 210. 
15The One is not Aristotle's First Mover or God, who 
is subsistent thought which eternally thinks itself 
(Metaphysics, Book 12, Ch. 7, 1072b25-30; Ch. 9, 1074b33-
35). Plotinus would object both to Aristotle's position 
that unity is not greater than being but is merely a 
transcendental term which is given equally to all the 
categories and to his view that all that is being is one and 
all that is one is being (Metaphysics, Book 2, Ch. 3, 
998bl5-26; Book 10, Ch. 2, 1054al3-19). 
75 
great unity and perfection, Nous cannot be the supreme 
reality: Nous It;self is not simple but is a unity-in-
multiplicity and is both a knower and a known (Ch. 2). The 
soul, when it aspires to the level of Nous, can apprehend 
that which is beyond Nous and to which no perfection of Nous 
can be applied. Hence, the One cannot be any kind of 
movement (kinesis), rest (stasis) or being (ousia). It 
likewise follows that zoe, because it is a self-kinesis, and 
energeia do not apply to the One either (Ch. 3). 
In order to ascend to the One, the self-kinesis of the 
soul must become united with the unwavering self-kinesis of 
eventually even go beyond intellection and 
altogether.16 And on the level of Nous soul will live 
perfectly, but when it attains the One it will transcend 
even life itself ( Chs. 4-5). Whatever is to be the first 
existent must be absolutely simple, for if It has any 
16The One neither needs nor has knowledge because 
this would involve It in a dualism. It neither knows nor is 
ignorant (VI, 9 [9], 6, 42) and, in fact, is beyond thinking 
and knowledge (III, 9 [13], 9). 
Thus, the human soul's ascent to the One must be 
through Nous but ultimately beyond Nous as well. Faced with 
its mysterious, if not unknown, goal the soul even 
experiences fear (VI, 9 [9], 3, 7) lest it should fail in 
its ascent. Rist points out that this 
..• is the nearest Plotinus comes to the notion of 
mystical darkness so common in Christian writers ...• 
Plotinus' dilemma arises on a metaphysical rather than a 
moral plane. Can the soul, which has hitherto only 
recognized its finite manifestations, dare to live on a 
newly desired infinite plane? (Rist, Road to Reality, 
p. 220) 
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multiplicity at all It thereby admits of some imperfection 
and cannot be p~imary. But if as pure unity It is 
indeterminate it thus surpasses everything, including the 
self-kinesis and life of Nous (Ch. 6). Thus, if a soul is 
to begin its ascent to the One, it must imitate It by 
freeing itself of all externals and turning totally 
inward. 17 The son who truly comes to know himself, for 
example, simultaneously discovers his source and father (Ch. 
7) _ 18 
Consequently, if the soul truly knows itself, it will 
see that its natural state is like a self-caused circular 
17on this sort of inward-turning knowledge see Rene 
Arnou, Le d~sir de Dieu dans la philosophie de Plotin 
(Paris: Vrin, 1921), pp. 193-94; hereafter, Arnou, Le 
desir. 
Plotinus also describes this condition as rapture or 
possession (VI, 9 [9], 11, 13). Such expressions make more 
vivid the fact that the soul is dominated and characterized 
by its source, the One. Whenever the soul abandons itself 
(VI, 9 [ 9], 11, 24), it becomes unlike itself and stands 
outside itself (VI, 9 [9], 10, 15; Chapter 11, 12 and 23. 
18The metaphor of ascent (I, 6 [ 1], 7, 1-5; 9, 3-4; 
VI, 9 [9], 11, 11; v, 1 [10], 3, 3) is only one way Plotinus 
describes the soul's journey to the One. This journey he 
sometimes describes as a returning or "awakening" to our 
inner selves (IV, 8 [ 6], 1, 1). But, knowing ourselves 
involves knowing our origin (VI, 9 [9], 7, 32-33). This is 
the valuable contribution of those passages which refer to 
the One as a father or speak of the return of the soul to 
its source as a journey to the fatherland (I, 6 [1], 8, 6; 
VI, 9 [9], 7, 33; 9). For helpful discussion of the One as 
"Father" see John Rist, Eros and Psyche (Toronto: University 
Press, 1964), pp. 72-3; hereafter, Rist, Eros and Psyche. 
motion around some central object.19 
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The soul thus 
discovers its identity with the All-Soul, the life of which 
is an everlasting and perfect circular self-kinesis.20 
This self-movement has the One as its object and center. 
And the closer the soul's self-movement ultimately comes to 
the self-kinesis of Nous the more concentrated will be the 
soul's vision of its true object, the One. Unfortunately, 
the soul's gaze is not always fixed upon the One, just as 
the members of a chorus are not always attentive to their 
conductor. However, when the soul finally beholds the One, 
it attains its true end. Then the soul does, so to speak, 
an inspired dance around It (Ch. 8). 21 Now comes the key 
text. 
KEY TEXT VI, 9 (9), 9 
l 9This "circular movement" is, of course, a noetic 
self-kinesis and does not involve any sort of physical 
motion. 
20In the Timaeus ( 37a-b) Plato describes the soul's 
intellection as a circular self-kinesis which, when the soul 
descends into body, becomes disturbed and broken. For 
helpful remarks on this point, see Brehier, Enneades, Vol. 
6, Part 2, pp. 167-168. 
21The metaphor of a dancing chorus occurs in VI, 9 
(9), 1, 32: 8, 36-45: 9, 1-3). It has its origin, Brehier 
points out, in a type of dance known as the "cyclic chorus" 
in which the chorus moved in a circle around an altar while 
singing and dancing. Occupying the center was the chorus 
leader holding a lyre (Brehier, Enneades, Vol. 6, Part 2, p. 
184, n. 1). 
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[l] In this [circling sort of] choral dance the human 
soul sees the fount 22 of life and the fount of Nous, 
the principle of being, the cause of good, and the~t 
of soul. [2] The generated beings [life, Nous, being, 
the good, soul ] do not pour out from and"""T thereby] 
diminish It [the One]23 for It is not a material mass. 
Otherwise the generated beings would be perishable. [3] 
But, as the case stands, they are eternal because their 
principle [the One] always stays the same, not dividing 
itself into them and always remains intact.24 
22p1otinus here utilizes the metaphorical pegen 
(literally, "fount," "spring," or "well-head") to describe 
the One. He sometimes likens emanation from the One to the 
flowing of a spring or river (see, for example, III, 8 [30], 
10, 2-4). Even life itself is sometimes said to "flow out" 
from the One as if from a spring which gives itself totally 
to the rivers going forth from it (III, 8 [30], 10, 3-10). 
However, the implication here (#1-#4) and elsewhere, 
VI, 9 (9), 3, 14-16, is that the One is the source of life 
but is not life Itself. Because Plotinus explicitly makes 
this point in our next key text (III, 8) we shall fully 
examine it there. See also Rein Ferwerda, La Signification 
des images et des metaphor~s dans la pensee de Plotin 
(Groningen: J. B. Walters, 1965). 
23In the opening passages of the key text Plotinus 
does not explicitly mention the Primal Reality or the One-
Good. However, the intent of the chapter is to explain the 
ascent of the soul to the One-Good and the remarks on 
emanation (e.g., #1, #4, #5) confirm that it is the One-Good 
that is the principle spoken of here. 
In their explanatory comments Henry-Schwyzer (Plotini 
Opera, Vol. 3, p. 322) note that A. J. Vitringa believes 
that ekeinon (line 3) should be understood as referring to 
to hen, the One, and Marsilius Ficinus explains that to hen 
is the intended subject in lines 3 and 4. Furthermore, 
Brehier points out that it is the Good which is 1 here 
described as the source of Intelligence and life (Brehier, 
Enneades, "Notice," Vol. 6, Part 2, p. 168). Finally, as 
early as I, 6 [ 1], 7, 11-12, Plotinus refers to the Good 
(i.e., the One) as cause of life and mind and being. 
24As Plotinus makes clear here (#1-#4) and in VI, 9 
( 9), 3, 14-16, the One is the source of life and of all 
subsequent realities. But, though the One is the power of 
producing all things (V, 4 [7], 1, 9-10), It is not any of 
them. Accordingly, the One is neither Nous nor soul nor 
life nor ousia (VI, 9 [ 9], 39-46) but transcends them, a 
transcendence which he expresses often. See I, 6 ( 1), 9, 
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[ 4] Therefore they too remain [ intact and dependent 
upon the One] just as light persists as long as the sun 
remains.25 
(24continued) 
37-41; v, 4 (7), 1, 9-10; 2, 38 and 40; VI, 9 (9), 3, 39-46; 
11, 42; V, 1 (10), 8 7-8; I, 2 (19), 3, 31; I, 3 (20), 5, 7. 
He also makes the point in several later treatises, namely: 
IV, 4 (28), 16, 27; III, 8 (30), 9, 2; VI, 6 (34), 5, 37: 
VI, 2 (43), 3, 7-10; 17, 18-22; III, 7 (45), 2, 8; V, 3 
(49), 10, 5; 11, 2-28; 12, 47-48; 17, 13-14; I, 7 (54), 1, 
8. Specifically, the One cannot be life because life is 
self-kinesis, whose highest manifestation is noes is. But 
intellection is not a characteristic of the One but of Being 
(i.e., Nous and other lower realities) since intellection 
involves multiplicity: a duality of knower and known. The 
transcendence of the One over life will be taken up again 
and in greater detail in later key texts, especially III, 8 
(30) and VI, 7 (38). 
25The sun and light analogy is applied repeatedly to 
the One in Plotinus' treatises (e.g., V, 1 [10], 2; v, 6, 
[24], 4; V, 5 [32], 7-8; and I, 7 [54], l; see also V, 4 
[7], 1, 23-41; VI, 1 [10], 6, 28-40; V, 3 [49], 12, 39-44). 
This analogy, along with that of the radiation of heat from 
fire (discussed in Text A), and of development and growth 
from a seed (V, 9 [5], 6; IV, 8 [30], 9; III, 3 [48], 7), 
provides another way of understanding the nature of 
emanation and the relationship of the One to its products. 
According to both R. E. Witt ( "Plotinus and Posidonius," 
Classical Quarterly, Vol. 24, 1930, pp. 198 and 205-207) and 
A. H. Armstrong (Architecture, pp. 54-58), Plotinus' theory 
of light has a very prominent status in his thought and 
makes its first appearance as an element in his emanation 
doctrine. Both Witt and Armstrong maintain that Plotinus' 
doctrine probably depends on the account of color as a 
material arroppon of particles given in the Timaeus (67d) 
and is deeply affected by the Posidonian theory of light as 
well. Naturally, care must be taken to avoid conceiving 
light as a material outflow from the sun as the Stoics did. 
On the contrary, as Wallis (Neoplatonism, p. 61) points out, 
the image's popularity with Plotinus stems in large part 
from the fact that he regards light not as a body or (with 
Aristotle) as a modification of the air, but as something 
substantial yet incorporeal (IV, 5 [29], 6-7; II, 1 [40], 7, 
26-30). 
Plotinus' own contribution to the doctrine of light, 
Armstrong maintains, is twofold: light is incorporeal and 
it is an outflow from its luminous source (Architecture, p. 
54). But Plotinus also argues that there is a close 
parallel between light and life, the energeia (of Nous and) 
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9, 1-7: 
• Ev oi -rav-rr, -riJ xopE{9- 1<a8opij. 1r17y1Jv µiv {wijs, 
' ~ ' ~ • ' ,, • f) ~ • , • ,,. .,. ~ 
1T'YJY'YJV aE vov, apx17v OV'TOS, aya ov ainav, pii,.av .,,vx17s· 
t ' I J t t ""' 'I' t t ""' t\ I t 
OVK EKXEOµEVWV a1T av-rov, EL'T EKELVOV El\a'T'TOVV'TWV" ov 
' ,, ... ..I.() ' ... J. ' , ~ ~· • ' yap oy1<os· 'Y/ .,, ap-ra av ,1v -ra yEvvwµEva. vvv a ECT'TLV 
''t' " f, \ , ... f , , , , 
awia, on TJ apx'YJ av-rwv wcrav-rws µEvH ov µEµEpicrµEVTJ 5 
t t / t \ \ t tr\ I ~ \ 1 .., I .. t 
ELS av-ra, al\/\ O1\TJ µEvovcra. OLO KaKELVa µEv££" OLOV EL 
I .,, ''..I.A , 
/-LEVOV'TOS 'YJI\LOV KaL 'TO .,,ws µ£VOL. 
[ 5] We are neither severed nor separate [ in spatial 
terms] 26 from the One, even though our bodily nature 
intervened and drew us to itself. But we breathe [are 
alive] and are preserved since It does not give Its 
gifts and then withdraws, but always furnishes them 
abundantly, as long as It is the very reality which It 
is. [ 6] We are, indeed, more [real] when inclined 
towards It and There in the intelligible world is the 
good state of our inner reality,27 and to be far from 
It is to be forsaken and weaker. [ 7] The soul rests 
There and is beyond evils, having returned into that 
place which is purged of evils. 
(25continued) 
of soul (IV, 5 [29], 7). Something lives, then, ultimately 
because the One by Its very nature is eternally present to 
it (or more accurately, the living item is present in the 
One) providing the means for its preservation (#4-#5). Other 
uses of the light analogy are to be found in I, 1 (53), 4, 
12-18; IV, 3 (27), 22, 1-7; I, 1 (53), 4, 12-18. See also w. 
Beierwaltes, "Die Metaphysik de Lichtes in der Philosophie 
Plotins," Zeitschrift fur philosophische Forschung 15 (1961) 
334-62 or A. H. Armstrong, "'Emanation' in Plotinus," Mind 
46 (1937) 61-66. 
26Br~hier' s commentary is helpful here: "on ne peut 
done s' eloigner du Bien au sens local du mot" ( Br~hier, 
Enn~ades, "Notice," Vol. 6, Part 2, p. 168). 
27Here and later in our key text, (#18) Plotinus 
makes reference to suoaq.1ovLa., which is a composite of 
di ( "well" or "good") and 6a.q.1ov ( "genius," "spirit" or 
"inner reality") and should be translated as "the good state 
of one's inner reality." Translations such as "well being" 
or "happiness" do not fully express what Plotinus ~eans by 
this term and, therefore, may be misleading. 
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9, 7-14: 
. OV yap 0.7TOTETµ~µe0a 
1~\ I t t \ "" t / j,__1 
ovoe xwp,s eaµev, EL Kai TTapeµTTeaovaa TJ awµaTos .,,vais 
, , , , A "' t\\t, , , Y' 8 
TTpos aVTTJV TJµas ELAKvaev, a"" eµTTveoµev KaL acp.,,oµe a 
,~, .,.,, / 1 / 1\\11\ "" 
ov oovTos, ELT aTToaTavTos EKELvov, a"" ae, xopTJyovvTos 10 
., ... J. ., > I A\\ I > \ I \ 
EWS av [I OTTEP E(]TL. µal\l\OV µEVTOL eaµev VEVaaVTES TTpos 
• , , , .,. • Ao , < ~ , > , .,. , , avTo Kai TO ev evTav a, TO oE TToppw e,va, µovov Kai 
.s. .,. , Ao , • , .,. , , A ., c 
,,TTOV ELVaL. EVTaV a KaL avaTTaVETaL .,,vxTJ KaL KaKWV EsW 
els TOV TWV KaKWV KaOapov T61Tov avaopaµovaa · 
[8] And There in the intelligible world the soul thinks; 
and There it is without passion. And there it truly 
lives. For there is living in the here-and-now [soul's 
earthly life] and without the divine a trace 
imitating the life There. [9] Life There is energeia 
of Nous; and energeia also generates gods quietly by 
contact with the One28 and begets beauty, begets 
justice, and begets virtue. 29 [ 10] For the soul is 
pregnant with these, upon being filled with the divine, 
and this [state of being filled with the divine] is its 
principle and its goal. [11] This is the soul's 
principle because it is from there above, and this is 
the soul's goal [because] There [above is] the Good. And 
when it [the soul] has arrived There it becomes its true 
self and what, in fact, it is and always has been [i.e., 
There soul regains its proper nature]. [12] For 
involved with thin~s here below it is degraded, in exile 




• Ao \ • 0 \ • Ao \ \ • \ 0 A y A 
15 EVTaV a, KaL aTTa TJS EVTaV a. KaL TO aATJ ws ':,TJV • Ao \ \ A \ \ ., 8 A ., y A 
EVTaV a" TO yap VVV KaL TO aVEV EOV LXVOS ':,WTJS 
, , , ' ~' , ... ,,,... , , ' ... 
EKELVTJV µ,µovµevov, TO OE EK/1:L ':,TJV EVEpyELa µev vov· 
28on the other hand, perhaps pros (line 18) is being 
used reciprocally. This conceivably is its sense here. But 
what is the referent of ekeino then? Another alternative is 
that pros ekeino may mean "for that purpose." However, 
neither of these helps to eliminate nor to preserve the 
sense of Text B. Hence, the most likely referent of ekeino 
is the One. 
29see Plato, Symposium 209a; 212a; also see 
Armstrong, Enneads, Vol. III, pp. 182, n. 2-3. 
30This remark has its origin in Plato, Phaedrus 246c 
and 248c. 
£V€py£La 0€ Kat Y£VV~ fJ£OVS £V '1]0'VX~ -riJ 1TpOS £K£LVO 
£1Ta</,iJ, Y£VV~ 0£ KClAAOS, Y£VV~ 0LKaLOO'VV7JV, apE'TTJV Y£VV~. 
20 -rav-ra yap KV£L if;vxiJ 1TA'YJpWfJ£'iaa 8£ov, Kat 'TOV'TO av-riJ 
1 \ \ / \ 1 \ / fl 1 .,..(} I\ ~ I fl \ apx'YJ KaL 'T£/\OS• apx'YJ f-LEV, O'TL £K£L £V, 'T£/\OS 0£, O'TL 'TO . (}' , ... \, ... , , , \ \ .. ~ 
aya ov £K£L. KaL £K£L Y£VOf-L£V"fJ YLYV£'TaL atn''YJ KaL O1T£p ,,v· 
' \ , "'"f) \ , , ., ' A. ' \ 
'TO yap £V'TaV a KaL £V 'TOV'TOLS £K1T'TWO'LS KaL 'flV')''YJ KaL , 
1T'T£poppV'YJO'LS. 
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[ 13] An indication that the Good is There is soul's 
love, which is natural to us. Accordingly, Love has 
been paired with sou131 in pictures and myths, for the 
soul is different from that God above, but is sprung 
from Him and hence of necessity loves Him. [14] And 
when soul is There she has heavenly love; here below her 
love is common.32 Aphrodite There is also heavenly, 
while here below she becomes common, prostituting 
herself, as it were. [ 15] Every soul is Aphrodite. 
This is suggested in the [circumstances of the] birth of 
Aphrodite and the simultaneous birth of Love.33 [16] 
Therefore, soul loves God [ the One] in accordance with 
her natural disposition and desires to be at one with 
Him in the same way that a girl loves a noble father 
with a noble love. [17] Whenever she [soul] comes into 
being and is deceived by wooings, as it were, 34 she 
exchanges [that noble love] for a mortal love and in the 
absence of her father is subjected to outrages. [ 18] 
But, coming to hate the wanton acts 
31I follow Henry-Schwyzer (Plotini Opera, Vol. 3, p. 
323), who substitute ,ns; tJ,vxns; for Tats; IJluxa-Cs; , 
and Marsili us Ficinus ( Plotini Enneades [Paris: Edi tore 
Ambrosio Firmin Didot, 1855], p. 537), who translates this 
passage as follows: " ..• amor ipse ingeni tus animis et in 
scripti et fabulis •••• " 
32p1ato, Symposium 180d; 203b-3. 
33see the very late III, 5 (50), where Plotinus 
attempts an allegorical interpretation of the Symposium's 
myth of the birth of Aphrodite. 
34such Greek words as hoion or hosper ("so to 
speak") abound in Plotinus' writings and reveal both his 
great gift for richness of metaphor and, more importantly, 
his conviction (which he shares with Plato) that reality 
defies rigid verbal description and ultimately is 
inexpressible. For helpful discussion of this point see 
Wallis, Neoplatonism, p. 41. 
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here, and purifying herself of things here and returning 
again to her father, she is again well off. 
9, 24-38: 
I:' \ A I:'\ ., \ • (J' • A \ f ., 
O"f/1\0L OE 07'L 'TO aya ov EKEL KaL O Epws 
25 0 T7JS 1/JvxiJs O avµ</>v-ros, KafJo Kai avvl{EVK'TaL "Epws 
A lTI A ' • ..J. A ' • '(J • ' ' ., -raLS rvxais KaL EV ypa..,,aLS KaL EV µv OLS. ETTEL yap E'TE-
(J A • , •t. • I !:'I • A • A •t. I pov EOV EKELVTJ, Es EKELVOV oE, Epg. av-rov E5avayKTJS. 
\ ..,. J ... \ ) f "''E ., • A(J I:' \ 
KaL ovaa EKEL -rov ovpavLov pw-ra EXEL, Ev-rav a oE 
I I:' I ' I • • A •A.,J. I:' I • 
1TaVoTJµos YLYVETaL· KaL yap Ea-r,v EKEL n..,,pooLT'TJ ovpa-
, • A(J I:' ' I I I:' f' • (J A ' 
30 v,a, Ev-rav a oE YLYVE'ra, TTaVoTJµos o,ov E-ra,pLa EL<Ja. KaL 
., A .,.. ' •A ..J. I:' I ' A • I ' ' A E<1'TL 1Taaa -,,VX'TJ n..,,pooLTTJ· KaL 'TOV'TO aLVL'T'TE'TaL KaL Ta 'T'TJS 
•A.,J. !:'I '(J' '. "'E • • • A I n..,,pooL'TTJS YEVE /\La KaL O pws O µET aV'T'TJS yEvoµEVos. 
> A 'f' \ ..J. / ., ,/, \ (J A f (J A (J / \ 
Epg. OVV Ka'Ta 'f'V<1LV EXOVaa 'f'VX'TJ EOV EVW TJVaL EI\OV-
., 0' \ A \ \\ ., ., 
aa, W<17TEp Trap €VOS KUI\OV r.a-rpos Kal\OV Epw-ra. o-rav 
I:' ' • I • '(J A f' , • (J A ., \ \ 
35 OE ELS YEVE(1LV El\ ovaa OLOV µv'TJ<1'TELaLs a'TTU'T7J TJ, a/\1\0V 
> \ \ C I (J \ " > I ' \ '/3 1y I al\l\a5aµEVTJ VTJ'TOV Epw-ra EpTJµL<;L 1Ta-rpos V pL1:,E'Tat· µL<I'TJ-
1:' ' I \ ' • A(J "/3 • I A A I:' aaaa oE 1Tal\LV -ras Ev-rav a v pELS ayvEvaaaa -rwv TTJOE 
\ \ I "'(J \ \ I > (J A 1Tpos 'TOV TTa-rEpa av LS <1'TEI\I\OµEVTJ EV1Ta EL. 
[19] As for him to whom this emotion [of noble love] is 
unknown, let him consider, from the loves of this world, 
what it is like to attain the things one most loves, 
because these lovable objects [here] are mortal and 
harmful, loves of shadows, and thus he changes his 
opinion [about them] suddenly, because, after all, these 
are not the true beloved, nor our good nor what we seek. 
[ 20] But There is the true object of our love, with 
which we can unite, participating in It and truly having 
It, not enfolded in external flesh. 
9, 38-46: 
KaL of~ 
\ " / > \ l(J A > A(J > (J / (J µEv ayvwa-rov E<1'TL TO 1Ta 7/µa 'TOV'TO, EV'TEV EV EV vµELa w 
, ' A , ""(J ' I ,, I ' ... -t" a'TTO 'TWV EV'TaV a Epw-rwv, OLOV E<1'TL TVXELV WV 'TLS 40 
µaALa'Ta J.pp., Kai OTL Tav-ra µiv 'T(l J.pwµEva 8v71-ra Kai 
/3Aa/3Epa Kai El8wAwv EpWTES Kai µE-ra1TL'TT'TEL, OTL OVK 'ljv 
\ ,, , , , ~ \ ' , (J \ ' ... '~, C\ 
'TO OV'TWS . EpwµEvov OVOE 'TO aya OV 7/µWv ovo 0 
r A , A 1::-, , ,, (J , • , " ., , 
1:,TJTOVµEv. EKEL OE 'TO a/\7} LVOV EpwµEvov, '!) E<1TL KaL 
avvEiva, µE-raAaf36v-ra av-rov Kai OV'TWS EXOV'Ta, ov 45 
'TTEPL'TT'TV(1(10µEVOV aap[iv ;gwfJEv. 
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[21] Whoever has seen this knows what I rnean;35 
because the soul has another life then, both while 
corning toward$ It [by ascending to Nous] and upon 
already reaching It and sharing in It. -rr2] So that 
having been so disposed, the soul becomes aware that the 
supplier of true life is present to it, and that the 
soul needs nothing anymore. [23] On the other hand, it 
is necessary to put away everything else and come to 
rest in It alone and become It alone,36 trimming 
away37 the rest, as much as we are surrounded by It, 
so that we are eager to go away from here and we are 
vexed at our being here; and this is necessary in order 
that we may embrace the whole of ourselves3~ and have 
no part of ourselves which does not come into contact 
with the divine. [24] [Only when one has attained 
Nous] is it possible to see Him [the One] and see 
oneself as it is right to see [Him]. [25] [Then] one 
[is made] bright; filled with the intelligible light, or 
rather [has become] light itself, pure, weightless and 
buoyant. She [the soul] has become divine, or rather is 
di vine. [ 26] Then she is illuminated; but if she is 
again weighed down, she is, as it were, like a mere 
flicker [of a flame which is gradually extinguished]. 
35A similar phrase occurs in I, 6 ( 1), 7, 2, where 
Plot in us says of the Primal Reality ( the One-Good) that 
"anyone who has seen It knows what I mean when I say that It 
is beautiful." 
36chapter Eleven of this treatise, one of the more 
moving Plotinian passages, describes the soul's journey to 
the One as an "escape in solitude to the Solitary." See 
also I, 6 (1), 7, 9-11 and Plato, Symposium 2llel. 
R. T. Wallis points out that even the Neophythagorean 
Nurnenius of Apamea used a similar phrase: "alone with the 
alone." However, his usage was probably "not significant, 
since it was a commonplace among ancient religious writers" 
(WallisL Neoplatonism, p. 33). 
3tcompare this expression to a similar one which 
describes the human soul's purification as a "stripping off 
of the garments" with which one is clothed (I, 6 [l], 7, 5-
7). For discussion of this and related metaphors in 
Plotinus see Rist, Road to Reality, p. 188ff. 
38In this very difficult passage I rely on Brehier's 
translation, which seems to convey the meaning of the Greek 
clearly. 
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We shall begin our analysis of this key text, as in 
Text A, by showing the sequence of its principal arguments 
(i.e., its movement of thought), which is as follows. 
In Chapters One through Eight Plotinus has stressed 
that any existent is real to the extent that it is one. 
Thus, the soul, if it is to live fully, must first ascend to 
Nous, which is a true energeia, a true self-kinesis and a 
true life. By this union with Nous the soul may continue 
its ascent to the One, which is beyond energeia, kinesis and 
life. Union with the One may be poetically described as a 
circular kind of dance around a central guiding figure. 
a. But what is the One? Careful reflection upon Its 
nature reveals that It is the source of everything: life, 
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~, being, goodness and soul (#1). 
b. [But someone might protest]39 must not the 
supreme source of so many beings be diminished by Its 
productivity? Plotinus replies: this objection presupposes 
a materialistic and spatial image of the One who, as 
immaterial and supremely perfect, is undiminished in Its 
emanation of all else. 
If this were not the case, namely, that the One were 
diminished in Its production, the beings below It would be 
perishable. But instead they are eternal. Hence, their 
principle is always the same and a self-sufficing producer 
and does not produce them after the fashion of a material 
mass, which produces by actually giving a part of itself to 
its product. But the One is so powerful as to produce 
without Itself being affected in any way (#2). 
c. The beings below the One are eternal and yet 
because they are partly multiple they cannot themselves 
account for their own eternal reality. The ref ore, there 
must be something self-sufficient, because perfectly simple, 
that accounts for their being. So long as their source 
exists they exist, just as light persists so long as the sun 
remains (#3-#4). 
39An interesting and potentially confusing element 
of Plotinus' style is his occasional dialogue with an 
imaginary interlocutor who presents a speech or a series of 
questions, which Plotinus then answers, often in the first 
person. 
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d. Since the presence and sustaining power of the One 
also explains our. being [i.e., since we are real to the 
extent we are one], we are never really separate from the 
One. We are separate from It only because of [unreality 
and] matter. Accordingly, we are alive because the power of 
the One always sustains us and we are simply because the One 
is. Hence, since It is that which is intrinsically present 
to us and that which really sustains us as real, it follows 
that the more we become like It the more perfect we become. 
And since to be real is also to be good, the closer we 
approach to the One the more we transcend evil (#5-#7). 
e. Hence, the soul finds repose in the intelligible 
world, which is beyond evil. And its rational nature, which 
here is distracted by matter and passion, is There 
unmolested and actualized. And There is true life and There 
the soul truly lives. [But someone might say: does it not 
live here also?] It does live here, but its life is but a 
vestige and a shadow of true life because here it is remote 
from the One, the source of life40 (#8). 
f. Life There is the energeia of Nous. This energeia 
generates all intelligible realities by its contact with the 
One. The soul lives truly on the level of Nous because that 
is the realm of perfect act. By virtue of its energeia Nous 
40see above, n. 11. 
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begets beauty, justice and virtue, which likewise exist in 
the soul because soul is a logos of Nous (#9-#10). 
g. Once the soul comes to live There, it too aspires 
to become intimate with the source of reality, as its 
ultimate principle and goal. The One is the soul's 
principle because It alone fully explains that world of 
perfect act (Nous). It is the soul's goal because as the 
source of the real and thus the good, the One is the 
terminus of soul's love. Hence, by attaining to the 
intelligible world the soul ~erfects its nature, but if it 
remains here it is degraded and does not realize its true 
nature. It is, so to speak, in exile and without its wings 
(#11-#12). 
h. [Sections #h, #i, #j, and #k of our movement of 
thought will refer primarily to love and do not explicitly 
mention zoe itself. Nevertheless they are important because 
it is through love that the soul moves away from this 
earthly life to the most noble life of Nous, which Itself 
lives through love of the One-Good.] The very fact that the 
soul by its nature loves and longs for its source proves 
that its good is beyond the sensible world.41 This 
explains why images of the god of love have historically 
4lp1otinus uses the 
describe the soul's ascent 
the relationship of Nous to 
Comments. 
desire or love metaphor to 
to the One-Good and to explain 
the One, as we shall see in our 
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accompanied the images of souls in pictures and myths. For 
since the offspring cannot help but love its parent the 
soul, being sprung from the One, cannot help but love It 
(#13). 
i. The soul's love as realized There is heavenly, 
while here it becomes corrupted and distracted by matter. 
This poetically may be likened to Aphrodite's love, which in 
the heavens is pure and divine, but here like that of a 
harlot. Every soul in this respect is like Aphrodite. And 
as in the mythological literature, love is the offspring and 
constant companion of Aphrodite, so love is the offspring 
and constant companion of the soul. There£ ore, soul by 
virtue of its very nature yearns for God and desires to be 
with God, not out of any kind of lust or wanton love, but 
out of a love that compares with the noble love of a girl 
for her noble father (#14-#16). 
j. If soul's gaze is distracted from that noble 
object, her love becomes ignoble, corrupt and unwholesome, 
and subjected to wantonness and outrage. But the soul may, 
remembering her noble Father, choose to purge herself of her 
sins and return to love Him who is the source of her well 
being (#17-#18). 
k. Of course those who are corrupted by mortal and 
lesser kinds of love cannot appreciate this noble love. In 
appreciating this higher love let them recall moments of 
satisfaction whenever, in regard to mortal and transient 
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objects, the lover comes finally to own the beloved. Hence, 
even they may come to understand such a noble love and the 
profound joy and fulfillment which accompany it (#19}. 
1. This comparison has its limits, however, because 
the objects of sensible love are only shadows and involve 
change. They cannot be the true objects of the soul's love 
nor can they be its good. The true object of the soul lies 
beyond this world of matter and flesh. The ignorant and 
those preoccupied with the sensible objects of love may have 
difficulty appreciating that the soul's ultimate object of 
love is There, but those who have experienced this kind of 
transcendent love know what is meant (#19-#20}. 
m. For to transcend this world is to transcend this 
life and to attain a better life by ascending to Nous and 
ultimately by sharing in the One. If the soul comes to 
understand that its true life is There, it becomes aware 
that it is alive and real because it participates in the 
supplier and source of life. It is in this that the source 
of soul's good and, hence, the true object of its love lie 
and the soul needs nothing else (#22}. 
n. On the other hand, in order for the soul to 
realize that its true life lies There it must first 
transcend the distractions of this world. Only thus does 
the soul attain to the intelligible world, wherein she 
realizes her true nature and has a kind of contact with God, 
by whom she is illuminated and thereby becomes divine. In 
that intelligible world, 
flame and filled, with 
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then, she is as a bright eternal 
divine light. But if she is 
distracted by the world below she is as a mere flicker of a 
flame which gradually diminishes (#23-#26). 
The following issues in the key text require 
clarification and comments: a) life as the energeia of 
~' and b) the role of eros in the life of Soul and in the 
life of Nous. 
a) Life as the energeia of Nous 
In text B (#9) Plotinus describes the life of Nous as 
energeia. This characterization adds significantly to our 
understanding of z6e itself, especially when this additional 
commentary is linked with our discoveries in text A, namely, 
that z6e is self-kinesis and intellection. 
As we saw in text 
determinate (intelligible) 
A, energeia itself denotes a 
nature or entity ( ousia). In 
other words, energeia is the same as form (eidos). Hence, 
by describing the energeia of Nous as life, Plotinus means 
to say that the very nature of Nous is life. 
But what specifically is this life which constitutes 
the en.ergeia of Nous? If we can answer this question, we 
will strengthen our grasp of what Plotinus means by life in 
the strictest sense. 
In attributing life to Nous Plotinus follows Aristotle 
to a certain extent. Let us, then, examine briefly what 
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life means for Aristotle. 
understood in two .senses: 
The term "life," for him, is 
life everywhere below the level 
of God (e.g., plant life, animal life, human life, etc.) and 
life on the level of God. 
Aristotle begins by noting that natural bodies may be 
divided into those that possess life and those that do not 
(i.e., the four elements and their compounds). By life on 
the lowest, or vegetal, level of natural substances is meant 
the self-nourishment, growth and deterioration of the 
natural body.42 Life on the animal level consists of 
powers and operations in addition to the above mentioned, 
among which are the power of producing motion and stopping 
with respect to place, the power of sensation, etc.43 
Life on the human level consists of an even greater variety 
of powers and operations, including the power of 
intellect.44 In general, life on the level of plants, 
animals and human beings consists, for Aristotle, of their 
being able to be efficient causes of, and of their actually 
being efficient causes of, their own various operations. 45 
42ne Anima, Book 2, Ch. 1, 412a13-15. 
43Ibid., Book 2, Ch. 2, 413a23-25. 
44Ibid., Book 2, Ch. 3, 414bl8-19: 415a8-14. 
45For Aristotle it is obvious that there exists also 
the ceaseless, circular motion of the various heavenly 
spheres. Each sphere has a separate moving agent ( or 
Intelligence) whose life the sphere desires to imitate, as 
closely as possible, by circular movement. Besides the 
separate intelligences, the heavenly spheres also involve 
each a soul informing matter, which is the fifth essence: 
quintessence (Metaphysics, Bk. 12, Ch. 8, 1073a25-bl7). 
93 
Life on the level of God, however, does not involve 
the existent which.is alive being the efficient cause of its 
own various operations. Rather, life there is identical 
with intellection and is itself uncaused. If on the human 
level, Aristotle argues, the highest activity is 
contemplation (and is an activity which human beings can 
have only for a while) and thereby constitutes perfect human 
life, then perfect life as such (the life of God) must be 
perfect intellection as such and energeia.46 Accordingly, 
God (as Subsistent Intellection) is perfect and eternal life 
(since perfect life is equivalent to perfect knowledge, 
which, according to Aristotle, is pure act).47 Thus, 
46That God's energeia is one of perfect intellection 
is the position of Metaphysics, Book 12, Ch. 7, 1072bl4-31. 
This seemingly permanent dimension of his thought is 
expressed in various texts (e.g., On the Heavens, 292a22-b4; 
Nicomachean Ethics 1178bl0; Politics 1325b28). 
Although praxis is ascribed to God in the Nicomachean 
Ethics (1154b25) and the Politics (1325b30), it is meant 
there in the wider sense in which theoria is a kind of 
praxis (see Politics 1325b20). 
Aristotle's position on energeia is explained in C.H. 
Chen, Sophia: The Science Aristotle Sought (New York: George 
Olms Verlag Hildesheim, 1976), Chs. 25-26. 
47For something to be alive, as we have seen, is for 
it to be capable of efficiently causing its own operations 
and/or to be actually efficiently causing these operations. 
In all existents we are able to observe that this "being 
alive" is a combination of act and potency. Each living 
existent has a soul, itself actuality, from which (as 
actuality) follow certain operative powers (active 
dynameis). When actuated by some object these operative 
powers efficiently bring about some result (e.g., 
intellection, a moral act, etc.), and for this reason may be 
called operations as acts. Specifically, what is known is 
the content-determining cause of the actuation of the knower 
and is the telic cause of the knower's actual loving. Thus, 
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where there is fully actualized knowledge there is true 
life. 48 
Similarly, for Plotinus, Nous is pure energeia because 
Its very nature is noesis.49 Accordingly, because Its 
(47continued) 
the good-as-known actuates and moves the living agent to 
act. The relevant fundamental Aristotelian principle here 
is that whatever is moved is moved by another; whatever goes 
from potency to act does so by that which is itself in act 
(De Anima, Book 3, Ch. 10, 433a9-32; 433bl3-38; Metaphysics, 
Book 12, Ch. 5, 107la4-18; Ch. 8, 1073a24-33). 
Aristotle's examination of the various operative 
powers and their respective operations yields the conclusion 
that the highest human activity or operation is intellection 
itself (Metaphysics, Book 12, Ch. 7 1072b20-25). Hence, to 
be fully alive is to be actually and always knowing. To be 
perfect life is to be that state of intellection. To be 
subsistent intellection is to be subsistent life (Ibid., 
Book 12i Ch. 7, 1072b28-31). --
4tsFurthermore, where there is fully actualized 
knowledge and, hence, true life, there is, we may infer, 
true happiness as well (Metaphysics, Book 12, Ch. 7, 
1072b25). Examination of the nature of happiness provides 
another means for understanding the life of Aristotle's God. 
In the Nicomachean Ethics ( Book 10, Chs. 3-8) he explains 
happiness as follows. Perfect happiness (he teleia 
eudaimonia) is theoretical activity ( theoretike energeia), 
which is coextensive with contemplation (theoria). 
Accordingly, the happiest life is the life of reason --i.e., 
the philosophic or theoretical life (Nicomachean Ethics, 
Book 1, Ch. 5, 1095bl9; Book 10, Ch. 7, 1177al2-18; 1178a4-
8; Ch. 8, 1178b7-32). The second happiest life, Aristotle 
adds,is life in accordance with practical wisdom and moral 
virtue -- i.e., the practical or political life (Ibid., Book 
1, Ch. 5, 1095bl8; Book 10, Ch. 8, 1178a9-22; Politics, Book 
7, Ch. 2, 1324a40). Thus, intellection is the highest 
perfection for human beings. From this we can inf er that 
God, for Aristotle, is perfect because He is subsistent 
intellection. 
this section 49In order to understand 
let us examine the following 
Plotinus (and note also 
influences): being in potency 
(to energeia on), act (he 
dynamis). 
terms as they 
the relevant 
(to dynamei on), 
energeia) and 
more clearly 
are used by 
Aristotelian 
being in act 
potency (he 
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energeia is noesis, only Nous is a knower essentially and 
absolutely. Furthermore, Nous must be eternal, and not 
temporal, because Its knowledge is simultaneous and always 
complete, not successive and piecemea1.50 
(49continued) 
In II, 5 (25), 1, 10-15, Plotinus defines "being in 
potency" as that which can become something else after what 
it currently is. When a thing can acquire an accidental or 
a substantial form from an extrinsic cause it is said to be 
in potency or dynamis in the passive sense (Ibid., Ch. 2, 
lines 29-34). The Aristotelian origins of this definition 
are obvious from the fact (among others) that the Greek term 
to dynamei on is used by Aristotle to describe passive 
dynamis (see, for example, De Genera ti one et Corruptione, 
Book 1, Ch. 3, 317bl6-18; Metaphysics, Book 4, Ch. 4, 
1007b28 and Book 12, Ch. 6, 107lbl9). 
"Being in act" or to energeia on is the opposite of 
"being in potency" and thus refers to any being that is 
completed by a form (II, 5 [ 25], 1, 26-29; 2, 3-8). Being 
in act, however, is different from form itself, which is one 
component of being in act (II, 5 [ 25], 2, 10-15). Hence, 
being in act denotes both sensible and intelligible beings, 
since the latter are composites also. Here, too, the 
Aristotelian influence is apparent since to energeia on is 
used by Aristotle (see, for example, Metaphysics, Book 8, 
Ch. 6, 1045bl7-23 and Book 9, Ch. 6, 1048b8) and since 
Plotinus' explanations of change seem to echo those of 
Aristotle. 
"Act" or he energeia is, for Plotinus (as well as for 
Aristotle in Metaphysics, Book 4, Ch. 2, 1003b25-27), 
identical with form or eidos (II, 5 [25), 2, 28-31). Being 
in potency is that which receives, and is the substratum of, 
act. Act comes to being in potency extrinsically and unites 
with this substratum, thereby producing a composite: being 
in act (II, 5 [25), 2, 33-34). 
"Potency" or he dynamis is not passive but active 
dynamis, namely, a being's capacity (through its own 
perfection) to bring about and receive act. In other words, 
whatever is potency (active dynamis) has the perfection and 
the power to impart some form either to itself or to 
another. He dynami s ( or active dynami s ) , then, is the 
active power of any living agent. ( In preparing these 
remarks on energeia and dynamis, I have relied on the 
extensive explanations contained in Hancock, Energeia~) 
50see v, 9 (5), 1-4. Also see III, 7 (45), 3, 34-38. 
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Thus Nous is the eternal and highest being because It 
is identical with ,the object of Its knowledge. All beings 
other than Nous are temporal because they are, as beings 
whose knowledge involves succession, dependent on Nous to 
bring them to act. 51 Finally, al though the One is prior 
to Nous, such antecedence is not chronological but simply 
expresses the logical dependence of Nous (which Itself is 
eternally in energeia) on the One for Its reality.52 
Because Nous is both eternally in energeia and depends 
on nothing else for Its knowledge (once It has turned back 
to the One and been informed by It), It is Itself what It 
intellects It is both knower and known, subject and 
object (Nous and noeton).53 Furthermore, since It is 
eternal, Its knowledge is not discursive, which is 
characteristic only of temporal beings, but intuitive.54 
51As a result, while all beings (including Nous) can 
be said to be alive, only Nous can be termed life itself. 
Only Nous, because It is eternal self-kinesis and a self-
intellection, truly is life. 
How eternity is the life of Nous and how time is the 
life of Soul will be examined key text D: VI, 7 (38). 
52v, 9 (5), 5, 4-7. 
53see V, 9 (5), 5, 4, where Plotinus depicts Nous as 
in act.and eternally Nous. 
54The characteristic act or energeia of Nous is 
noesis, an intellection that immediately grasps the whole of 
the object in its entirety without any kind of process or 
transition. This is termed "non-discursive thought" by 
Blumenthal, but may also be called intuition. This 
type of thought (noesis) is contrasted in a number of 
passages with dianoia or logismos, which proceeds by 
movement from one object to another 61.,i::(ooos; and which 
is characteristic of soul (V, 1 [ 10], 11; I, 3 [ 20], 4, 6-
19; II, 9 [33], 1, 24-30; V, 3 [49], 9, 23-25; 17, 23-24; I, 
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It is important to note that Plotinus' account of the 
life, intellectiqn and energeia of Nous parallels 
Aristotle's explanation to a certain extent. However, it is 
equally significant that Plotinus, under Plato's influence, 
transcends Aristotle in at least two respects: first, by 
describing Nous as a self-kinesis rather than akinetos; 55 
(54continued) 
8 [51], 2, Bff). This process is described by expressions 
like a\Ao XO.I., a\Ao Aeti3E:LV (V, 3 [ 49], 17, 23-24). This 
process of discursive thought is terminated only when the 
mind enters into that immediate, complete and eternal 
possession of its object which is the mark of noesis (I, 3 
[ 20], 4, 9-20; IV, 4 [ 28], 12, 5-12). In several instances 
there is also a contrast between the restless, and 
successive life of soul, and the quiet, unchanging and self-
contained life of Nous (V, 2 [ 11], 1, 16-21; I, 4 [ 46], 3, 
24ff; III, 2 [47],-4-,-13-16). The precise nature of soul's 
life, especially the nature of soul's contemplation, will be 
explicated in our next key text, III, 8 (30). 
In those cases where Plotinus is concerned primarily 
with stressing the transcendence of Soul (and sometimes even 
of World Soul and the souls of the heavenly bodies) he will 
often deny it some of its characteristic features. Thus he 
sometimes argues that neither Soul (IV, 4 [28], 1, 4-16) nor 
World Soul nor the souls of the heavenly bodies (IV, 4 [28], 
6-7) need memory. But we may infer (and, hence, recognize a 
difficulty) that only that which knows intuitively (i.e., 
grasps its object completely and eternally) has no need of 
memory since no part of its knowledge is ever absent from it 
(V, 9 [ 5], 5, 29-34). On this topic see John M. Rist, 
"Integration and the Undescended Soul in Plotinus," American 
Journal of Philosophy 88 (1967) 410-422. 
55see Metaphysics, Book 12, Ch. 8, 1074a35-37. 
Plotinus accepts the Platonic conception of primal (as well 
as every other kind of) life as self-kinesis. It is not 
possible, Plotinus reasons, for the Primal Reality to be 
primal life because life is a self-kinesis which is the 
energeia of intellection, and that implies a duality of 
knower and known. Accordingly, if to be real is to be one, 
as Plotinus maintains, the Primal Reality cannot be Nous 
(which Itself is multiple), but must be simple and one (and, 
hence, above life). 
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second, by synthesizing the Platonic Forms with Aristotle's 
noes is noeseos. We shall have occasion to expand on these 
important differences between Plotinus and Aristotle in 
later key texts. 
matters here. 
Let us comment only briefly on these 
Plotinus, under the influence of Plato, considers 
intellection to be a kind of kinesis and thus he is willing 
to ascribe it to his Nous. Aristotle does not call his God 
(or Nous} a kinesis because this would obscure its principal 
cosmological role as Prime, but Unmoved, Mover.56 
The combination of Plato's World of Forms with 
Aristotle's Self-Thinking Intelligence ( or Unmoved Mover} 
Plotinus probably saw in germinal form in the Timaeus 
(30cff}, where the ideal model of the world is an 
intelligible living being and the Craftsman is an intellect, 
and in the Sophist (248e-249d}, where true being consists in 
56rn Book 12 (Ch. 6, 107lbl2-22} of the Metaphysics 
Aristotle enumerates five requirements for the production of 
eternal motion. 1) There must be an eternal ousia 2) which 
is capable of causing motion 3) not only simply because it 
has the power (dynamis} to do so, but because it can 
actually exercise (energeia} it. 4) This ousia, then, must 
be energeia and not dynamis. 5) This ousia must be 
immaterial, since it must be eternal. Since that which 
moves by being moved by another cannot be first, there must 
be something that moves without itself being moved (Ch. 6, 
107lb34-37}. This unmoved mover must itself be motionless 
and yet somehow cause motion in others (Ch. 7, 1072a25-27}. 
Aristotle's Unmoved Mover, then, may be termed a "mover" 
only through extrinsic denomination, as the final cause of 
all movement (by being an object of desire and love). On 
this last point see Metaphysics, Book 9, Ch. 8, 1049b24-25. 
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the forms, in motion, life and intelligence. 
Thus aided by Plato, Plotinus concludes that Nous is 
actually a significant unity. Nous, in thinking Itself, 
thinks the infinite plurality of Platonic Forms. These 
Forms (noeta which Nous intellects) are the products of Nous 
and identical in nature with It. Each is therefore itself a 
life and intelligence. Each Form is also both an 
intelligible and an intelligence. The great unity of Nous 
is thereby emphatically assured by the fact that It is 
really a universe of beings (which themselves are individual 
intelligences or knowers) where each one knows and is known 
by every other. Furthermore, each Form is itself in act 
(energeia) and actually knows all other Forms. 57 
Plotinus concludes, Nous is a one-in-many. 
Thus, 
How precisely does the energeia of Nous, which is Its 
life, generate these Forms (#9)? Let us return briefly to 
Plotinus' explanation of how Nous comes to be. Nous is 
brought into being by the overflow of the One, which 
involves two moments. In the first moment (prohodos), Nous 
is indeterminate, unformed and dynamis. Plotinus also calls 
this first stage "intelligible matter. 11 58 In the second 
57see VI, 7 (38), 5 and VI, 2 (43), 20-22. Also see 
IV, 8 (6), 3, 14-16. 
5 8 See I I , 4 ( 12 ) , 5 , 2 4-3 7 and I I I , 8 ( 3 0 ) , 11 , 1-8 . 
Why matter must be postulated in the Intelligible World is 
explained in the early chapters of treatise II, 4, where 
Plotinus stresses that it is free from the imperfections of 
its sensible counterpart. While both constitute the 
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moment ( epistrophe), Nous turns back to the One out of 
desire for It (because the One is also the Good) and becomes 
thereby determined, formed and energeia.59 Nous, however, 
cannot grasp the One all at once and in the latter's full 
perfection. Accordingly, Nous achieves an understanding of 
the One in terms of the world of Forms, the totality of 
which is the object of Nous' own contemplation. Thus, Nous 
contemplates Its source by also contemplating Itself.60 
In this way, Nous, the first product of the One, is both 
knower and known.61 Nous is a reality whose determination 
and life result directly from Its desire for Its ultimate 
(58continued) 
principle of indeterminancy within their respective worlds, 
intelligible matter does not share sensible matter's 
unsubstantiality and, of course, should not be regarded as 
evil (II, 4 [12], 5, 12-23: 15, 17-28: II, 5 [25], 3, 8-19). 
We shall examine intelligible matter further in key text D: 
VI, 7 ( 3 8) . 
5 9 IV, 7 ( 2 ) , 8 3, 6-2 5. 
60The lower (Nous) here is related to the higher 
(the One) insofar as~is a logos of the higher. However, 
our understanding of this relationship here is furthered by 
the doctrine of contemplation. Although Plotinus will make 
his position on contemplation more clear in later treatises 
( especially in III, 8 [ 30] ) , it may already be seen to 
function as early as treatise IV, 7 ( 2), 83, 6-25, where 
he refers to the need of the inferior (the product) to "gaze 
upon" (or contemplate) the superior (the producer or 
source). 
6lowing to Its own vast perfection, Nous too 
overflows in Its own two-moment process of prohodos 
(dynamis) and epistrophe (ener~eia) and thus produces soul. 
Such evolution of energe1a from dynamis through 
contemplation continues until all perfection and being are 
exhausted. Plotinus explains the relationship of 
contemplated and contemplator in treatise V, 2 (11), 1, 5-
22. We shall have more to say about how contemplation 
relates to life in key text C: III, 8 (30). 
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source, the One-Good. The result of such a combination of 
Platonic and Aristotelian elements is the Nous of Plotinus' 
Enneads, a self-living (because self-moving) Intelligence 
whose contents are the Forms.62 
We may summarize this first area of clarification as 
follows. The energeia (i.e., that which makes an entity be 
formally what it is) of Nous is life and intellection 
(noesis), which is a self-kinesis whose ultimate object is 
the One. Other beings (e.g., Soul and Nature) have 
intelligence but only Nous is intelligence. Soul and Nature 
have intelligence only because they participate in (by being 
62In v, 9 (5), 5, 7-16 Plotinus makes clear why it 
is appropriate and even necessary, to join the Forms with 
Nous by arguing that the very nature of Nous is inseparable 
from the objects of Its intellection. In other words, Nous 
and noeton are not separable from each other. 
This view is not entirely original to Plotinus, 
however. Albinus (second century A.O.) in his Epitome (or 
Didascalicos, Ch. 9) also identified his Supreme Deity with 
Aristotle's self-contemplating Intelligence (who was further 
identified with Plato's Demiurge and with the Form of the 
Good) and made the Forms be the thoughts of God. With 
regard to the theory of Forms Albinus thus accepted this 
common Middle Platonic interpretation, which was first 
found, among extant authors, in Philo of Alexandria (25 B.C. 
- 40 A~D.), in his De Opificio Mundi, Vol. 5. 
Discussions of this and related issues are found in R. 
E. Witt, Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism 
(Cambridge, 1937); H. A. Wolfson, Philo (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts; 1947), Vol I; A. H. Armstrong, "The 
Background of the Doctrine 'That the Intelligibles are not 
Outside the Intellect,'" Entretiens sur L'Antiquite 
Classique, V: Les Sources de Plotin (Geneve: Fondation 
Hardt, 1960), pp. 393-425; John Dillon The Middle Platonists 
(Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977). 
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1_ogoi of) Nous. 6 3 Similarly, other beings have life ( or 
are alive) but only Nous is life. 64 Soul and Nature have 
life only because they participate in (by being logoi of) 
NOUS. -
b) The role of eros in the life of Soul and 
in the life of Nous 
Plotinus uses eros ( love or desire) to describe the 
soul's ascent to the One (#10, #13-#26) 65 and the 
63Precisely how Soul and Nature are intelligent and 
alive will be clarified in Text C: III, 8 (30), 8-10. 
64In III, 7 (45), 5, 11 Plotinus explains that there 
are degrees of life and that these degrees entail eternity 
and time. We shall have more to say on these points in text 
E: I, 4 (46), 3-4. 
65There are other texts (I, 6 [ 1], 7, 12-14; V, 8 
[31], 10, 33; VI, 7 [38], 22; 36, 17-19; III, 5 [SO]) where 
Plotinus describes the soul's ascent to the One-Good in 
terms of the love metaphor of the Symposium (206ff). This 
fact is relevant to text B because the soul's relationship 
to the One is described as a "longing" and is compared to 
the love of a noble maiden and to Aphrodite herself. 
However, though Plotinus seems to describe the maiden's love 
in the language of physical passion, he is careful to point 
out that it is more like that which is directed towards a 
noble father than that which is directed toward a bridegroom 
or some other sort of lover. Such a caution makes obvious 
that Plotinus does not follow Plato's doctrine of love 
( S:r:mposium 180c-185c; 206c ff) without reservation. This 
point is further explained in his treatise on love, III, 5 
( 50), 1, 40ff. There Plotinus introduces the important 
distinction between the pure ( and hence superior) love of 
beauty, which does not desire to generate, and the love 
which is mixed with desire for perpetuity and so seeks to 
generate (and hence is inferior). While in Plato all love 
up to the highest is essentially productive (Symposium 
212a), in Plot in us authentic love is not. Consult Albert 
Marten Wolters, Plotinus 'On Eros': A Detailed Exegetical 
Study of Enneads III, 5 (Amsterdam: Filosofisch Ins ti tuut 
van de Vrije Universiteit, 1972). 
103 
relationship of Nous to the One. 66 He even mentions (some 
commentators contend) er6s as a "characteristic" of the 
one. 67 
The role of love in the soul's journey is, as R. T. 
Wallis puts it, "an excellent example of a Platonic theme 
taken over by Plotinus and submitted to some drastic tacit 
corrections. 11 68 Among other things,69 Plotinus takes 
exception to Plato's view that love aims at procreation in 
the beautiful. 70 For Plotinus the more perfect form of 
love is that which does not deliberately aim at production 
(although production may in fact be an occasional by-
product), since such an aim is a sign of dissatisfaction 
with one's present state71 and a turning from one's center 
( or inner reality) towards what is outside and sensible. 
66see, for example, VI, 7 (38), 35, 19-33. 
67 Treatise VI, 8 ( 39), 13, lff; 15, lff seems to 
provide the only data upon which J. Trouillard (La 
Procession lotinienne [Paris: Presses Uni versi ta ires de 
France, 1955, passim) and Rist (Eros and Psyche, pp. 76ff 
and Road to Reality, pp. 66-83) base their description of 
the One as willing and loving Itself. But, as Plotinus 
himself cautions (VI, 8 [39], 13, 1-5; 18, 52-53), such 
terms are ultimately inadequate because they imply 
(incorrectly) that the One has needs and, hence, is 
imperfect. (See also another late treatise, III, 5 [50], 7, 
9-15 and Wallis, Neoplatonism, p. 64). Additional relevant 
comments are contained in Rist, "The One of Plotinus and the 
God of Aristotle," Mind, Vol. 27, no. 1, p. 85ff. 
68wallis, Neop'Iatonism, p. 86. 
69For helpful discussion of the ways in which 
Plotinus modifies the Platonic conception of eros, see 
WallisL Neoplatonism, pp. 86-88. 
tOsymposium 206e. 
71III, 5 (50), 1, 38-50. 
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out of his great concern for preserving the primacy of the 
one-Good, Plotinus· so radically distills the Platonic view 
of love that only one key point remains: the real aim or 
object of genuine love is union with the beloved. 
The several instances in which Plotinus notes that 
contact with the One is made through the center of our soul 
further clarify the role of love.72 Our particular center 
is not itself the One. We must seek and focus on the center 
common to all souls (and indeed to all realities below the 
One). 73 Reflection on this analogy reveals that the 
centers of concentric circles cannot be distinguished unless 
the circles are moved apart.74 Thus, the One is not 
something we contain, our inmost "self," so to speak, 75 
7 2 I I , 2 ( 14 ) , 2 , 6 ff ; V , 1 ( 1 0 ) , 11 , 9-15 ; VI , 8 
(39), 18, 8ff. 
73vI, 9(9), 8, 10-12. 
74vI, 9 (9), 10, 16-18. 
75The use of the term "self" here is not meant to 
imply that Plotinus has an authentic philosophy of "self" or 
that he is aware of "self" in any sort of technical meaning. 
Even Gerard J. P. O'Daly notes in his study on the subject 
( Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self New York: Barnes . and 
Noble, 1973, pp. 89-90) that Plotinus has 
no fixed word --hence no concept, strictly speaking --
for 'self'. As P. Henry has pointed out, there is no word 
for 'person, ' or self, in Greek, and so Plotinus uses 
autos to express the concept. He also uses hemeis, or 
the reflexive hauton.. But if the word, and the 
explicit, canonized concept are missing here VI, 7, 35 
and VI, 9, 11, adequate testimony has already been given 
of Plotinus' clear awareness of the importance of a 
concept of self - whether in the historical process or 
in reflection - to account for the identity of a human 
subject at the several levels of existence possible to 
man. 
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nor is It merely a remote and passive object of our gaze, 
waiting, as it we~e, for us to find It. On the contrary, 
the One is the reality which contains us, as our 
transcendent source, to which we return out of love for Its 
goodness (#13-#18).76 
Love, then, is desire for what is good. Specifically, 
it is the desire for, as Plato puts it, permanent possession 
(75continued) 
However, at least one Plotinus scholar has disputed the 
"adequate testimony" provided by O'Daly. Leo Sweeney, in 
his article: "Mani's Twin and Plotinus: Questions on 
'Self'," (Jay Bregman [ed.], Neoplatonism and Gnosticism 
[Norfolk, Virginia: International Society for Neoplatonic 
Studies, 1988]) argues that terms like autos hemeis, hauton, 
etc. do not refer to "self" in any technical sense of the 
word. Rather, they are sometimes used simply to emphasize 
the contrast between a pair of items (e.g., soul and body) 
while at other times they are used to refer to, and focus 
on, what something really or essentially is. 
76wallis notes (Neoplatonism, p. 40) that, for 
Plotinus, 
our true self is eternally saved and all that is 
required is to wake up to this fact, a process requiring 
self-discipline, but perfectly within the soul's own 
power (I, 6 [l], 9, 22-25). And it is doubtful whether 
his mysticism can be classified as 'theistic' without 
serious qualification.... The 'suddenness' of the 
vision is not necessarily proof of grace in the theistic 
sense, since, first, Plotinus is here echoing Plato 
(Symposium 210E, Epinomis VII, 341C-D), secondly, he 
stresses that the necessary movement is the work of the 
soul, not of the One (VI, 9 [9], 8, 33ff; V, 5 [32], 8, 
13ff) and, thirdly, similar declarations occur in non-
theistic mysticism, notably in Zen Buddhism. And 
Plotinus' denial that the One loves its products would 
seem to mark a decisive rejection of the fundamental 
tenet both of Christian mysticism and of theistic 
mysticism in general, that mystical union involves a 
reciprocal love-relationship between two persons. 
r 
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of the Good. 77 This desire is another name for the self-
motion, and hence life, of the soul and thus of all motion 
and change in the uni verse. Accordingly, there is a very 
close relationship between the soul's immortality, owing to 
its self movement, and its eros. Based upon these 
considerations, then, we may infer that soul's genuine life 
is a self-kinesis (i.e., intellection or contemplation) 
which is motivated and initiated by love of its ultimate 
object, the One-Good. 
Desire or love is also fundamental to Plotinus' 
explanation of how and especially why Nous and soul are 
produced and produce subsequent realities. Each being, in 
the first moment of its production, is an indeterminate 
desire that through love of its source then reverts back to 
that source and is thereby made determinate. In addition, 
love is the inspiration, so to speak, for contemplation, 
which is necessary for production. The One-Good is the only 
object of Nous' love. The self-kinesis of Nous, which is 
Its very life, would make no sense and would not eternally 
originate if Nous did not love the One-Good. Love, then, is 
the reqson why Nous lives. 
In a later treatise, VI, 7 [38],78 Plotinus 
77symposium 204e-206a. 
78vI, 7 (38), 35, 19-33; 
examine relevant portions of this 
our study. 
36, 17-19. We shall 
complex treatise later in 
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describes Nous as eternally and permanently in two 
simultaneous states, one "drunk" (loving) and one "sober" 
(knowing).79 Nous has a) the power for thinking, by which 
It examines Its own contents, and b) a power by which It 
"sees" that which is above (the One) by a kind of intuition 
(by which It first simply "saw" and afterwards, as it "saw," 
acquired intellect and is one). The first of these is the 
contemplation of Nous when It is "in Its right mind," so to 
speak; the second is Nous in love. Nous, then, lives by 
eternally pursuing Its prope~ activity of knowing while It 
is eternally raised above Itself in the union of love.BO 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Obviously, VI, 9 is important to our study because it 
makes explicit, al though tersely, what the life of Nous 
entails. Furthermore, it explains how, if Nous is alive, 
everything subsequent to It must be alive also. Finally it 
establishes the role and importance of eros in any living 
being. 
First, Nous is perfect as mind or knower because 
intellection (noesis) is Its very nature (ousia) and 
essential act (energeia). It is Itself what It knows 
79see also III, 8 (30), 11, 23-24. 
80As Armstrong (The Cambrid e Histor of Later Greek 
and Early Medieval Philosophy Cambridge: University Press, 
196 7] , hereafter: Armstrong, Cambridge History, pp. 262-
263) notes, Nous' "power of love seems to be identical with 
that unbounded life as it first came forth from the One." 
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because It is both knower and known. Its knowledge is not 
discursive but intuitive and, hence, It knows eternally and 
completely. Nous, then, may be said to be life because Its 
life is Its energeia and a self-kinesis. Through Its self-
kinesis Nous causes Its own reversion (epistrophe) towards 
the One ( and this reversion is the energeia of Nous). 81 
~, then, moves Itself intellectually to know the One. 
And this self-originated movement of Nous from active 
dynamis (Nous in the first moment of Its emanation from the 
One: prohodos) to energeia likewise marks the generation of 
the content of Its intellection: the world of intelligible 
Forms. Plotinus thus combines elements of Platonic and 
Aristotelian origin to describe the life of Nous more fully. 
The result of this combination is a self-moved Intelligence, 
whose contents are the Forms and whose life is energeia, 
which is precisely Its self-kinesis as intellection. 
Through Its life and intellection Nous is necessarily 
productive. Its principal products are the intelligibles, 
which It contains and which represent Its best grasp of the 
Primal Reality. Each intelligible Form is itself a knower 
and a known and alive. In this way Nous is a unity which is 
multiple, a one-in-many. The other_ beings Nous produces 
81In what precise sense Nous 
emanation from the One (prohodos) 
discussed in text D: VI, 7 (38). 
in Its first moment of 
is also life will be 
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(e.g., Soul and Nature) have intelligence, but only Nous is 
intelligence. Ac9ordingly, their lives are less perfect 
because they involve multiplicity of a higher magnitude. 
soul and Nature, for example, have intelligence and life 
only because they participate in the primal intellection and 
life of Nous by being Its logoi. 
A fuller answer to the question: "How does Nous 
live?" is provided by reference to the role of eros in 
Plotinus' thought. Nous, the first product of the One, is a 
reality whose determination (through the moment of 
epistrophe) results from Its self-kinesis of intellection. 
But Nous initiates its kinesis out of love for Its source. 
In other words, Nous turns to the One and is filled by It 
because the One is the object of Its desire or love. The 
very motivation of Nous' self-kinesis is the One's supreme 
goodness, to which Nous, and any being for that matter, is 
inexorably attracted. 
In this way eros further explains the life of Nous, 
insofar as It lives fully only through turning to the One-
Good, the Source of Its life and content and the object of 
Its desire. Love for the One-Good likewise helps to explain 
more fully the life of soul, especially as it ascends first 
to its antepenultimate source, Nous, and then to its 
ultimate source, the One-Good. 
By refining the Platonic view of eros Plotinus is able 
to bring into focus its role in his theory of life. Genuine 
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1ove involves neither the production of some artifact nor 
anY physical or s~nsual liaison with another being. Its 
true aim is union with the primal reality -- the One-Good: 
the ultimate object of desire. 
What genuine love motivates in any being is precisely 
self-kinesis, (which is intellection and which ultimately 
has as its object the One as intelligible), which is the 
very life of that being. 
Finally, although this key text has provided some 
information regarding the life of soul, 
remain to be answered. First, in what 
several questions 
specifically does 
soul's intellective life consist? What does it mean to say 
that the life of soul involves contemplation and production? 
How does the life of soul differ from the life of Nous? 
What is the nature of the human soul's life? For answers we 
must proceed to our next key text, III, 8 (30). 
CHAPTER IV 
TEXT C: ENNEAD III, 8 (30), 8; 10 
The key text we shall examine in treatise III, 8 is 
found in Chapters 8 and 10.l Before turning our attention 
to the key text let us describe the treatise as a whole. 
According to Porphyry, III, 8: "On Nature, Contemplation 
and the One," is the thirtieth treatise that Plotinus 
wrote2 and hence, belongs to his middle period, during 
lTreatise III, 8 as a whole is a rich source of data 
on zoe and related notions. In Chapters 8 and 10 we find 
the""synthesis of this data that our study requires. 
Specifically, we find there an integration of life with 
logos, contemplation and seriousness. 
Secondly, although there is some discussion of life as 
dynamis in Chapter 11 of III, 8 (as well as in V, 1 [10], 7, 
1-25 earlier), we shall defer full treatment of this issue 
to our next key text -- VI, 7 (38) -- which contains a more 
detailed and more extensive analysis of this relationship. 
2porphyry, "Life," p. 25, lines 30-35. treatise 
III, 8 is in fact the first part of a major work of 
Plotinus, including v, 8 (31); V, 5 (32); and II, 9 (33), 
the four sections of which Porphyry arbitrarily separated 
into distinct treatises (see Armstrong, Enneads, Vol. I, p. 
xi, Vol. II, pp. 220-221, and Vol. III, p. 258). For 
further information on these four treatises see D. Roloff, 
Die Grossschrift III, 8; V, 8; V, 5; II, 9 (Berlin, 1971). 
The problems raised by the appearance of these subdivisions 
as separate treatises are discussed in H. R. Schwyzer, 
"Plotin," in Pauly's Realencyclopadie, XXI, 487. For an 
evaluation of Porphyry's principles for arranging the 
treatises see R. Harder, "Eine Neue Schrift Plotins," in 
Kleine Schriften (Munich: Beck, 1960), pp. 303-13. 
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which he produced works "of the highest perfection. ,.3 In 
order to introduc~ this key text, we shall briefly examine 
those treatises subsequent to _Text B (VI, 9 [9], 18 sqq) and 
preceding III, 8, which contain helpful background data on 
zoe. -
In treatise V, 1 ( 10), 2 Plotinus explains that the 
world Soul is that which immediately gives order, life and 
movement to the various parts of the sensible uni verse. 4 
In chapter 7, lines 1-25, he turns to Nous to describe It as 
an active power (dynamis) of Its own being.5 In Its first 
moment of emanation from the One, Nous is indeterminate 
intellection and for that reason It is life. 
In treatise II, 4 (12), 5 Plotinus further describes 
the life of Nous in Its first indeterminate moment. He 
speaks of Nous as intelligible matter endowed with divinity 
(ton theon), life and thought. He distinguishes 
intelligible matter from sensible matter by noting that the 
3John Deck, for example, considers III, 8 "worthy of 
special attention. It stands out for its finished literary 
execution, for its weaving together of central Plotinian 
themes, and for its unification of the Plotinian world by a 
contemplation present in all things below the One, the 
Plotinian God" (Contemplation, p. 3). 
4The World Soul furnishes life to the uni verse both 
collectively and distributively. In doing so it is both 
immanent (by penetrating, illuminating and animating every 
item in the universe) and transcendent (by being above the 
heavens and the sensible cosmos). 
5As noted earlier, we shall thoroughly examine the 
nature of life as dynamis in our next key text: VI, 7 (38). 
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latter is intrinsically lifeless and merely a "decorated 
corpse." 6 
After several treatises 7 which are not particularly 
helpful to understanding zoe, we come to VI, 4 (22) and VI, 
5 (23), both of which deal generally with the all-
pervasiveness of life in the universe. Specifically, these 
treatises contain the following important points. a) Matter 
participates in an individual soul (VI, 4 [ 22], 16, 4ff). 
Hence, no soul ever really participates in body, for the 
inferior always participates in the superior and not the 
other way around. b) Time is the result of the diminished 
presence of Nous in the Soul (i.e., Soul is a logos of 
Nous). Nous is measureless, all powerful (i.e., dynamis), 
and nowhere limited. As such, Nous is outside of time. Its 
6In II, 4 ( 12), 3, 6-18, Plotinus discusses 
intelligible matter and indicates that even intelligible 
realities are composite, but in a different way from 
sensible realities. Logoi in the intelligible world are 
composites of intelligible matter and form and of potency 
and act. But while in sensible existents matter is always 
receiving different forms, in intelligible realities matter 
always remains the same because each reality There contains 
all the forms at once. For example, insofar as· the 
intelligible realities are in act, they make Nature itself 
be composite as it actuates and forms lower realities. In 
this way, Plotinus can be seen to anticipate his explicit 
explanation in III, 8 ( 30), 3-4 of how Nature causes and 
forms all vegetal life. 
7see III, 9 (13): "Various Considerations;" II, 2 
( 14): "On the Circular Motion;" III, 4 ( 15): "On Our 
Allotted Guardian Spirit;" I, 9 ( 16) : "On the Reasonable 
Departure; II, 6 ( 17): "On Quality;" V, 7 ( 18) : "Whether 
There Are Ideas of Particulars;" I, 2 ( 19) : "On Virtues;" 
I, 3 (20): "On Dialectic;" IV, 1 (21): "In What Way the 
Soul is Said to be a Mean Between Undivided and Divided 
Being." 
very eternity is identified with dynamis. 8 
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c) The power 
that is Nous is~ present as one life, unfailing and 
inexhaustible. Hence, eternity is the life of Nous as Nous 
is related to Itself. Time is the life of Soul as Soul is 
related to Nous. The distinction between eternity and time, 
then, is a distinction between the lives of Nous and 
soul. 9 
In treatise V, 6 ( 24), 6, 20-21, Plotinus further 
expands what was said earlierlO by defining life as 
intellection (noesis). Life on any level ( from Nous to 
Nature) will always be some sort of intellection .11 In 
II, 5 (25), 3 Plotinus turns to the Soul and mentions that 
it is a potency (i.e., dynamis) for life. It is not a mere 
passive potency, however, but an active potency .12 The 
svI , 5 < 2 3 > , 11 . 
9vI , s < 2 3 > , 12 • 
1 Ov, 1 ( 1 O ) and I I , 4 ( 12 ) . 
llit is only in Text C, however, that Plotinus fully 
explicates the connection between life and intellection. 
12p1otinus insists in II, 5 (25), 2-3 that the 
following technical distinction be maintained between to 
dynamei on ( being in potency or passive potency) and he 
dynamis (potency itself or active potency). Passive dynamis 
is that capacity by which something is completely dependent 
on another for its own determination. Active dynamis, on 
the other hand, is that power by which something determines 
itself (i.e., brings about its own determination or 
realization). My analysis here is in agreement with that of 
Hancock, Energeia. Furthermore, the meaning of to dynamei 
~ here correlates generally with Aristotle's usage of the 
same term in the Metaphysics (Bk. 4, Ch. 4, 1007b28 and Bk. 
12, Ch. 6, 107lb19). 
In the next treatise, III, 6 (26), 2, 34ff, we find 
further amplification of active dynamis as it relates to 
soul. The reasoning part of soul is not a passive potency, 
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status of Soul's life as dynamis is only metaphysically, not 
temporally, prior to the status of its life as energeia. 
In Chapter 6 of III, 6 (26) Plotinus returns to life 
on the level of Nous. Since Nous is perfect intellect and 
the fullness of wisdom, Its life must necessarily be 
perfect. 
dynamis) 
There is nothing to which Its power (i.e., 
does not extend, nor can Its power be 
quantitatively limited.13 Similarly, in two other 
treatises (i.e., VI, 1 [10], 4 and V, 5 [32], 1), he 
describes Nous as at once intelligence, being and life. 
Treatise IV, 3 (27), whose general topic is the nature 
of the sense powers and of the productive power of Soul, 
stresses that Soul's life is a productive power which makes 
possible all sensible life. Specifically, the Soul gives 
life to all things that do not of themselves possess life 
(Chapter 10). Finally, in IV, 4 (28), 36 we learn that the 
entire universe is ensouled, contains various dynameis and 
(12continued) 
as is physical matter (where there is physical change), but 
a self-realizing potency (i.e., an active dynamis). Active 
dynamis here describes the potency to act by one's own 
nature and not by any extrinsic necessity. 
13As Armstrong points out (Enneads, Vol. III, n. 1, 
p. 234), 
Real Being is limited for Plotinus in the sense that the 
number of Forms in it is finite, but unlimited in that 
it is eternal, its power is infinite and it has nothing 
outside to bound or measure it but is all-inclusive and 
so unincluded and is itself the absolute standard of 
measurement. 
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thereby is full of life (i.e., life itself entails the very 
notion of dynamis) ~· More specifically, man's ascent to Soul 
is possible because he has the power of Soul in his 
life. 14 
We are now ready to examine III, 8 itself. Since our 
key text is found in the eighth and tenth chapters of the 
treatise, we shall briefly summarize relevant data from 
preceding and intervening chapters. 
Nature is a logos and produces through contemplation 
because it is living. Nature causes life in others and is 
itself alive because it is related both to what is below and 
to what is above. The content of Nature's contemplation 
consists of the various logoi, which it uses to make 
sensible existents.15 These logoi can be called 
14since treatise IV, 5 ( 2 9) deals exclusively with 
the nature of soul's sense powers it offers no useful 
information on life. 
15In certain additional passages of the Enneads 
(e.g., V, 7 [18]), Plotinus seems to suggest that there are 
forms of individuals. John Rist, in "Forms of Individuals 
in Plotinus" (Classical Quarterly n.s. 13 [1963], pp. 223-
231) argues in favor of such an interpretation. He notes 
that because each human being is said to be an intelligible 
world (in III, 4 [15], 3, 22), he has within himself a part 
of the world of Forms. It is just such a consideration, 
Rist concludes, that lay behind Plotinus' attitude to forms 
of individual living things. (See also Rist, Road to 
Reality, pp. 86-88.) 
H. J. Blumenthal, on the other hand, argues that 
Plotinus is undecided about forms of individuals ("Did 
Plot in us believe in Ideas of Individuals?" Phronesis 11 
[1966], pp. 61-80). In his arguments Blumenthal points out 
that Plotinus in VI, 5 (23), 8 recants his position in V, 7. 
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contemplation in a passive sense as the content of 
contemplation (Chapters 1-2).16 
Nature itself lives because it is related through 
contemplation to what is above it, namely, Soul. Soul 
contemplates, and the content of its contemplation is Nature 
which is its logos (Chapter 3, lines 8-12). Nature, in 
order to be what it is and to be living, must make. Indeed, 
its very life is its making through contemplation, in the 
twofold sense of an operative state and a content (Chapter 
3, lines 17-25).17 
Nature produces through contemplation and itself 
originates from the contemplation of Soul and ultimately 
16How does Nature contemplate and thus produce its 
products (Chapter 1, lines 22-24 )? In order to produce, 
Nature does not need tools or machines but only matter on 
which it can work and which it can form (Chapter 2, lines 1-
5). How does this forming come about? Nature itself is a 
form without matter (Chapter 2, lines 22-23). It makes by 
simply contemplating and thereby the content of its 
contemplation (i.e. , logoi) results. These logoi are the 
means through which Nature, itself a logos, produces 
sensible existents (Chapter 2, lines 28-30). Those logoi 
are themselves dead and they are at the end of the line of 
contemplation since they set up no further or lower level of 
things (Chapter 2, lines 30-34). 
17The identification of the operative state of 
contemplation with the content of contemplation is 
established in III, 8 (30), 8, 1-10 and later in V, 3 (49), 
5, 1-25 also. We understand iJEWp~a as an "operative 
state" so as to avoid the unfortunate and misleading 
connotation of translations like "activity" or even 
"operation," both of which suggest too strongly the notion 
of praxis and thus lead us away from the true nature of 
theoria itself as poiesis. 
even of Nous.18 Men, too, live by contemplating, 
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but 
those whose conteJUplation is unclear and weak make action 
(£raxis) be a substitute for genuine contemplation and 
reasoning (Chapter 4, lines 30-39). 
Having considered how Nature's life and making 
(poiesis) is a contemplation, Plotinus in Chapter Five turns 
to the Soul in order to show how and what its contemplation 
produces. When the Soul is fully alive, having attained its 
fullness of knowledge in contemplation and having become 
itself all a vision, it produces a further but weaker vision 
(i.e., Nature). This is so because Soul, al though it is 
always filled and illuminated (and thus vivified) by Nous in 
which it remains, has two further parts or aspects. The 
first is the World Soul, which is Soul in its function of 
animating the sensible universe as a whole. But the second 
part, Nature, goes forth, leaving Soul in quiet repose (and 
union with Nous) above, and thereby produces the individual 
existents of the sensible world (Chapter 5, lines 12ff). 
The second aspect of Soul is weaker than the first, 
because in Plotinus' system what goes forth is never equal, 
but always inferior, to what remains above. Thus, all 
18Nature is a soul which is the offspring of a prior 
soul with a stronger life. Hence, Nature is the image of 
another and higher contemplation and thus what it produces 
is weak in every way because a weak contemplation produces a 
weak content (Chapter 4, lines 14-30). 
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actuation of Soul is contemplation and life, which however 
is weaker in Nature than in Soul (Chapter 5, lines 14-25). 
Soul, then, contemplates and makes that which comes 
after it, Nature, which in turn contemplates but in a more 
external way and thus unlike its predecessor. In this 
manner contemplation makes contemplation and life makes life 
-- ever weaker and less vivid, but contemplation and life 
nonetheless. 
Even the man of action (praxis), then, seeks 
contemplation and lives, although he does so weakly and 
incompletely. In this way action ultimately leads back to 
contemplation since what the soul receives is always a logos 
which understands silently (Chapter 6, lines 1-13). 
But this logos resides more properly in the soul of 
the serious man o crTiouoat::os; ) , where it is more silent and 
more fully possessed.19 There the soul genuinely lives 
and needs nothing because it is filled with true knowledge 
and enjoys the confident life that comes from possessing 
that knowledge as fully as it can. In the man of action, 
however, the known is still outside the knower. This 
duality exists precisely because his contemplation is of 
19Further explanation of seriousness and of the 
serious man in to be found in to be. found in my Master's 
Thesis, entitled Seriousness and Playfulness in Plotinus' 
Enneads (Loyola University, Chicago, 1978). 
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such a sort that it has not yet effected a union between 
knower and known.· 
The soul of the man of action, then, does not possess 
life fully because it does not possess the content of its 
contemplation completely, with the result that the soul 
wants to learn about the content more thoroughly and thereby 
achieve full contemplation and full life.20 
In Chapter Seven Plotinus merely repeats points on 
contemplation which we have already covered. Hence, we 
shall turn directly to the first section of our key text, 
lines 1-38 of Chapter Eight. 
TEXT C : I I I , 8 ( 3 0 ) , 8 ; 10 
[l] Now inasmuch as contemplation ascends from Nature 
to Soul, and from Soul to Intellect, and the 
contemplations become always more intimate and united to 
the contemplators, and in the soul of the serious man 
the objects known tend to a [point of] meeting with the 
[knowing] subject since they are pressing on towards 
Intellect, clearly in Intellect both are now one, not by 
their becoming akin as in the best soul, but 
entitatively [by virtue of their ousia] and by the fact 
20when men act or speak or make an artifact of any 
sort, the result is an action or a word or an object of 
which they can be aware and which they can contemplate and 
thus live. Some men are carried into this kind of action, 
then, precisely so that they might see in this admittedly 
inferior way that they are yet incapable of apprehending 
fully with their intellect. For the soul of the man of 
action (praxis) cannot achieve contemplation and, hence, a 
full and complete life, except by going outside itself in 
this way. It lives truly only when it returns within itself 
and has the intelligibles as the content of its 
contemplation, for there is a part of soul which . always 
looks to Nous and remains behind (Chapter 6, lines 14-40). 
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that thinking and being are the same. 21 [ 2] For 
there is no longer one thing and another, for if there 
is there will ·be something else again which is neither 
the one nor the other. So this must be something where 
both are really one. [3] But this is living 
contemplation and not an object of contemplation as 
though it were in something else. [ 4] For that which 
is in something else is alive because of that other, not 
in its own right. 
8, 1-12: 
,,.. A , ., TA 1:- , e , , Q , 
.I av-ra· µ£V OV'TW. 'TJS OE Ewp,as avafJaLVOVCITJS 
, - ,J., , ' \ .,, ' ' > ' , , '"" 
EK 'T'TJS ~VUEWS Em y,Vx:rJV KaL a1To 'TaV'T'T}S ELS vovv 
\ J\ 1 I ,... 8 ..., I \ r 
KaL an OLKELO'TEpwv 'TWV Ewp,wv y,yvoµEVWV KaL £VOV-
µlvwv 'TO£S 8EwpOVUL Kai J?ri rijs U1Tov8alas ipv')(1jS 1TpOS 
' , \ .... f / ,, - , ' ,, 
5 'TO av-ro 'T'-f) V1TOKELµEvt.p LOV'TWV 'TWV EyvwuµEvwv a'TE 
, A I:' / • \ , I:' \ / "I:' I\ JI .I.. 
ELS vovv U1TEVOOV'TWV I E1TL 'TOV'TOV O'T}I\OVO'TL 7/0'TJ £V aµ~w 
1 t / fl 1 \ - 1 /,., ""' '"" J I ~ \ \ t ovK oiKnwun, w<r1rEp E1TL 'T'TJS ~vx:r,s 'T'TJS apLU'T'TJS, al\/\ 
ovula Kai 'TW -rav-rov 'TO Elva, Kai 'TO VOE£V Elva,. . . . 
0 • \ ., .!'\ \ \ 1:-> .!'\ \ ..! \ . \ .. .!'\ \ ., " V yap E'TL a/\1\0, 'TO O a/\/\0° 1TaAiV yap av a/\/\0 EU'TaL, 0 
' I _.., \ ' .!'\ \ A - .. A .. " ., ., .I.. 
10 OVKE7' a/\/\O KaL a/\/\0, "-!EL ovv 'TOV'TO ELVaL EV OV'TWS aµ~w· 
A 1:- , , 0 , ,. _ • 8 , .. , , _.,, , 'TOtl'TO 0€ £(TTL cwp,a bwua, ov EWp7Jµa, OLOV 'TO EV a/\1\t.p. 
,,.. \ \ ' _!'\ \ ,. A , A J • ,. A 
.IO yap EV a/\1\'-f) bwv 'TL EKELVO, OVK av-robwv. 
[ 5] If, then, an object of contemplation and thought 
[i.e., contemplation in its content] is alive, it must 
be self-living and not be a life of growth or of sense 
perception or of the rest of soul. [6] For thoughts in 
a way are of other sorts too, but one is a growth-
thought, one a sense-thought, and one a soul-thought. 
[ 7] How, then, are they thoughts? Because they are 
logoi. And every life is a certain kind of thought, but 
one thought is dimmer than another, just as with life 
too. [8] But this [life of Nous] is clearer. And this 
first life and first intellect are one. [ 9] So the 
21p1otinus is here alluding to Parmenides, fragment 
3: "For it is the same thing to think and to be 11 ( see 
Freeman, Ancilla, p. 42). Similar citations may be found in 
V, i (10), 8, 17 and I, 4 (46), 10, 9. For valuable 
comments on this fragment, see Leo Sweeney, S. J., Infinity 
in the Presocratics: A Bibliographical and Philosophical 
Study (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), p. 109, 
hereafter, Sweeney, Infinity. 
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first life is first 22 thought, and the second life is 
thought in the second degree, and the last life [is] 
thought in the· last degree. [10] Every life, then, is 
of this kind and also a thought. 
8, 12-21: 
[11] While perhaps men may speak of different kinds of 
life, yet they do not speak of different kinds of 
thought, but say that some are thoughts, but others are 
not thoughts at all, because they do not investigate at 
all what kind of thing life is. [12] But we must bring 
out this point, at any rate, that again our discussion 
shows that all things are a by-product of contemplation. 
[13] If, then, the truest life is life by thought, and 
this is the same as the truest thought, then the truest 
thought lives, and contemplation and the object of 
contemplation at this level are living and life, and the 
two together are one. [14] So, if the two are one, how 
is this one again many? For it contemplates something 
which is not one. For when it contemplates the One, it 






iuws. OLatpopas. -rax' av AiyoL£'Y civ8pw1TOL, 
t \ I _> \ \ ' , I , 1:'> "\ t 
0 V IU:)'OVCTLV, aN\a -ras. fl,EV, -ras. O 01\WS, 0 V 
, ., "\ , r , ., , , , r A 
VOTJCTELS., on 01\WS, TTJV <:,W7JV O TL 'TTO'TE ECTTLV ov <:,TJTOVCTLV. 
'A\\. • A , , , ., _!\ .. • \ I 
1\1\ EKELVO )'E E'TTLCTTJfl,aVTEOV, OTL 1Ta,uv av O I\Oyos. 25 
, , ~ , (J I \ I ., E' I • 
1rapepyov EVOELKVVTaL EWpLas; Ta 1ravra OVTa. L 'TOLVVV 7J 
22Here I accept Muller's emendation 
(Henry-Schwyzer, Plotini Opera, p. 406). 
as correct 
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r , , .!\ 0 , , r , , ., ~· , , _ ~WTJ TJ a/\"f/ EO"TarTJ vo71an <:,WTJ EU'TLV, aV'T'TJ oE Tavrov TT) 
_!\ 0 I I f ,'\ 0 I I y- \ f 0 I 
UJ\"f/ EU'Ta'Tr, VOTJU££, T/ a/\"f/ EO"TarT} VOTJULS' <:.Tl KaL T/ Ewp,a 
\ \ 0 I \ ..., y- \ ,. \ \ I\ f .... \ 
Km 'TO EWPTJP.a 'TO 'TOLOV'TO <:,WV KaL <:,WTJ KaL EV oµov 'Ta 
8vo. "Ev oJv ~v 'T(l 8vo 7TWS' av 7TOAAa. 'TOV'TO 'TO £V ; "'H O'TL 30 
, "0 A'E, '" '" 0 "", r fl ovx EV EWpEL. 7TEL KaL O'TaV 'TO EV ewpr,, ovx WS' ev· 
, ~' , • I A 'A\\ ' ' {; I • " , • EL OE P.'TJ, ov ,'LVE'TaL VOVS', 1\1\a ap..,aµEVOS' WS' EV ovx WS' 
,, {; ,, • \ \. ,I\ 0 • \ \ ' , " 
T]p5a'TO €P,ELVEV, al\/\ €/\a EV t:aV'TOV 1TOI\VS' ,'EVOP,EVOS', o,ov 
f3ef3apTJp.lvos, Ka, l[ElA,[Ev avTov 1ravTa lxnv 8lAwv 
• f3 ,, _,. , A , • 0 , A A ~ , , - WS' Ei\TLOV TJV aV'TCf> /J.T/ E €llTJUai 'TOV'TO, OEV'TEpov yap 35 
• I " ' , \ '{; \ '{; • \ I \ A 
E')'EVE'TO - o,ov yap KVKI\OS' E5£1\L5aS' av'TOV ')'EYOVE KaL oX'll-'a 
\ t / ~ \ _,,L I \ f \ \ \ 
KaL E7TL7TEOOV Ka, -rrEp,..,,EpELa KaL KEV'Tpov KaL ypaµµa, KaL 
\ \ ,1 \ ~\ I f3 \ I \ "8 I I:'\ > fl -ra p.EV avw, Ta OE Ka'TW' El\'TLW p.ev O EV, XELpW 0€ ELS' O. 
[Plotinus closes Chapter Eight (lines 38-48) by noting 
that Nous contemplates the One as a multiplicity. 
Consequently, Nous is universal since Its contents, the 
Forms, encompass all Being. 
In Chapter Nine Plotinus turns from Nous to the primal 
reality, which he calls the Good or the One.23 Nous 
cannot be the first, he argues, because multiplicity comes 
after unity and Nous is multiple, for It is both intellect 
and intelligible. There is very little we can say to 
23It was noted in Text B that, according to Fritz 
Heinemann, Plotin: Forschun en uber die lotinische Fra e, 
Plotins Entwicklung und sein System Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 
1921), it is not until VI, 9 (9), 57-58 that Plotinus 
equates the Good and the One. 
This identification is 
(thirtieth for both Heinemann 
is called the One because It 
in all things. Finally, 
explicitly in II, 9, 1, 5-6 
Porphyry) that "when we say 
Good, we must understand that 
same nature." 
further clarified in III, 8 
and Porphyry), where the Good 
is the source of the energeia 
Plotinus points out quite 
(24th for Heinemann, 33rd for 
the One and when we say the 
we are speaking of one and the 
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describe the One adequately since It transcends the nature 
of the intellect. , We must rely on a mystical intuition or 
(lines 20ff). 24 
Having explained how Nous is not the primal reality, 
Plotinus in the last portion of our key text, Chapter Ten, 
makes explicit why the One must transcend life.] 
[ 15] What is It [ the One] then? The dynamis of all 
things. [ 16] If It did not exist, neither would all 
things, nor would Nous be the first and absolute life. 
That which is above life is the cause of life. [ 17] 
For the energeia of life [i.e., the life of Nous] is not 
altogether primary, but flows, as it were, as if from a 
spring. [18] For think of a spring that has no further 
origin, that gives all of itself to rivers, not expended 
by the rivers, but silently remaining itself. The 
rivers that come from it, before each of them flows away 
in its own direction, remain together still, although 
each in a way knows already where it will send its flow. 
24John Rist points out that the only philosophers to 
use t:HJ3o>..n technically before the days of Plotinus were 
the followers of Epicurus, who employed it in their 
arguments for the primacy of sensation. The meaning of 
EHSo>..n is twofold. First, it is a "comprehensive [ a~poas; ] 
... view of the data provided by the senses or the mind." In 
addition to its "comprehensiveness," an E:JtL,J3o>..n can be "not 
a grasping of new external data but a casting back of the 
mind on itself and on whatever impressions it has." This 
latter meaning is helpful, Rist argues, in clarifying III, 8 
( 30), 9, 20ff. There the One exceeds Intellect or Nous, 
whereas the highest knowledge we ourselves possess is that 
of Nous. By what EHSo>..n a~poa, he asks, can we then 
know the One? For Rist the answer is that 
we can know it by means of what is like it in ourselves. 
In other words ... it is only the One in us that enables 
us to know the One in itself. 'EnL,J3o>..n is then, as 
for the Epicureans, both a~poa and a turning of the 
self back upon itself. (Road to Reality, pp. 49-51). 
10, 1-10: 
,,., C' \ ,, A I A , ~ \ ,, • c,» 
.I. L OTJ OV ; ·~vvaµ,s TWV 1TaVTwv· ,,s P.TJ OVUTJS ovo 
" \ / • c-• " A ,. \ f / \ A ,,., C, \ av Ta 1raVTa, ovo av vovs r:,WTJ 7J 1rpwT7J Ka, 1raua • .1. o oE 
f \ \ ,. \ ti }' ... t \ f ... f ""' ' I 
V7TEp TTJV r:,WTJV aL7"£0V r:,W7JS 0 ov yap TJ TTJS r:,WTJS £VEpy££a 
\ / .,. / ~\\t ., 0 A • \ f' 
Ta 1raVTa ovua 1rpWT7J, = wu1rEp 1rpoxv uua avTTJ o,ov 
t ...., 1\T I \ \ , \ ~\ \ t " 
5 EK 1TTJYTJS • .l.VOTJO'OV yap 1TTJYTJV apXTJV a/V\T}V OVK EXOVO'aV, 
~ A ~\ A A f / • , _ \ 0 A A 
oovuav oE 1TOTaµo,s 1rauw aVT7Jv, ov,c ava11.w uuav TO£>" 
""" _! \ \ \ I 't \ f I \ ~ \ 't~ 't ... 
1TOTaµo,s, a/V\a P,EVOVO'av aVT7JV TJO'VXWS, 'TOVS OE Es aVT7J> 
1Tp0EA7JAV06Tas 1rp'iv aMov aA.\71 pEi.v oµov uvv6VTas £7"£, 
"!:, !:, \ ' f / t<;- / ' , ,l. / • A \ TJOTJ OE o,ov EKaO'TOVS £LOOTas 0£ a,y1]0'0VO'LV aVTWV Ta 
10 pEvµaTa· 
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[ 19] Or think of the life of a great plant, which 
courses through all of it while its origin remains and 
is not scattered over the whole of it inasmuch as it is 
settled in the root. [ 2 0] The ref ore, this [ the root] 
furnishes the plant its whole life, in its multiplicity, 
but remains itself not multiple in nature, but the 
source of the multiple life it furnishes. [21] And it 
is no wonder. Or it is a wonder how the multiplicity of 
life comes from what is not a multiplicity; and the 
multiplicity would not be if what is not a multiplicity 
had not existed before the multiplicity. [22] For the 
source of life is not distributed into the whole. For 
if it were it would destroy the whole; and the whole 
could no longer even come to be if the source did not 
remain by itself and different from it. 
10, 10-19: 
.. ,. \ ,I.. A / ~ \ \ t\0 A 
TJ r:,WTJV 'f'VTOV P,EYLO'TOV o,a 1TaVTOS £1\ ovuav 
cipxfjs P,EVOVUTJS ,ca, ov O'KE8au0ElUTJs 1TEpL 1rav aVTfjs olov 
• .,,. •c- I A ., , I ' ' A £V pLr:,?7 LopvµEV7Js. VTTJ TOLVVV 1TapEUX.£ µEV TTJV 1Tauav 
,. \ A ,I.. A \ \\ / ., C,\ t \ t \\ \ .,. 
r:,WTJV T<p ..,,vTq, TTJV 1TOI\I\T}V, EP,ELVE OE aVTTJ ov 1TOI\I\T} ovua, 
~\ \• , , • \ \. v , 0 • ·~, "H , 0 • • WV\ apxTJ TTJS 1TOl\l\7JS • .n.aL avµa OVoEV. KaL avµa, 1TWS 
\ \ A0 A ,. A • /; • \ '0 ~ \ • ~ \ TO 1TI\T} OS TTJS r:,WTJS Es OV 1TI\T} ovs ,,v, Kat OVK ,,v TO IS 
1TAfj0os, El µ~ 7"0 1rpo TOV 1TA~0ovs ,iv o µ~ 1TAfj0os 
~ 0 • \ ,,. • \ A f • / 
,,v. V yap P,EpLr:,ETaL ELS TO 1TaV TJ apxTJ· P,EpLU-
0 "" \ J / \ " \ \ """ \ 't ~I 'I\ II uua yap a1TWl\£UEV av ,ca, TO 1rav, Kat ovo av £TL 
ylvoLTO µ~ P,EVOVUTJS Tfjs a.pxfjs lcp' eavTfjs E7"£pas OVUTJS· 
[23] Thus everywhere there is reference back to one. 
And in each case there is some one to which you reduce 
it, and this in every case to the one before it, which 
[still] is not simply one, until we come to the simply 
one, which cannot be traced back to something else. 
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[24) If we take the one of the plant -- for this is its 
source remaining [within it] and the one of the 
animal and the one of the soul and the one of the 
[physical] All, we are taking in each case that which is 
most powerful and valuable in it. 
10, 20-26: 
A ' ' • , ' A ',I.' ., V ' •,1.• • I I u,o ,ca, TJ avaywY71 1TaVTaxov E'f' EV . .n.a, E..,, EKaUTov µEv 20 
fl t C\ > I~ \ I~ \ "" t e\ \ \ 1 -
1'"£ EV, E£S o ava~ns, ,ca, 1'"0oE -ro 1Tav ns EV To 1Tpo av-rov, 
, • , A ., ., , , , • .\ A " "'8 A OVX a1TI\WS EV, EWS T£S E1T£ TO a1TI\WS EV El\ ?f 'TOV'TO 
~·. I ··~\\'A'''. \ ' A,I. A., A OE OVICE'T£ E7T W\/\0. 1\1\ E£ µEv 'TO 'TOV ..,,v-rov EV - 'TOV'TO 
~ \ \ f , \ f / \ \ y I t\ \ \ ./ .. • "' I\ 
oE ,ca, 71 apX71 71 µEvovcra - ,ca, -ro .,,cpov EV ,ca, -ro 'l'vXT/S EV 
I I A \ I\ \ QI \ QI f A I~ ,ca, -ro -rov 1raVTos EV l\aµ,-,avo,, l\aµ,-,avE, EKaUTaxov To ovva- 2s 
-rw-ra-rov ,cal -ro -rlµiov· 
[25) But if we take the one of the beings which truly 
are -- that one [i.e., the One] which is their origin 
and spring and ~ower -- shall we lose faith and think of 
it as nothing? 5 [ 26] It is none of the things of 
which It is the origin; yet [It is] such [that], nothing 
can be predicated of It -- neither being nor entity nor 
life -- [because It is] above all such predicates. [27) 
But if you grasp It by taking away being from It, you 
will be struck with wonder. And directing your gaze to 
It and meeting It and coming to rest within It, [ you 
will] understand It more and more intimately, 
comprehending It by the embrace [of intuition] and 
seeing Its 1reatness by the beings which exist after and 
through It. 6 
25Perhaps To µn6iv here should be translated as 
"the nothing," in order to emphasize that the One is a 
reality of which nothing ought to be predicated. 
Henry-Schwyzer in their textual notes point out that 
although Ficinus deleted the article in this (second) 
instance of To µn6Ev ( in line 28), this second instance is 
"'nihilum' mysticorum posteriorum." 
26Armstrong (Enneads, Vol. III, p. 397, n. 1) points 
out that although the repeated ouv in lines 33-35 defies 
translation, it seems to suggest the close presence of the 
One both with the Forms which spring from It and the 
contemplating mind. 
In Chapter 11 of III, 8, Plotinus notes that Nous 
needs, depends on and desires the One, which Itself needs 
nothing. In addition, his remarks on dynamis and energeia 
on the level of Nous anticipate his extensive treatment of 
these notions in VI, 7 (38), our next key text. 
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10, 26-35: 
• ~ \ ' - • ..!\ '8 ,, u OE TO TWV KaT Q.1\1} Eiav OV'TWV 
• \ > \ \ \ \ ~I \ QI > I 
EV, 'T1}V apxr,v Kai 7r1JY1JV Kai ovvaµ.iv, l\aµ.,-,avoi, a1rtCTT7J-
' ' ~\ • I "H • \ ' ~\ uoµ.ev Ka, TO µ.7JoEV V1TOV01JUOµ.Ev ; Ecrn µ.Ev TO µ.7JoEV 
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COMMENTS 
We shall now present the movement of thought in Text 
c. Treatise III, 8 (30) describes in various passages life 
on the levels of Nous and Soul, the life of the serious man, 
the life of animals and plants (Ch. 8 ) , and the 
transcendence of the One over life (Ch. 10). Accordingly, 
the movement of thought in the text consists of two parts. 
The first part (#a-#e) explicates the life of Nous in terms 
of contemplation and, through the logos doctrine, applies 
life to Soul, to the serious man, and to animals and plants. 
The second part (#f-#j) makes explicit how all life depends 
on the One, which Itself transcends life. 
a. Contemplation [ Plotinus begins] is more or less 
perfect (i.e., unified) with reference to the level of 
reality which is contemplating i.e., whether Nature, Soul 
or Nous. Also, the objects of contemplation are more or 
less united with their contemplators in reference to the 
level of reality (e.g., the objects of Nature are less 
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intrinsic to Nature than are the objects of Soul with Soul 
and Soul's objects are less united with it than the noeta 
are with Nous) (#1). 
b. Indeed, on the level of Nous contemplated and 
contemplator are the same. And they are truly the same, not 
just interconnected, as they are on the level of Soul. The 
very ousia of Nous is the unity of the contemplator and the 
contemplated, a position which reflects the truth of 
Parmenides' famous formulation that thinking and being are 
the same (#2). 
c. This unity of Nous and Its own intelligible 
contents is perfect life, for life consists in contemplation 
and Nous is perfect contemplation. [And in this way 
Plotinus' second hypostasis compares somewhat with 
Aristotle's "thought thinking itself," except that the 
former acquires content by contemplating an object other 
than itself while the latter loves and contemplates only 
itself.] Since Nous is perfect being, contemplation and 
life, all posterior beings, as logoi of Nous, are Nous 
manifested on diminished levels of reality. Thus, every 
posterior being is also a contemplation and a life. Hence, 
plants, animals and humans are thoughts too, but they are 
thoughts dimmed by their remoteness from Nous. This 
hierarchy of lives represents a gradation of thinkers more 
and more estranged from their thought (#3-#7). 
d. So if one admits there are different kinds of 
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lives, he should admit that there are different kinds of 
thoughts. Some men do not admit this thesis because they do 
not realize that life is thought -- i.e., contemplation in 
its content (#8-#11). 
e. Therefore, they do not fully appreciate that Nous 
is perfect life, since It is a unity of thinking and 
thought. Since Its life is contemplation it must be subject 
to a twofold analysis. It must be described as noesis and 
noeton ( knower and known) • This duality results from the 
fact that Nous is not the first reality but the second. As 
inferior to Its source, Nous cannot be perfect unity and 
therefore cannot grasp perfectly Its object: the One. 
Hence, Nous fragments Its object into a multiplicity of 
forms, which are the content of Its own mind, and It knows 
the One by knowing these contents (#12-#14). 
f. [In Chapter Nine Plotinus explains why Nous cannot 
be primal reality. Nous is multiple ( since It is both 
intellect and intelligible) and multiplicity comes after 
unity. Secondly, Nous is a number, but the principle of 
number is prior to number. Therefore, the One is other than 
all things and is before all of them. Plotinus begins 
Chapter Ten with the statement that the One is the dynamis 
ton panton. As such, not only can the One produce all 
things but It is in all of them as their dynamis.] The One 
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is the [active] dynamis behind all things.27 Nothing 
would be living or,would ever be for that matter if the One 
were not Itself above life and if the One did not exist. 
For only what is above life can be the cause of life (#15-
#16). 
g. Accordingly, the energeia of life can best be 
understood only in terms of what necessarily and logically 
precedes it and is its source, namely, the [active] dynamis 
of the One. The source of life, the One, may be compared 
with a spring that has no source outside itself, which gives 
waters to the rivers but always remains what it is in 
itself. 
spreads 
The One may also be compared with the life that 
itself throughout a huge plant, while still 
remaining somehow fixed in, and originating from, its roots. 
What goes out from the spring or from the roots is, of 
course, a living being, but one which is still in some ways 
bound to the source from which it arises. The life that 
runs through a plant, for example, depends on the existence 
and nature of its source, the root, and could not itself 
exist nor run through the plant without that root. Clearly, 
then, it is necessary to understand first the nature of the 
root or the spring or, in general, the ultimate source of 
27For a similar description of the One see also V, 4 
(7), 2, 38 and the late treatise, V, 3 (49), 15, 32. 
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something if one is to understand how that item lives (#17-
#19). 
h. But how is it that the One, which is sheer unity 
and simplicity, can be the source of such a vast 
multiplicity? Although amazing, it is clear that such 
actually is the case. The multiplicity of life does come 
from what is not multiplicity, since the origin [the One] is 
not divided up into the All [Nous and, eventually, Soul] 
lest the All too be destroyed and since the origin must 
remain by itself and different from everything else lest the 
All not even come into being (#20-#22). 
i. Accordingly, we must [Plotinus counsels] go back 
everywhere to the unity within each existent. In each case 
we find that there is some one -- some unity -- which is 
itself simple and irreducible, to which it can eventually be 
reduced. [As he has done elsewhere,28 Plotinus here 
proceeds inductively. ] From the oneness we perceive in 
plants, animals, our souls and the physical universe we may 
move to truly real beings [ Nous and Soul] and then to the 
One, which is primal reality because of Its sheer unity and 
transcendence of being. It is the One which gives them 
oneness and thereby also reality and power. For the oneness 
Which the One furnishes is that which is most powerful and 
most real in them. [Furthermore, this oneness constitutes 
28see, for example, VI, 9 (9), 1, lff. 
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their (active) dynamis to contemplate and thereby to make 
themselves and subsequent existents] (#23-#24). 
j. In fact, the [active] dynamis in them is the One 
[since the One is (active) dynamis] just as the oneness in 
them is the One [since each of them is the One on a lower 
level of reality -- i.e., each existent is a logos of the 
one]. Thus, although the One is other than all Its products 
[ inasmuch as the One Itself is not totally identical with 
all Its logoi], this otherness does not alter the fact that 
all reality found on any lower level is the One. The One is 
simply the undiminishable source of all else, including 
being, entity and life. Our initial "understanding" of the 
One comes when we examine Its traces and products in the 
sensible universe. Our ultimate "understanding" of the One 
comes only as a mystical intuition of It (#25-#27). 
This movement of thought has contributed in several 
ways to our understanding of Plotinus' doctrine of zoe. In 
brief, Plotinus has indicated that the degree of perfection 
(i.e., unity) achieved by any contemplator is directly 
proportional to the degree of proximity between the 
contemplator and the contemplated (#1). At the highest 
level (i.e., the level of Nous), there is perfect life, 
which is the identity of thought and its object (#1-#3, #8). 
Other kinds of thoughts (i.e., those below the level of 
Nous) are lives too, but only to the extent that each is a 
logos, a less perfect manifestation of the life of Nous. 
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gence, every life is a contemplation (#6-#11). Finally, the 
life of Nous and. of every other being originates from the 
highest reality, Itself an active dynamis which is simple 
and one and undiminished in Its giving. 
nothing else would be and live (#15-#17). 
Without the One 
We must clarify the following issues in Text C to 
develop further our understanding of zoe: a) life as logos; 
b) life as contemplation; c) the life of the serious man; 
d) how the One is the cause of life. 
a) Life as logos 
Plotinus' treatment of life in Text C manifestly 
relies on the notion of logos. 2 9 We learn there ( #5-#7) 
that each existent below Nous is alive precisely because it 
is a logos of Nous. But what is a logos? Although the term 
appears frequently in III, 8, it is never adequately 
described. 
In general (as we saw in Text A), logos functions as 
the ontological explanation of the bi-directional 
relationship between the higher (the producer) and the lower 
29por a brief but helpful survey of various views of 
logos, see Gelpi, n. 1, p. 302. Also see Gurtler, "Human 
Consciousness," Chs. 8-9. 
In addition, consult Rist, Road to Reality (pp. 
102), for whom logos is that aspect of Soul which, 
transmitting the creative Forms, creates, maintains 





(the product). 30 Donald Gelpi in his illuminating article 
entitled, "The Plo,tinian Logos Doctrine," makes this notion 
more precise by defining it as "an active power31 
identical with the being of the hypostasis in which it 
exists and ordered to the production of some reality lower 
than itself. 11 32 Furthermore, "the final logoi are the 
logoi of sensible form. Since sensible form does not 
produce any other being, the logoi of sensible form 
terminate the process of universal emanation. 11 33 
30First, logos denotes the relation of a hypostasis 
to its products. Logos is a kind of principle or formative 
plan within the hypostasis and accounts for the formation 
and development of all the lower realities which proceed 
from the hypostasis (see IV, 3 [27], 9-16; III, 2 [47]; III, 
3 [ 48]; II, 3 [ 52], 16-17; this point is further explained 
in Wallis, Neoplatonism, p. 68). 
Second, logos denotes a product's relation to its 
producer. Specifically, an item is a logos insofar as it is 
the higher precisely as existing on a lower level -- and, 
thus, the lower is a logos of the higher -- because the 
former has become more multiple and, hence, less real (see 
I, 2 [19], 3, 27-30. Wallis (Neoplatonism, p. 69) points 
out that this notion has its foundation primarily in 
Platonic psychology (Theaetetus 189e and Sophist 263e, for 
example). 
31Dynamis is the Greek word here being translated as 
"active power" or "active, causal power." In this sense the 
One, for example, can be described as dfnamis, since It is 
the causal power of all things (V, 3 [49 , 15, 32-35). Thus 
the very ousia of Soul is a dynamis of the logos precisely 
because Soul is the power which produces the logos. In 
similar fashion, the various logoi are dynameis with regard 
to the sensible universe they inform and animate (VI, 1 
[ 42] , 10, 15-24). For additional discussion of this point 
see Gelpi, p. 312, n. 57. We shall have more to say on the 
subject of dynamis as it relates to zoe in our examination 
of Text D: VI, 7 (35). 
32Gelpi, p. 315. 
33Ibid., p. 315. 
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Accordingly, logos functions on each level of reality in 
plotinus' system in the following way.34 Nous, the second 
hypostasis, in two separate but related moments, emanates 
from the One, the first hypostasis. This second hypostasis 
is the logos and multifaceted image of the One and, as such, 
as the eternal archetype of the sensible functions 
world. 35 The third hypostasis, Soul, is the logos (as 
product and multiple image) of Nous.36 
34According to Plotinus (II, 9 [33], 1, 31-33; III, 
5 [ 50], 9, 20) logos does not constitute another nature 
between Nous and Soul and, hence, is not itself a separate 
hypostasis or level of reality. The arguments of Armstrong 
(Architecture, p. 102), for whom logos is a fourth distinct 
hypostasis, are decisively dismissed by evidence provided by 
Deck (Contemplation, p. 56, n. 1 and p. 63, n. 7). 
3 5 See VI , 7 ( 3 8 ) , 12 . 
3 6 See I I I , 9 ( 13 ) , 3 ; I I , 2 ( 14 ) , 3 , 1-6 ; I I I , 4 
(15), 2; VI, 4 (22), 16; IV, 3 (27), 5; 9; 12, 1-8; 18; II, 
9 (33), 7. Gelpi (p. 303) offers the following helpful 
explanation. 
At its highest 'level' Soul remains in Nous and shares 
in the higher unity of the Nous. Its second I level, I 
the World Soul, contains, generates, as well as 
transcends, the sensible universe. As the life 
principle of the sense world, the World Soul contains 
all the perfections of the sensible universe and draws 
them into a single vital unity. The third 'level' of 
Soul, particular Soul, participates in the divine Soul 
in the Nous but is the most scattered manifestation of 
Soul. ~is Soul dividing itself in order to impart 
itself to the image of particular sensible beings. At 
their lowest levels of sensation and vegetation, 
particular Souls become enmeshed in and corrupted by 
matter. Matter terminates the Plotinian emanation and 
vitiates any form which attempts to fill its emptiness. 
The sensible universe results from the mixture of Soul 
and matter. 
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Logos thus has a bearing on how Plotinus understands 
Nous and Soul to be living. How Nous is a logos {i.e., the 
::.---
one-on-a-lower-level) may be explained in two ways.37 
Nous is a logos {and, hence, Itself lives and is cause of ---
subsequent lives) insofar as It contains within Itself at a 
higher level of reality the entire complex of archetypal 
logoi {i.e. , the Forms) corresponding to the logoi which 
subsequently also exist at the lower level of Sou1.38 
secondly, Nous is a logos insofar as It is a combination of 
unity and multiplicity {i.e.,.a one-in-many) which serves as 
the archetype of the less cohesive combination of unity and 
multiplicity {i.e., a one-and-many) which exists on the 
level of Soui.39 
Soul, then, depends on Nous as Its model and for its 
being and life. In fact, Soul is completed only by turning 
37It is worth noting that in V, 8 {31), 3, 1-10, 
Plotinus seems to suggest that logos cannot be predicated of 
Nous at all. In his article {n. 47, p. 310) Gelpi provides 
a detailed explanation of this difficult passage. 
38see Gelpi, p. 312; see also v, 9 (5), 5, 6-12. Of 
course, the priority mentioned here is not temporal but 
ontological. 
39Gelpi points out that for Plotinus 
Nous is a logos merely analogous to the logoi of the 
Soul; for the Nous is a transcendent logos which grounds 
the essentially temporal and passible logoi of the Soul 
in the stability and permanence of its eternity. Being 
the prior principle of the two, the Nous communicates to 
the Soul the logoi which Soul possesses, through the 
lesser intelligence {Nous) which is in Soul itself. 
{pp. 312-313) --
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back to Nous in contemplation. 40 In addition, although on 
the level of Soul the logos of Nous and the Soul are 
identica1,41 this identity must be understood in a twofold 
way. First, Soul is a logos insofar as Soul is related to 
what is below it by being ordered to the production of the 
entire sensible realm. 42 Second, Soul is a logos insofar 
as it always depends on a higher reality (Nous, which Itself 
is a logos} for its own existence. The Soul lives, then, 
because logos there is a power of Soul (i.e., because Soul 
is ~-on-a-lower-level}, and ordered ultimately to the 
production of the entire range of sensible being. 
The relationship between life and logos reminds us 
once again that life is intellection, which is a self-
kinesis. Every being has life precisely and only because it 
is a logos of some higher reality, which itself is a logos 
of a still higher reality (until we come to the highest 
reality, the One, of which everything else is a logos}. 
Each of these beings lives to the extent that it is 
intellective, that is, to the extent that it contemplates 
the One as multiple. It is precisely this intellection -- a 
40see III, 8 (30}, 3, 1-23; 6, 9-27; 7, 1-22. 
4lsee the very late treatise, VI, 1 (42}, 10 15-24. 
42see IV, 7 (2), 2, 22-25; IV, 3 (27}, 10, 38-42. 
Gelpi (p. 313} distinguishes three levels of logos here. 
First, there is the "divine Soul" (All Soul}, where the 
logoi are pure intellections and produce nothing sensible. 
Second, there is the "universal logos' (World Soul}. Third, 
there is "particular logos" (individual soul}. 
138 
self-kinesis -- which is identical with the life of the 
being. But no being could be intellective unless it somehow 
was identical with Nous, which is pure intellection and, 
hence, life par excellence. The only way in which something 
lives is by being the logos of Nous by actually being 
~ on a lower level of reality. 
Accordingly, Plotinus' logos principle may be seen to 
express two important dimensions of life. Logos as 
extensive shows that the order of beings is an order of 
products and a gradation of diminishing lives. This is 
logos in its "vertical" dimension. Logos as intensive, on 
the other hand, shows that each hypostasis, because it is a 
unity in multiplicity, is a single reality encompassing an 
infinite plurality of living beings. 
"horizontal" dimension.43 
This is logos in its 
b) Life as contemplation 
We see in the Enneads that Nous, like the One, 44 is 
productive simply by being Itself. For Nous this means to 
be an intellective life. Hence, on the level of Nous, 
contemplation (theoria) is intellectual knowledge (noesis), 
which is life and which is necessarily productive. Let us 
43That logos functions as a principle of reconciling 
multiplicity and unity is argued not only by Giirtler but 
also by E. Friichtel, Weltenwurf and Logos (Frankfurt am 
Main: Klostermann, 1970), pp. 18 21, 39, 68 and Rist, Road 
to Reality, pp. 84-102. 
4 4 See V, 4 ( 7 ) , 2 , 3 9-4 0 ; V, 1 ( 10 ) , 6 , 7-9 ; V, 5 
(32), 12, 39-44. 
139 
examine the intellectual dimension of life more carefully. 
In Nous there is a triple identity of the knower, the 
state of knowing, and what is known i.e. , of 
contemplator, contemplation, and content of contemplation 
(#1-#2).45 To this triple identification Plotinus adds 
another, namely, between knowledge and life. 46 
Specifically, then, Nous is Its own knowledge and Its own 
contemplation, and, as such, is primal life, which lives 
through itself. Hence, if there is a scale of life ( and 
everyday experience confirms that there is), there must be a 
corresponding scale of knowledge. Clearer and more unified 
knowledge (or contemplations) and lives mean better 
knowledge and lives, and the clearest, most unified and, 
hence, best life is Nous itself. 
Plotinus' association of life with Nous is not without 
historical precedent. In the Sophist (248e-249a), for 
example, Plato notes that it would be entirely improper to 
45This point is also made in the late treatise, V, 3 
(49), 5, 21-25~ "the contemplation must be the same as the 
contemplated, and Nous must be the same as what Nous knows -
- since, if it is not the same, there will be no truth." 
Et A ~ A \ 8 I ' 'TOV'TO, OE£ 'T'T}V £wp,av 
., l AB "' \' ..... ,, 1': "" TaVTov '= va, 'T'fJ £WP'TJ'T'f), Ka£ 'TOV vovv TavTov £,va, -rep 
"" \ I 'I \ t I 'I _1 \ '8 II • I \ 
VO'TJ'T'f). KaL yap, (:£ 1-''1/ 'TaV'TOV, OVK UJ\"f/ ua £0''Ta£ 'TV1TOV yap 
•t. f .,, \ ,, ~ """ Iii ,, , ,, 




to the general 
V, 3 (49), 5. 
6 ( 24), 6, 20-23 Plotinus identifies 
and being in Nous. In addition, he alludes 
identification~life and knowledge later in 
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assume "that motion, life, soul, understanding have no place 
in that which is perfectly real - that it has neither life 
nor thought, but stands immutable in solemn aloofness, 
devoid of intelligence. 11 47 For Plato, then, life also 
must be elevated to the level of supreme reality. 
Aristotle, too, links life with knowledge by identifying it 
with the First Mover, the Separate Intelligence.48 
Thus, for Plotinus, whether we speak of an individual 
human soul or of the hypostasis Soul itself (i.e., the All 
Soul), life at its most perfect and pure involves union with 
Nous through contemplation.49 
Our key text makes clear that life is intimately 
related to contemplation. Because nothing may be said to be 
(i.e. , anything which has being, namely, any product of 
Nous) unless it contemplates, and because to contemplate 
means to live, then all beings, from All Soul down to the 
lowest sensible existent, are alive. In other words, every 
thing subsequent to Nous is alive precisely because it is a 
logos of Nous. All beings are lives and intelligences, 
4 7Here I follow F. M. Cornford' s translation (Edith 
Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, eds., Plato. The Collected 
Dialogues (New York: Bollingen Foundation, 1961), p. 993, 
except I have substituted "motion" for "change" in his 
translation of kinesis. 
48see Metaphysics, Bk. 12, Ch. 7, 1072bl3-29. 
49Because zoe thus involves noesis or contemplation, 
which, in turn, involves an inherent duality, we infer that 
the One must transcend zoe. 
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then, because they all are more or less perfect images of 
their immediate source, Nous.SO 
We have considered the noetic dimension of life on the 
level of Nous. Let us now examine briefly Its productive 
dimension. Nous produces silently, without motion and 
without any self-depletion. 51 It produces necessarily by 
living perfectly--i.e., by being and remaining what It is, 
sheer intellection.52 On the level of Nous, then, life is 
a poiesis, a necessary kind of production to which the 
producer is ontologically pi;ior, 53 and which is unmoved, 
intelligent, and proceeds by way of contemplation and not by 
any sort of discursive reasoning.54 
Let us investigate briefly also the way Soul and 
Nature live by producing. 
always remains with Nous. 
The higher part of the All Soul 
The production of the sensible 
universe is eternally effected by the lower part of the All 
Soul, the World Soul. 5 5 The World Soul's production, 
50Their ultimate source, of course, is the primal 
reality the One. 
sf since we learn relatively little in III, 8 about 
the productive dimension of Nous' contemplation, our brief 
analysis here relies on the rather late treatise III, 2 
(47), 12 38-45; 2, 15-16. 
5 See III, 2 (47), l; 2, 2-15. This motion of 
production will be used to describe the production of Soul 
and Nature. 
5 3 See VI , 7 ( 3 8 ) , 8 , 5-12 . 
54see III, 2 (47), 14, 1-6. 
55see IV, 3 (27), 6, 2; 9. 
r 
142 
however, is no longer immobile, as the following passage 
illustrates: 
Soul does not produce while remaining [unmoved], but 
being moved brings forth an image. Looking there, to 
its source, it is filled, and going forth to another, 
opposed movement it brings forth its own image, which is 
sensation and, in plants, Nature. Nothing is separated 
or cut off from what is before it. Accordingly, Soul 
seems to reach as far as plants; and in a certain way it 
does reach that far, for there is something of it [Soul] 
in plants.5 6 
In general, the living, productive movement of the All Soul 
has two facets : a movement toward Nous and a movement 
toward what is below, matter. Specifically, just as Nous 
lives by producing intelligently and without deliberation or 
discursive reasoning, so too the All Soul lives by producing 
without any deliberation outside itself or discursive 
reasoning.57 World Soul lives by producing with 
consistency and uniformity, not by accident, but because it 
knows what must be and orders its inferiors to the pattern 
it has in itself.58 
56see v, 2 (11), 1, 18-24: 
'H '-' ' . , A ~ \ \ ' 0 A OE ov JJ,EVOVCTa 1TOLEi, a.lV\a KLVTJ eiaa 
• ' "'-' ' 'E A ' "' • Q\ ' "0 • ' EYEVVa EWWI\OV. KEL JJ,EV ovv ,.,I\E1TOVCTa, 0 EV EYEVE'TO, 
\ A '0 - '-' \ J f ~"' \ \ J f 
20 1Tl\7Jpov-raL, 1rpoEI\ ovaa oE ELS' KLVTJP"LV a.lV\'Y}V KaL evavnav 
- "'-' \ J - "0 \,l..f \ J A ,I.. -YEVV<f E LOWI\OV aV'T'Y}S' a LCT 'YJCTLV KaL ..,,vaLV 'T'Y}V EV 'TO LS' ..,,v-ro LS'. 
O ,._., '-'' - ' , - , , ..... , , ~' VOEV OE 'TOV 1rpo av-rov a1T'Y}p'T'Y}'TaL ovo a1TO'TE'TJJ,7JTaL. ow 
Kai SoKEi Kat ~ cxvw ifrox~ JJ,EXPL </,v-rwv ¢,0&.vELV • -rplmov 
f ,1..0 f ff J - \ J ,I.. A yap 'TLVa 't' aVEL, O'TL av'T'Y}S' 'TO EV ..,,v'TOLS'. 
57see IV, 3 (27), 10, 15; IV, 4 (28), 10, 27-29; II, 
9 (33) 2, 12-18. 
58see IV, 4 (28), 12, 29-36. 
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What connection is there between the life of Nature 
and its production of the sensible universe? Although the 
word cp0oL,s; 59 (Nature} is sometimes used by Plotinus to 
denote the very makeup of a thing, a principle, and even a 
hypostasis, 60 in III, 8 refers to the lower part 
of the World Soul. Nature is that part of the World Soul 
which makes plants and the earth itself be what they are and 
be living. 61 Although Nature, so to speak, is the last 
outreach (or, more accurately, downreach} of the hypostasis 
Soul, it nevertheless contemplates and thereby lives and 
produces. Nature contemplates and the lines which bound 
bodies come to be.62 Nature's contemplation does not 
involve discursive reasoning, which is precisely the 
searching for what is not yet possessed.63 Nature 
possesses itself (i.e., Nature is a logos of World Soul and 
59oeck (Contemplation, pp. 124-126} provides a brief 
but valuable analysis of the meaning of this difficult Greek 
word. 
60see, for example, III 6 (26}, 4, 41-43; VI, 8 
(39}, 13, 38-40. 
On whether Nature is ( as Armstrong maintains} or is 
not ( as Rist maintains} a separate hypostasis, see 
Armstrong, Architecture, pp. 86ff and Rist, Road to Reality, 
pp. 92-93. Concerning the meaning of hypostasis in general, 
consult John P. Anton, "Some Logical Aspects of the Concept 
of Hypostasis in Plotinus," Review of Metaphysics, 31 
(1978}, pp. 258-271; Heinrich D6rrie, "Hypostasis: Wort und 
Bedeutungsgeschichte," Nachrichten der Akademie der 
Wissenschaften in Gottigen (1955}, pp. 68-74. 
61see IV, 4 (28), 27, 11-17. 
62see III, 8 (30), 4, 5-10. Also, see Armstrong 
(Enneads, Vol. III, n. 1, pp. 368-369), who offers some 
helpful analysis of this passage. 
63Ibid., 3, 16-17. 
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ultimately of Nous) as the object of contemplation and 
thereby produces the sensible uni verse as the fruit of its 
contemplative labor.64 The living contemplation and 
production of Nature is still a genuine poiesis. 65 We 
must understand life, contemplation and production on the 
level of Nature as weakened kinds of knowledge.66 Nature, 
then, is clearly a life because it is a self-kinesis: a 
knowing power and a logos which possesses internally the 
object of its contemplation. 
c) The life of the serious man 
Just as Nature is a life by virtue of its 
contemplation, so man is a life for the same reason. We can 
begin to understand the nature of human life by contrasting 
the life of the serious man ( 0 0TIOU6al'.os; with the life 
of the man of action ( ). Even the man of action 
seeks contemplation, although he does so weakly and 
incompletely.67 Nevertheless, when the object of his 
activity is achieved, it comes to be present in his soul as 
an object of knowledge and contemplation because it is the 
good which is the goal of his activity.68 Thus it is not 
outside but inside his soul as the proper object of his 
64For further examination of the role of Nature in 
Plotinus' system, see Deck, Contemplation, pp. 65-72. 
65see III, 8 (30), 2, 22-34. 
66see, for example, III, 8 (30), 4, 19-20. 
67see III, 8 (30), 4, 30ff. 
68see III, 8 (30), 6, 1-6. 
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contemplation. But he is not yet capable of recognizing 
this good as such because his soul is weighed down and 
distracted by the various activities and sensible things 
surrounding him. In this way, then, even action (praxis) 
ultimately leads back to contemplation since what the soul 
receives 
silently.69 
is always a logos which it understands 
But this logos resides more properly in the soul of 
the serious man, where it is more silent and more fully 
possessed. There the soul keeps quiet and needs nothing 
because it is filled with knowledge and enjoys the 
confidence that comes from possessing it fully. The more 
confident the soul of the serious man becomes, the more 
silent is its contemplation and the greater is the unity of 
its contemplation, and the soul's knowing comes into unity 
with what is known. It is this unity of knower and known 
which is the chief characteristic of the authentic human 
life of the serious man. 
Let us examine this last point more closely. In the 
man of action there exists a bifurcation of knower and 
69Logos is, as we have seen earlier, essentially the 
higher reality as it is found on a lower level. For 
example, the content of Nous' contemplation insofar as it is 
found on the lower level of Soul is a logos. Similarly, 
what the soul of the man of action receives is always a 
logos because what his soul contemplates now finds itself on 
a lower level as a result of that contemplation. 
70see III, 8 (30), 6, 12-17. 
known. What is known is outside the knower.71 
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And this 
auali ty exists pr.ecisely because his contemplation has not 
yet effected a union between knower and known. The soul of 
the man of action, then, does not possess its content 
completely with the result that the soul wants to learn 
about it more thoroughly and thus achieve full 
contemplation. 72 It consoles itself by substituting 
various sorts of activities (e.g., making physical 
artifacts) for a true state of contemplation. The soul does 
this because even in its wegkened state it still longs to 
see and to be filled with the contemplative vision.73 
When men act or speak or make something, the result is 
an action or a word or an object which they can be aware of 
and contemplate. Some men are carried into this kind of 
action, then, precisely so that they might see in this 
admittedly inferior way what they are yet incapable of 
apprehending fully with their intellect. For the soul of 
the man of action cannot achieve contemplation except by 
going outside itself in this way. When it returns within 
itself it has these objects as the content of its 
contemplation, for there is always a part of the human soul 
which "looks" to Nous (for the soul is Nous as logos) and 
71see III, 8 (30), 6, 17-19. 
72see III, 8 (30), 6, 30-34. 
73see III, 8 (30), 4, 30-39. 
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remains behind, as it were. 74 This is precisely why the 
human soul's life admits of degrees of perfection. This is 
also why, though it has sunk to the level of praxis and no 
longer contemplates as it should, the human soul can always 
improve its life by turning within and recognizing its true 
nature ( as logos of Nous, whose life it should seek to 
imitate). 
The soul of the serious man recognizes this and, as a 
result, goes outside itself much less because he has already 
reasoned and thus with respect to himself he is vision and 
true life even when revealing to another what he has in 
himself.75 What does Plotinus mean here? First, the 
serious man, when he goes outside himself, does so not to 
gain objects for contemplation, for he already has these 
within, but only in order to communicate them to others 
insofar as he can. Second, with respect to himself the 
serious man is already a vision because he has achieved true 
contemplation by coming to an intuitive unity with what he 
knows. He becomes increasingly unified within himself and 
ultimately with the primal reality precisely because he is 
able to focus his intellectual gaze ever more clearly upon 
the successively higher and more perfect levels of reality. 
And in this way he lives the perfect human life. He 
7 4 See I I I , 8 ( 3 0 ) , 6 , 3 4-3 6 . 
75see III, 8 (30), 6, 37-38 
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accomplishes this by first contemplating the Soul and coming 
to a greater and more distinct awareness of its nature and 
function and thereby coming to reside within the Soul and 
being unified with it. In doing so he sees that the Soul is 
the result and content of the contemplation of Nous and also 
that the Soul itself contemplates Nous. This realization 
impels him to look beyond the Soul and to contemplate Nous. 
When he reaches the level of Nous, his own intellect becomes 
akin to It and more and more united to It through 
contemplation. 
and pure life.76 
At this stage the human soul lives the true 
76But the serious man sees that Nous contemplates 
something even higher still. Accordingly°;he cannot stop 
his ascent when he reaches the level of Nous, but must 
continue beyond It to the One. This final ascent, however, 
no longer involves contemplation, nor life as we have been 
describing it, but entails a throwing of oneself upon the 
One, so to speak -- a contact and identity with the One 
through an intuitive apprehension ( E:Til..SoAn ) of this 
Primal Reality, which lies beyond contemplation. 
This ascent of the soul of the serious man from the 
level of Nature through Soul and Intellect to the One, then, 
is a direct reversal of the process of emanation. In order 
to reach the One the serious man must understand this 
hierarchy of reality that unfolds from the One and he must 
see how it can be collapsed back into the One. To do this 
the serious man must ascend through the successive levels 
leading to the One by contemplation (his true life) and 
finally by intuition. The final stage, when he reaches the 
One and achieves unity with It, no longer involves 
contemplation or, again, life as we have been describing it, 
but is 
another kind of seeing, a being out of oneself [what one 
is as a distinct and lower existent], a simplifying, a 
self-surrender [a surrender of what one is as a 
distinct, less real and presumably living being] , a 
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What, then, are the chief characteristics of the life 
of the serious man? His is a life of contemplation rather 
than action. He concentrates on knowledge and the pursuits 
of intellect rather than everyday and external activity. He 
has become increasingly unified within himself and 
eventually with Soul and Nous and ultimately with the One. 
Further, because he has turned his gaze to the One-Good, he 
has all that he needs within himself, and no longer needs to 
turn to what is outside his intellect. Unlike the man of 
action who must construct artifacts or utter sentences in 
order to see what he is contemplating, the serious man is 
(76continued) 
pressing towards contact, a rest, a sustained thought 
directed to perfect conformity. (VI, 9 [9], 11, 22-25) 
There the serious man is no longer outside the One but 
within It and the two are really one. When man has done 
this he has achieved seriousness, just as the Soul has 
achieved seriousness through unity achieved in contemplation 
and as the Nous has achieved seriousness by coming to unity 
with the object of its contemplation. 
There exists, accordingly, not only a unity within the 
serious man but also within the whole Plotinian hierarchy. 
For whether we ascend or descend through it, each level is 
obviously a logos insofar as it is related to what is above 
it and below it (with two exceptions: the One above which 
there is nothing, and the lowest level below which there is 
only the darkness of matter). It is also evident that these 
logoi or levels are related to one another through 
contemplation. From this perspective, then, it is possible 
to see how everything unfolds from the One, the source of 
all, and also returns to the One. It is this return to the 
One that the serious man wishes to achieve. And to the 
extent that he is increasingly unified within himself (and 
therefore with the Soul and Nous and, eventually, with the 
One) he becomes increasingly serious. Unity, the key to the 
entire Plotinian system, is at the heart of human 
seriousness and of life as well. 
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already a vision with respect to himself and all is within 
him.77 
d) How the One is the cause of life 
The above comments have demonstrated the connection 
between the life of man and the life of Soul and Nous. 
However, neither Soul nor Nous is the absolutely first 
reality. As we saw in Text B (#1-#4) and elsewhere in VI, 
9, 78 the One is the source of life and of all subsequent 
realities. Accordingly, since Soul and Nous are not 
primary, but derivative of ultimate reality, we are now 
compelled to address the question of the precise 
relationship of life to the Primal Reality, the One-Good. 
What, then, does it mean to say that the One is "supremely 
real" and the "source" of all else, including life? 
For the answer let us turn briefly to VI, 9 (9), 1, 1-
8. There Plotinus gives an inductively based (because it 
issues from reflection on concrete examples) explanation of 
what he means by "to be real" in reference to the One. 
Although difficult to grasp because of his use of the 
ambiguous Greek word einai and its derivatives, his 
77see III, 8 (30), 6, 37-40. In seriousness, then, 
we find that the one intuiting (i.e., the serious man) and 
the object intuited (i.e., the One-Good) have become a unity 
(#1). For the serious man, therefore, genuine fulfillment 
and ultimately eudaimonia (literally, the good state of his 
inner reality) consist in the unification achieved by his 
intellect through intuition of its object: The One-Good. 
7 8 See VI, 9 ( 9 ) , 3 14-16. 
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explanation may be expressed in the following three distinct 
ways. First, we may say that the One exists or actually is. 
That is, the One is not merely a mental construct or 
fiction but does actually exist as an independent item. 
second, we may say that Nous is but that the One is not. 
Here we mean to distinguish Nous, which involves 
multiplicity (because It is a one-in-many79 and thus is 
Being), from the One, which is sheer unity and thus 
transcends multiplicity and Being. Finally, we may also say 
that the One is real. By t~is we mean that the One is of 
~alue, significance and worth.so In fact, the One is 
supremely real because It is supremely valuable, significant 
and worthwhile. 
As the supreme reality the One is the source and cause 
of all else, including life. What sort of causality does It 
79For further explication of this point see Leo 
Sweeney, S. J., "Are Plotinus and Albertus Magnus 
Neoplatonists," Graceful Reason: Essays in Ancient and 
Medieval Philosophy Presented to Joseph Owens, CSSR, ed. 
Lloyd P. Gerson, Papers in Medieval Studies 4 (Toronto: 
Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1983), pp. 177-
202; hereafter: Sweeney, Graceful Reason. 
On "being" ( to on) as meaning "one-many" see VI, 2 
(43), 21, 45-58. 
80There are at least three sorts of value, worth and 
perfection: a) arbitrary (e.g. , coins: the government 
arbitrarily declares this piece of round metal to be worth 
five cents, this piece ten cents, and so on; b) subjective 
(e.g., the special value which a watch acquires for me 
because given to me by my brother); and c) objective (i.e., 
the worth which is imbedded in the object itself, which in 
fact is the object). In our discussion of what "to be real" 
means-we speak of value, worth and perfection in the 
objective sense. See Sweeney, AMAE, pp. 79-82. 
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exercise? We find an answer in our key text (#35-#38). The 
one's products flow out from It as do rivers from a spring 
which is itself unoriginated, which gives itself entirely to 
them and yet is not thereby diminished but remains Itself at 
rest and unchangea.81 
Nous, because It thus resembles the One, produces in 
the same way -- that is, by pouring forth a multiple power, 
which is a product resembling its maker, just as That Which 
was before It did. This act originating from entity ( or 
~) is Soul, which comes about while Nous remains at rest, 
for Nous too came about while That Which is prior to It 
remained unchanged.82 
Soul too is moved and thereby produces. It looks to 
Nous, whence it came, and is filled and thereupon goes forth 
to another opposed movement and thus generates its own 
image, namely, the sentient and vegetal levels of the 
physical uni verse. 8 3 Soul's descent to, and maintenance 
of, the vegetal level is accomplished by Nature, which 
Plotinus discusses explicitly and at length in III, 8 (30), 
3-4. Nature is the Soul in its lowest descent towards 
matter and, as such, is the source of all logoi in plants. 
And just as Soul itself is alive precisely because it is the 
8lp1otinus offers a more detailed reply in V, 2 
(11), 12 5-21. 
8 See V, 2 (11), 1, 13-18. 
83see v, 2 (11), 1, 18-21. 
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logos of Nous (i.e., Soul is Nous-on-a-lower-level), so too 
even plants live by being logoi of Soul. 
What do we discover about the One's causality in these 
two passages? Each of them characterizes Its causality as 
literally "emanative. 11 84 In our key text ( #35-#37) life 
is said to "flow out" from the One as if from a spring -- a 
spring which gives itself wholly to the rivers going forth 
from it, which in turn collect all together before flowing 
forth, although each knows even then the direction its 
streams will flow. Similarly, in V, 2 (11), 1, 8-9, the 
One, so to speak, overflows and thereby It has made 
something which is, to a degree, other than Itself. The 
product is other than the One only "to a degree" because it 
is still a logos of the One (i.e., the product is the One-
on-a-lower-level). 
Furthermore, the product is that dynamis which 
Plotinus in another treatise85 calls "intelligible matter" 
and which becomes Nous (i.e., Being and true life) by 
turning back to and contemplating the One, thereby filling 
and actuating Itself. In turn Nous produces by similarly 
pouring forth intelligible matter and dynamis, which however 
has by now become multiple and moving. It becomes Soul by 
84This description is 
Reason! pp. 188-187. 
ts5see II, 4 (12), 1; 
relationship of intelligible 
text , VI , 7 ( 3 8 ) • 
found in Sweeney, Graceful 
3-5. We shall take up the 
matter to life in our next key 
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contemplating its source and thereby filling and actuating 
itself. 86 This second moment of causality on the levels 
of both Nous and Soul is exercised by intelligible matter, 
which fills and actuates itself, and thus lives, by 
contemplating 
respectively. 87 
its source, The One and Nous, 
Accordingly, both our key text ( #33-#45) and V, 2 
(11), 1 describe the One as causing life through emanation, 
which for Plotinus is more illuminating and advantageous 
than efficient causality. The One in causing remains 
perfect; Its effects do not deplete It. Emanative causality 
occurs spontaneously, automatically and necessarily. The 
One produces because It is totally perfect and not because 
It freely chooses to produce. Emanative causality 
safeguards the transcendence of the One in particular and 
the nature of Plotinus' monism in general. What overflows 
from the One the intelligible otherness, matter, 
87In our key text (#35-#37) Plotinus develops and 
illuminates the twofold meaning of contemplation as 
operative state and as content (which he described generally 
in V, 2 [11], 1). In III, 8 (30), 3ff he explains that 
theoria is found on all levels of reality except the highest 
(because the One transcends contemplation and anything else 
that implies duality or multiplicity) and involves both an 
operative state of contemplating and its content (i.e., what 
is contemplated, what is cau·sed by the contemplation). This 
content itself is in turn an operative state producing its 
own content. This continues until one comes to the logoi of 
plants, which are the content of Nature's contemplation but 
do not themselves contemplate. For additional data on 




is logos of the One (i.e., the One-on-a-
Furthermore, Plotinus' adoption of emanation rather 
than efficient causality distinguishes him from both Plato 
and Aristotle. A brief examination of Plato's description 
in the Timaeus of the Craftsman's fashioning of the physical 
universe (especially Plato's initial explanation -- 29d-30a 
-- of why the Craftsman ordered the sensible world as he 
did) makes clear his distance from Plato. For what cause, 
Plato asks, were becoming and this All constructed by him 
(the Craftsman) who constructed them? Because he was good 
and, thus, without jealousy, he desired that all things 
should come to be as much like himself as possible. 
Desiring then that all things should be good and, as far as 
possible, perfect, the god took over everything visible and 
in disorderly motion and brought it from disorder into 
order, since he judged order to be in every way better than 
disorder. Taking thought he realized that the presence 
rather than the absence of intelligence in the visible 
universe would make it better and that intelligence demands 
88oynamis here is not to be compared with anything 
like Aristotelian prime matter, but rather should be 
understood as active dynamis or operative power (see 
Metaphysics, Bk. 5, Ch. 12, 1019al5-21). But Plotinus' 
dynamis is not merely a faculty of an individual soul (as it 
is for Aristotle) but is the entire overflow from the higher 
source, which helps constitute all lower existents by 
becoming energeia and filling itself through contemplation 
and by receiving such energeiai. 
the presence also of soul. 
156 
On the strength of this 
reasoning he consbructed intelligence within soul and soul 
within body in such a way that when fashioning this All he 
might execute a work which is by nature as excellent and 
perfect as possible. Thus the god's providence brought 
about a world which is a living existent endowed with soul 
and intellect. 
The radical difference between "emanative" causality, 
which Plotinus attributes to the One, and the "efficient" 
causality Plato ascribes to . the Craftsman is made evident 
·when we contrast the words each uses: "to flow," "to 
overflow," "to pour forth" versus "to construct," "to 
desire," "to take over," "to judge," "to take thought or to 
reason," "to execute a work," "to have providence." None of 
the verbs in the second group is applicable to the One, 
which transcends any sort of reasoning (and, hence, life}, 
judging, desiring, or executing a task.89 Aristotle's 
conception of efficient or moving cause is likewise quite 
different from Plotinus'. The causality of the One is 
strictly speaking not efficient or moving but "emanative" 
89This comparison of emanative and efficient 
causality is derived from Sweeney, Graceful Reason, pp. 186-
188. 
Such radical transcendence does not prevent Plotinus 
from sometimes ascribing to the One a mysterious sort of 
self-awareness (and, hence, perhaps life}. For analysis of 
such passages in Plotinus, see Rist, Road to Reality, pp. 
38-52, Wallis, Neoplatonism, pp. 58-59, and Gi.irtler; "Human 
Consciousness," Ch. 8. 
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precisely because Its products emanate, flow out, or pour 
forth from It. 90 · Such a view of causality (as emanative) 
makes it possible for those products to be genuinely unified 
with the One (since they are the One-on-a-lower-level) and 
yet to be other than the One (to the extent that a logos of 
the One differs from the One Itself). 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Clearly Text Chas contributed to our understanding of 
zoe, especially in the way this principle relates to logos 
and to contemplation. Our investigation has revealed that 
each level of reality below the One is real because it is 
emanated from, and thus is a more or less multiple 
manifestation or logos of, the Primal Reality. Any existent 
(whether Nous, Soul, an individual soul or a sensible thing) 
is what it is insofar as it is a logos (i.e., insofar as it 
participates in what is higher, by actually being the 
higher-on-a-lower-level). Furthermore, since Nous is primal 
life (by being a self-kinesis which is intellection), each 
level of reality below Nous is alive precisely because it is 
a logos of Nous • Like Nous, each reality below It is an 
active power (dynamis) identical with the being of the 
hypostasis in which it exists and ordered to the production 
of some reality lower than itself. 
90For Aristotle's 
Physics, 194bl6-195b30. 
discussion of causality see 
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On this view, Nous is alive because out of desire for 
the Ultimate Good · ( the One) It moves Itself to contemplate 
the One-Good. In doing so It produces the content of Its 
contemplation, the entire complex of living intelligibles or 
Forms. These are the One inasmuch as Nous is able to 
contemplatively comprehend It (the One). 





fully animated when it 
in contemplation of the turns back to 
multiplicity of intelligibles There. Specifically, Soul 
lives because it, too, is a self-kinesis which is 
intellection, but of a weaker and more multiple sort than 
that of Nous. 
In short, all life below Nous is Nous as logos. All 
life is a self-kinesis which is intellective and productive. 
All products of Nous are alive precisely because they are 
Its images or logoi. Hence, all things (from the hypostasis 
Soul downwards) live and produce additional realities to a 
greater or lesser degree depending upon their contemplative 
closeness to, or remoteness from, the primal life of Nous. 
Furthermore, life on the human level also admits of 
degrees and may be expressed in terms of its two extreme 
manifestations. The life of the serious man is one which 
involves identification between his intellect and Nous. 
Accordingly, his is a life of contemplation rather than 
action. He concentrates on intellection rather than on 
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external activity. He has become increasingly unified 
within himself (and in this way he has become unified with 
the One) and no longer needs to turn to what is outside his 
intellect (i.e., the sensible universe). The man of action 
(praxis), on the other hand, embodies a dichotomy between 
knower and known. Although he, too, contemplates (and thus 
lives, albeit imperfectly), he does so weakly and 
incompletely. His soul, accordingly, must still console 
itself by substituting various sorts of artifacts and 
external activities for a true state of fully internal 
contemplation (of its source, Nous and ultimately the One). 
Our analysis makes obvious that the One is the 
undiminished source of all other realities, supremely real, 
unified and simple. As such, It is other than all other 
realities (because It is simple and they are multiple) and 
yet not entirely other than any of them (since they are all 
logoi of the One and, hence, they are the One-on-a-lower-
level-of-reality). In addition, the One is both the source 
of life and above life. It is the source of all life 
because Its first product (Nous) lives only by Its self-
initiated contemplation of the One as multiple. The One 
Itself is above life, however, because it does not 
contemplate or move Itself since any such phenomena would 
involve It in a duality (of knower and known, mover and 
moved, etc.), which Its very nature precludes. 
Finally, although we have already examined the life of 
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Nous to some extent, the question of precisely how It and 
=---
It S intelligible contents live has not been fully answered. 
secondly, we must also clarify how the notion Life is 
logically distinct from Nous and Form. In other words, how 
are the three chief components of the intelligible world --
Life, Form and Nous -- related? Finally, although it is now 
somewhat clear how life is energeia, we have not yet 
elucidated how life is dynamis. These questions we shall 
take up in our analysis of the next key text: VI, 7 (38). 
CHAPTER V 
TEXT D: ENNEAD VI, 7 (38), 13; 15; 18 
Our next key text is found in the rather lengthy and 
intricate treatise entitled by Porphyry: "How the Multitude 
of the Forms Came Into Being and On the Good."l Like Text 
C (III, 8 [ 30] ) before it, Text D belongs to Plotinus' 
intellectually vigorous middle period. Owing to its 
thematic structure and considerable length, this treatise 
may conveniently be divided into two parts. In the first 
part (Chs. 1-14) Plotinus explicates the nature of Nous and 
in the second part (Chs. 15-42) he examines the connection 
between Nous and the Primal Reality, the One-Good. 
The seven treatises between Texts C (III, 8 [30]) and 
D, though containing little significant information on zoe, 
do provide the following facts which are helpful to setting 
up the context for our key text. In V, 8 (31), "On the 
Intelligible Beauty," Plotinus examines how Nous and the 
World of Intelligibles are perfect beauty.2 There (Ch. 4) 
!Porphyry, "Life," p. 20. 
2This treatise, along with III, 8 ( 30), V, 5 ( 32), 
and II, 9 ( 33), originally made up one single work by 
Plotinus. Porphyry's editing is the reason for its division 
into four separate treatises. On this point see Armstrong, 
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he reiterates that life on the level of Nous is pure and 
undiminished. Such life is a wisdom (sophia) not acquired 
by discursive reasoning (logos) but always all present and 
complete. This life is the very ousia of Nous and is true 
wisdom and beauty.3 
V, 5 (32), "That the Intelligibles are not Outside the 
Intelligence and on the Good," repeats information on the 
life of Nous, especially as rt~ is related to the Primal 
Reality. Nous lives and is intellective by being one with 
Its intelligible contents: the Forms (Ch. 2, lines 9-13). 
Although It is a close unity, Nous is not the ultimate or 
pure unity (and, hence, It is not the Primal Reality): It 
is the One-Good that as dynamis is the cause of Nous and Its 
intellective life (Ch. 10, lines 10-15). The next treatise, 
II, 9 (33), "Against the Gnostics," is largely polemical in 
nature and yields little helpful data on life. VI, 6 (34), 
"On Numbers," reminds us that it is Nous that is perfect 
life and perfect intellection and, by virtue of this 
perfection, is a great dynamis which, through Its self-
kinesis, produces all other lives and intelligences (Chs. 8, 
(2continued) 
Enneads, Vol. III, p. 358. For helpful discussion of the 
unity of these four treatises, see R. Harder, "Eine neue 
Schrift Plotins," Hermes 71 (1936) 1-10; Roloff, 
Grossschrift; V. Cilento, Paideia Antignostica, ( Firenza: 
Le Monnier, 1971); and Garcia Bazan, Plotino y las Gnosis, 
(Buenos Aires, 1981). 
3For a discussion of the status of beauty with 
respect to the One see Rist, Road to Reality, pp. 53-65. 
15 and 18). 
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II, 8 (35), "How Distant Objects Appear Small, 
11 p1otinus' study on optics, contains no information on zoe. 
In the brief I, 5 ( 36) , "Whether Well-Being Depends on 
Extension of Time," Plotinus argues that the life of 
eudaimonia is found only on the level of Nous (i.e., in 
eternity) and not on any lower level (i.e., in time). 
Hence, the extension of time does not affect it (Ch. 7). 
Finally, II, 7 ( 3 7 ) , "On Complete Intermingling," is 
primarily a critique of the Stoic view that two material 
substances, when mixed together, can completely 
interpenetrate one another and, hence, contains no helpful 
information on zoe. 
We shall now examine VI, 7 itself. Since the first 
portion of our key text is not found until Chapter Thirteen 
of this treatise, we shall first summarize the preceding 
twelve chapters. It is wrong ( Plotinus argues) to take 
literally Plato's explanation in the Timaeus (45a-b) of the 
production of the universe. Such an approach misconceives 
and even contradicts the kind of causality exercised by the 
Plotinian hypostases, which produce without reasoning and 
planning and which give to their products animation and 
spontaneous life (Ch. 1). Nous produces by knowing Its own 
contents, the eternal logoi for all beings. Because It 
knows simultaneously both the being and its cause (dioti), 
Nous differs from human intelligence, for the latter often 
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fails to have such simultaneous knowledge. (Ch. 2).4 
Since Nous knows everything perfectly, nothing exists 
in the sensible world which was not produced by, and did not 
somehow first exist in, the intelligible world. Such a 
position, however, seems to entail several difficulties: a) 
is sensation to be found on the level of Nous? and b) do the 
forms of irrational beings exist on that level? 
Plotinus' dismissal of the first difficulty is based 
upon the realization that a product is always inferior to 
what produced it. Hence, although the intelligible world is 
the principle of the sensible world, the deficiencies of the 
latter do not originate from, nor are they found in, the 
former. This is so because although both intelligible and 
sensible existents are indeed knowers, they are not equal as 
such. 
(i.e., 
Sensible existents (the products) are merely images 
logoi) of intelligible existents. In short, 
sensation is the result of the production of imperfect 
knowers and as such is not a part of the intelligible world, 
in which only perfect knowers are found (Chs. 3-8). 
The second difficulty is met by noting three related 
facts. Plotinus argues that since the forms of irrational 
animals are lives and perfections, they are compatible with 
Nous. Insofar as they are forms, then, they are equal to 
4In the Posterior Analytics (Bk. 1, Ch. 13, 78a22-
78b-31) Aristotle shows how some types of knowledge do not 
involve a simultaneous awareness of the cause of a being. 
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all other forms, because each of them is the whole of the 
intelligible world' (Ch. 9). Next, he indicates that Nous 
rtself would be imperfect, and the sensible universe would 
have no basis, if Nous did not admit an infinite 
multiplicity of forms and did not comprehend all beings in 
an eternal living moment (Ch. 10). Finally, he argues that 
the forms of plants and elements, since they reside in the 
intelligible world (for the same reason as do the forms of 
irrational beings) likewise are lives and perfections and 
are compatible with Nous (Ch. 11). 
Properly understood, then, Nous is the universe of all 
lives, Forms and beings, all of which are actuated by Its 
eternal intellection or self-kinesis. 5 Precisely how the 
kinesis of Nous actuates the plurality of lives is the issue 
of the first portion of our key text (Ch. 13). 
5That self-kinesis belongs to Nous was inferred in 
earlier key texts, especially Text A (""'fv-;-7 [2]), Plotinus' 
presentation there (#1-#7) was a more difficult and complex 
version of Plato's basic argument that life and movement in 
the sensible world depend on the life and self-motion of the 
soul. In the movement of thought (Text A, #c) it was noted 
that Nous and soul (i.e., World Soul and individual souls) 
are related to one another as ultimate cause of motion and 
life to proximate cause of motion and life. More precisely, 
the soul ( in Text A as well as in Plotinus' thought in 
general) is subordinate to Nous, insofar as it is a logos of 
Nous. That is, soul is Nous on a lower, more multiple level 
reality. As such soul is the vehicle by which Nous animates 
and constitutes the sensible world. Thus, we may understand 
that both soul and Nous are referred to in Text A (#3-#4) 
but in a specific relation to one another, as lower reality 
(soul) to a higher reality (Nous), in which the former is 
the channel through which the latter works in animating and 
constituting the sensible world. 
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TEXT D: VI, 7 ( 3 8 ) , 13 ; 15 ; 1 7 ; 18 
[ 1] Nous is · not simple, and neither is Soul, which 
comes from It, but all beings are multiple [in inverse 
proportion] to their simplicity. 6 [ 2] They are so 
[i.e. , simple] not insofar as they are composites but 
insofar as they are principles and insofar as they are 
acts. [ 3] For the act of the last [ intelligible 
reality] is simple [insofar] as [it is] a fading out [of 
act], but [the act] of the first [intelligible reality 
is simple insofar as it is the totality of] all acts.7 
[ 4] Nous moves with a movement that one would expect 
to find in beings which are multiple and yet always the 
same, and Its unity is not the same as something which 
is divisible into parts but is all together, since 
something which is in parts is not really a unity, but 
is di visible unto infinity. [ 5] But do we say that 
[Nous] is [i.e., originates] from something [else] and 
also [moves] toward something as [though] to a goal? 
[6] Then is what is between the All [and Its goal] like 
a line or like another body, something the same 
throughout and without diversity? [7] But what would 
be the worth of such a thing? For, if there were no 
change [in it], nor anything which brought it into a 
(5continued) 
Consequently, Plotinus' argument there, though 
somewhat terse and initially opaque, contained implicitly 
very important information on the nature of life. Making 
this argumentation more explicit revealed both how Plotinus 
is indebted to Plato and yet transcends him. 
Plotinus' comments in Text A on the nature of soul 
(specifically, the World Soul and every individual soul, as 
each is a logos of Nous and the channel through which Nous 
animates and orders the sensible universe) indicated that 
there is life where there is self-kinesis and that life is 
intellection. From this we may infer that as we ascend to 
greater and greater levels of intellection we may expect to 
find greater and greater levels of self-kinesis and life. 
6In many instances my translation of this key text 
is based upon Hancock, Energeia. Here and elsewhere in the 
translation of this key text I transliterate, rather than 
translate, the Greek word vou~ when it refers to the 
hypostasis itself. The term when it refers to an individual 
human intellect I translate as "intellect." 
7Brehier's translation is helpful (Enneades, Vol. 6, 
Part 2, p. 8 3) : "L' acte de 1 '@tre qui occupe le dernier 
rang dans le monde intelligible est simple; mais l'acte de 
1•gtre qui occupe le premier rang c'est tousles actes." 
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life of diversity, it would not be act, because such a 
state is in no way different from the absence of act. 
[8] And if the movement [of Nous] were of such a type, 
It would be only a single life and not the totality of 
life. [ 9] And life must be a totality and be all-
encompassing and nothing must be without life. [ 10] 
Nous must move Itself into everything, or rather must 
have always been so moved. 
13, 1-16: 
"E ' ,, - • \ - ,, • •1: ' - .,. , CTT£ yap OVTE VOVS' a1TI\OVV, OVTE TJ Es av-rov 'f'VXTJ, 
~ \ \ \ f\ , ., t \ - - ~ \ ., \ , (} 
Q/\/\a 1TO'1Cl,l\a 1TaV'Ta OCTCfJ a1Tl\a, 'TOVTO OE OCT'f) f.LTJ CTVV E'Ta 
\ fl J . \ \ fl t / T, - \ \ 1 I t 
KaL OCT'f) apxaL KaL OCT'f) EVEpyELaL. OV f.LEV yap ECTXaTOV TJ 
1 / f 1' \ I t \...., ,... ~\ I ,.. ...., 
EVEPYELa WS' av I\TjYOVCTa a1TI\Tj, 'TOV OE 1TpW'TOV 1TaCTaL. VOVS' 
I """ \ f / \ \ 1 \ \ 
5 TE KLVOVf.LEVOS' KLVEL'TaL µev waav'TWS' KaL Ka'Ta 'TaV'Ta Ka, 
fl , , t / t ' \ fl 1 / _>\ \ \ I 
o,uo1a. act, ov µev-roL -:-avroi• Kai £V -r, EV µ£pEL, a/V\a 1rai•;a · 
'I \ \ \ t / 1" t ft __!\\\ \ ,... 111 
E1TEL KaL TO EV f.LEPEL av ovx EV, a/V\a KaL TOVTO a1TELpOV 
~ , 'A , , ~ , ,J. " , , , , , 
CJLatpovµEvov. 1TO TLVOS' OE .,,aµEv av KaL 1TaVTWS' E1TL 'TL 
WS' ECTXa'TOV ; To 8J µEmtv 1TU.V J.pa WCT1TEp ypaµµ~, ~ WU1T'Ep 
10 ETEpov awµa Of.LOLOf.LEPES' TL Ka£ a.1rolKLAov ; 'AMa Tl TO 
'·E'' ~,,, •{:_\\' ~, 't, aEµvov , L yap µTjoEµLav EXEL E5a/\l\aYTJV µTjoE TLS' EsEYEL-
, ' ' ' r... ' , , ~, "' ' , ,, , ~ ' pEL av-ro ELS' TO <:,TJV ETEPOTTJS', ova av EVEPYELa ELTJ • ovoEV 
\ " < 1 I \ > I ~ ,J. I U" 
yap av TJ TOLaVTTJ KaTaCTTaCTLS' µTj EVEpynas- oia.,,Epoi. n.av 
I ~ \ ,1_ I t - - ~· " ,t KLVTJULS' OE l/ 'TOLaVTTJ, OV 1TaVTaXWS', f.LOVaXWS' CJ av ELTJ 
y , • ~ - ~ \ , y - \ '(} \ • ~ \ \ y -
15 <:,WTJ OEL OE 1TaVTa <:,TJV KaL 1Tav-raxo EV KaL OVOEV f.LTJ <:,TJV. 
'E ' , .,. - fJ ~ - "\ \ ~ ' - fJ 1TL 1TaVTa ovv KLVELCT aL CJEL, f.La/\1\OV OE KEKLVTJU aL. 
[11] A simple being [Nous], if it moves, is only that 
[which is moving], and either it does not advance into 
anything or if it does advance it [also] remains and, in 
this way, is [really] two things. [12] But if one [the 
first half of the duality] is the same as the other [the 
second half of the duality], the unity remains and there 
has been no advance.a [13] But if there is a 
difference [between the two halves of the duality], the 
8Here, 
useful: 
too (#11-#12), Brehier's translation is 
Si C'etait un terme simple qui se meut, elle ne 
contiendrait que ce terme unique; ou bien elle meme ne 
procede pas, ou bien, si elle procede, il y a autre 
chose qui reste immobile; il ya alors deux termes. Si 
le second est le meme que precedent, l' unite reste, et 
il n I y a pas eu veri tablement procession. ( Enneades, 
Vol. 6, Part 2, p. 84) 
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initial unity has advanced with differentiation and has 
produced a third unity out of some sameness and 
difference. This product generated out of sameness and 
difference has a nature which is both the same and 
different. And it is not a single different something, 
but it is an all which is different, since its sameness 
is an all. [14] Since it is an all which is [both] the 
same and different, it does not lack other things. It 
has a nature, then, that brings difference into the All. 
[ 15] If all these different things were before it 
[was], it would be influenced by them. [16] But it is 
not subsequent to them [since] it produced them all, or 
rather was all of them. 
13, 16-28: 
·A-
\ - ~\ , .... , .... , ,, \ " , ' ' , 
1T/\OVV OTJ E£ KWO£'TO, EKHVO µovov EXE£. Ka, TJ av-ro Ka£ ov 
"Q , ·~ , .. , "Q .!'\ \ , ., ~ , \ 
1TpDV,-,TJ ££S OVOEV, TJ E£ 1rpov,..,.,,, W\/\O f.LEVOV' WCT'TE ova' Ka, 
, , \ ... , , , " \ , \ /\ 0 , ~· 
££ TaV'TOV 'TOV'TO EKEW'f), f.LEVE£ EV Ka, OV 1TpOE/\Tj/\V EV, ££ 0 
., -,0 \ f , ' , , , , -
20 ETEpov, 1rpOTJll E f.LE'Ta ETEPOTTJTOS Kai E1TO£TJCTEV EK -rav-rov 
\ f , ' fl T" ' ~\ ' , ,.. ' 'TWOS Ka, E'TEpov -rp,-rov EV. J. EVOf.LEVOV OTJ EK TaV'TOV Ka, 
t I \ I ,,,,L_I JI t \ \ fl l 
ETEpov TO yEvoµEvov y,vcr,v EXE' -rav-rov Kai ETEpov E va, • 
., ~ \ , , ~~' \ \ ..... fl \ ' ' , ' , -E'TEpov OE ov Ti, W\/\a 1TaV E'TEpov. Ka, yap 'TO TaVTOV av-rov - n- ~ , , , " , ... • , ,, • , 
1rav. av OE TaVTOV ov Ka, 1Tav ETEpov OVK ECT'TW O 'T£ a1TO-
\ I ,.. ti ilf,.I JI II t\ ""f -0 
25 /\E£1TE£ 'TWV E'TEpwv, \,f"VCT£V apa EXE£ E1T£ 1TaV E'TEpoiovcr ai. 
E' \ 1" JJ/ \ , - \ ., , ,,~ ' " , µEv ovv ECTT£ 1rpo av-rov -ra ETEpa 1rav-ra, TJOTJ 1racrxo, av 
f , , ,.. , ~' ' ,, .... ' , , , ~,, 
V1T av-rwv' ££ OE /LT/ ECT'T£V, OV'TOS Ta 1TaVTa eyevva, f.La.1\/\0V 
0€ 'TU 1TCJ.VTa ~V. 
[ 17] These beings could not be except [ insofar] as 
[they are] actuated by Nous, which always actuates [in 
such a way as to produce] one being after another, as if 
[It were] wandering down every road but [always] 
wandering within Itself. Nous is a wanderer that by 
nature wanders within Itsel~ The wandering which It 
has by nature is in real beings which keep pace with Its 
wanderings. [18] But It always remains Itself 
[unchanged]. And this is a permanent wandering. Its 
wandering is on the meadow of truth, from which It does 
not deviate. [ 19] It has and encompasses everything 
and makes for Itself something like a place for Its 
movement [and this is also] the place where it moves. 
[20] And this meadow of truth is diverse, thereby 
making traveling about in it possible. [21] If It were 
not always and in every way diverse, if It were without 
diversity, there would [eventually] be a stop [ to the 
wandering]. [22] But if there were a stop, there would 
be no intellection. Hence, if It were at all, It would 
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not have had intellection. [ 2 3] But if this were the 
case, It would not be [ at all]. It is [ and must be] 
intellection. ,[24] And Its movement entirely fills all 
being, and all being is intellection completely and 
encompasses all life and [produces] one being after 
another. [ 25] It is something which is the same and 
which is different, and It is endlessly separating out 
different beings and making them apparent. 
13, 28-44: 
0 , " 'I/ \ II l \ - > VK ECTTLV apa -ra ov-ra E va, µ:r1 vov EVEp-
1 , I ~ \ , \ ~\ \ t #\ \ \ f" 
YTJCTav-ros, EvEpy7Juav-ros oE aEL WV\O p.E-r aN\O Ka£ oiov 
'\ 8' - '\ I \ > > - '\ 8' f' so 1TllaV'1} EV-ros 1rauav 1TllaV'1}V Kat EV av-rep 1TllaV'1} EV'TOS, Ota 
vovs EV av-r<i1 o ci>..7J8wds 1rl</,vKE 1rAavo.u8at · 1TEq>VKE 6' 
EV ovulats 1rAavo.u8a, uvv0EOVCTWV 'TWV OVCTtWV -rats av-rov 
' I fl - ~· > I > I 1' ,, \ 1Tl\ava,;-. av-ra.xov o avros ECTTL • µ.evovuav ovv EXH 'T'1}V 
, , 'H ~ , '\ , , _ , _ _ , '\ 
8 
, ...- , 
1Tl\aV'1}V. OE 1Tl\aV'1} av-rep EV -rep 'T'1JS al\'YJ etas 1TEoLep, 
1' , , Q I "E ,;:,, ' Q \ - \ • - I 
35 ov OVK EKfJatVEL. XEL OE Ka'Tal\a/Jwv 1rav Kat av-r<tJ 1TOLTJCTas 
t \ - 8 f' 1 \ r I < t \ A 1' 
ELS 'TO KtVELCT a, OtOV 'TO1TOV, ,ca, 0 "1'01TOS O av-ros -rep ov 
I n I'\ t' I > \ t'I - ,. \ t' l:,I > 
7"O1TOS. OLKtl\OV OE EO'TL TO 1TEOLOV TOV'TO, ,va KaL OLE~LOL • EL 
t' \ \ \ A \ > \ I'\ 8 I \ !\ 
OE µ.71 Ka-ra 1TaV KaL aEL 1TOLKLI\OV, Ka OCTOV /J,'1} 1TOLKLI\OV, 
• E' ~, ,, , ... ,, , , ,, , 
ECT'T'1}KEV. L O ECT'T'1}KEV, OV voe,• WCTTE Kat, EL ECT'T'1}, ov 
' ' ~' - '"-'' " "E 1' ' ' 6' 40 VEVOTJKEV • EL OE TOVTO, OVO ECTTLV. O'TtV OVV VOTJCTLS" 7J E 
I ..., \,.. ti ,.. \C' .-. ti 
KLVTJCTLS 1TaCTa 1Tll'1JPOVCTa OVCTLav 1rauav, KaL '1} 1raua OVCTLa 
I - r \ . '\ Q - - \ > .!"'\ \ > \ 
VOTJCTLS TTaCTa ':,W'1}V 1TEpLllatJOVCTa 1rauav, Kat fJ,ET WV\O aEL 
aAAo, Kat O 'TL avTOV TaVTOV, Kal llio, Kat OLaLpOVV'TL dEt Tb 
_!II''\'\ > ,I. I 
WV\O ava.,,a,vE-ra,. 
[ 26] And Its entire journey is through life and is 
entirely through living beings, just as to someone who 
travels over the earth whatever he travels over is 
earth, even though earth contains [various] differences. 
It is the same with the life There. What it passes 
through is itself but is always [also] other than itself 
so that it is not itself. But it always has the same 
journey through what is not itself because it does not 
change but rather it is present to all differences in 
the same way and according to its sameness. [ 27] If 
there were not something that related to the different 
beings in precisely the same way and by virtue of its 
sameness, there would be nothing at all, neither in act 
nor act itself. 
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13, 44-51: 
llaaa 8e Sui {wijs- ;, 1ropEla Kat 8La. 
r I - fl \ - ~ \ - > I I &\ ~ I/:, 
45 1:,q,wv 1raaa, WU1TEP KaL -rq, oLa yr/S' LOVTL 1rav-ra, a oLE!,ELUL, 
yij, ,cav 'f)L(upopa.s EX'!J -1, yij. Kal EKEi -1, µEV {w~, 8,' 77s, ,; 
• I ., ~ 1 • , ~\ \ • t • 1 'A , ~· ., , , , 
aV'T'TJ, o-rL oE" aEL WVI.TJ, ovx 1J avTTJ. EL o EXWV 'TTJV aV'T'1}V 
~ , - t t - ~ I{: ~ <I \ > IQ _> \ \ \ I oLa 'TWV OVK av-rwv OLE!,OOOV, O'TL P.TJ aµELfJEL, al\l\a UVVEO'TL 
-rois aAAOLS' 'TO waav-rws Kat Ka'Ta. -ravr&. • Eav yap µ~ 1TEp',, 
50 Ta llia 'TO waav-rws Kac. ,ca-ra Ta avra, apyEi 1TO.VTTJ ,ca',, 
' , / ' ~ , , ,~ .... -ro EVEpyE1.g. 1ea1, 1J EVEPYELa ovoaµov. 
[ 2 8] These other beings are It [Nous] • It is [thus] 
every being. If It is truly Itself, then It is 
everything. But if It is not everything, It is not 
Itself. [ 29] But if It is Itself complete and a 
totality, because It is everything else and is without 
nothing and nothing is incomplete in this totality, then 
there is nothing belonging to It which is not different, 
for it is through diversity of being that this being is 
complete. [30] If It had no diversity but were 
[entirely] the same instead of different, that would 
reduce Its being because [ in that case] It would not 
have brought about the completion of Its own nature. 
13, 51-57: 
"Ea-rL 8, ,ca',, Ta IDa 
t / fl - t / U \ ., t I ..., 1 ~\ / 
av-ros, WU'TE 1TaS' av-ros-. n.a, EL1TEp av-ros, 1TaS', EL OE µ1], 
oVK aV-rOs-. El SE 1ras- aVTOs-, KaL 1rO.s-' OT, 'Ta 1TClvTa, ,cal 
t~ / 1 fl \ \ ,... 't \ I 1~ / t 
OVOEV EU'TLV, 0 'TL P.TJ OJ)V'TEI\EL ELS' Ta 1TaVTa, OVOEV EU'TLV 
, - ., ' ~\ \ • ~\ \ .. , - \ - E' ' 55 av-rov, 0 'TL µ1] al\l\O, ,va a/\/\0 av KaL 'TOV'TO UVV'TEl\'{J- L yap 
\ .V\ \ _> \ \ \ [~\ \ ] t I t\ I > - \ > I µ1] al\l\O, WV1.a al\l\'f' -rav-rov, El\a-r-rwaEL av-rov TTJV ovaLav 
·~ I > I > I\ > - ,1. I wLav av 1rapExoµEvov ELS' UVVTEI\ELav av-rov .,,vaLv. 
[ In Chapter 14 Plotinus describes Nous as a giant 
organism whose various components and functions are all 
brought together into a single living unity. Although each 
of its components has its own unique makeup, each 
nevertheless exists and functions in relation to the good of 
the whole organism (lines 15-22). Therefore, the unity of 
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the intelligibles within Nous is analogous to, but much more 
intimate than, any organic unity because the parts of Nous 
are truly identical with one another.9 
With Chapter 14 Plotinus closes the first part of this 
long treatise. In Chapters 15-42, which comprise its second 
part, he examines the connection between Nous and the Primal 
Reality. This examination will take Plotinus beyond his 
treatment of life in the first part of this treatise, since 
it will require him to address the relation of life to the 
One-Good Itself. Here (Ch. 15) they key text resumes.] 
[31] This life [of Nous], then, the manifoldl0 and 
the whole, the first and the one, who is there who when 
he sees It is not glad and does not scorn all other 
life? [32] For the other [lives] below are dark, 
little and dim and imperfect and not pure but [are] the 
pure that has become soiled. And if you look at these 
[ impure lives], you neither see the pure [lives] nor 
live them [the pure lives] all at once. In them [the 
pure 1 i ve s ] there is nothing that does not 1 i ve, and 
[does not] live purely, having no evil. [33] For evils 
are here because [here there is only] a trace of life 
and a trace of Nous. [ 34] There is the archetype, 
which he [ Plato ]calls formally good: for among the 
Forms it has the place of the Good.ll 
9Here perhaps is another instance in which the 
"intensive" or "horizontal" dimension of logos is operative. 
Logos here accounts for the uni ty-in-mul tiplici ty of the 
intelligible beings within the second hypostasis. 
lOHere I follow Armstrong in translating ten pollen 
as "the manifold" since this English term (rather than terms 
such as "multiplicity" or "plurality") seems best to convey 
the fact that the plurality of Nous is ultimately itself a 
unity (Plotinus, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1953, 
p. 73). Furthermore, it would be a serious error to state 
that Nous is sheer, and only, multiplicity, since this is 
true only of sensible matter, which Plotinus (in II, 5 [25], 
5, 23-33) holds is actually unreal. 
llThis troublesome Greek term, aya~oEl.,6Es; , · here 
is best translated as "formally good" since Plotinus intends 
15, 1-10: 
,,, f 'f' \ r \ \ \\\ \ A \ 
J O.V'T"f}V OVV T"f}V '::,W"f}V T"f}V 1TOl\l\"f}V KO.L 1TO.O'O.V KO.L 
I \ I I I~ \ t , I 9 t / y 
1TpWT"f}V KO.L /.UO.V 'T'LS LOWV OVK £V TO.VT!} £LVO.L 0.0'1T0.'::,£TO.L 
, "'\\ ... , , 1 , r #\\ r , 
T"f}V 0.1\1\"f}V 1T0.0'0.V O.'T'L/J,0.0'0.Sj O'KOTO!; yo.p O.L 0.1\1\0.L O.L KO.TW 
\ \ \ t ~ \ \ I ,\ A \ , 8 \ \ 
KO.L O'/J,LKpO.L KO.L o.µ,vvpo.L KO.L £VT£ £LS Ko.L ov KO. o.po.L KO.L 
\ (J \ ,\' .. ' ' \ ~ ' , \ TO.S KO. o.po.s µ,o VVOVO'O.£. KO.V £LS O.VTO.S LV'l]S, OVK£7'L TO.S 5 
8 , " r ,., " f""' , , , , t ... , KO. o.po.s OVT£ op9s OVT£ '::,!]S £K££VO.S TO.S 1T0.0'0.S oµ,ov, o 
" ·~' , • \ rA \ (J A rA \ ·~' a.LS OVV£V £0'7'LV O TL l'-"1 '::,!} Ko.L KO. o.pws '::,'l] KO.KOV OVV£V• 
.,, ' ' ' , ""'(J " ,, r ""' ' ""' £XOV. TO. yo.p KO.KO. £VTO.V o., OTL LXVOS '::,W"f}S KO.L vov 
,, , A~\ \, f \' (J ~f .L • ,xvos· £K£L 0£ TO O.PX£TV1TOV TO a.yo. OHO£!; ,p"f}O'LV, O'T'L 
, A ~ \ , (J' JI 
£V TOLS ££0£0'£ TO a.yo. ov £X£L. 
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[35] For the Good is There and [Nous is There, which] 
is good because life consists in contemplation. [ 36] 
Those objects which It contemplates are f orma1ly good 
they are those which Nous acquired when It contemplated 
the nature of the Gooa:-[37] The Good came to It, not 
as He is There, but as Nous possessed Him. [ 38] For 
the Good is source and only out of Him [come the beings] 
in Nous and It is that which produces them out of Him. 
[39JFor it is not right that the one [Nous] that looks 
at Him [ the Good] should think nothing or should not 
think of the things in Him. For It [ Nous ] did not 
produce them [ of its own power]. [ 40] For It had the 
power to produce from Him and to be filled with Its 
products, the products of Him Who gives what He Himself 
does not possess. 
15, 10-20: 
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(llcontinued) 
it to refer to what is similar to, or influenced by, the 
Good and not to the Good Itself. 
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[ 41] But from unity itself comes a multiplicity to 
Nous. For Nous was unable to hold the power It took 
from the Good but fragmented it and made the one many, 
so that It might be able to bear it piece by piece. 
[42] So whatever It produced came from the power of the 
Good and is formally good and It [Nous] is good since It 
is composed of the beings which are formally good, a 
variegated sort. [ 43] So one might compare It to a 
living multiple sphere or to something multi-faceted 
[and] colored, shining with living faces; or imagine all 
the pure souls gather together in It, with no defect but 
complete in themselves, and the all-encompassing Nous 
set at their highest point, illuminating the region with 
intellectual light. [44] If one imagined It like this 
one would be seeing It from outside, as something 
different from oneself. But we have to become It 
ourselves and make ourselves that which we contemplate. 
15, 20-32: 
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[We have seen in Chapter 15 that Nous Itself is not 
the Primal Reality but emanates from the One-Good. It does 
so in a two-moment process which may be compared to the 
phenomenon of sight. In the first moment of Its formation 
Nous is an active dynamis (a formless or object-less sight); 
in the second It turns back to Its source and is filled with 
intelligibles (a sight which has an object and is thereby 
determined). In Chapter 16 Plotinus notes that Nous also 
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experiences a vision of light from the One-Good and that 
this vision occurs' at the same time as the fragmentation of 
the object of Nous' sight. Accordingly, the first stage of 
indeterminacy is an active power to behold two distinct 
objects: a) the infinite multiplicity of intelligibles, and 
b) the light of the One-Good.12 The final portion of our 
key text resumes with Chapters 17-18.] 
[45] But how do the beings [the Forms] in It and Nous 
Itself come to be if these beings were neither There in 
That [the One] which fills nor in That [Nous] which is 
filled? For when It was not yet filled, they were not 
[yet in Nous]. Is it not necessary for that which gives 
something of itself to have it [in the first place]? 
[ 46] But if so it is necessary that what gives is 
viewed as superior and what is given as inferior. For 
this is the case in the production of real beings. [47] 
First there must be something in act. The beings that 
come later are potentially whatever is prior to them 
[i.e., in act]. [48] And what is prior transcends the 
posterior and what gives transcends what is given 
because it is superior. [49] If therefore something is 
prior to act, it transcends act and therefore transcends 
[also] life. [ 50] If there is life in Nous, there is 
[necessarily prior to Nous] a giver of--rI'fe who is 
greater and more valuab--re-than life. [ 51] Nous has 
life but not because It requires a giver who has 
multiplicity. Its life is a certain trace of That [the 
One], but it is not the life of That. 
17, 1-14: 
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12In VI, 7 ( 38), 16, 24-31 Plotinus notes that the 
One-Good makes the intelligible beings ( and through them 
everything else) good by illuminating them with Its light. 
Additional references to this sort of light may be found in 
VI , 7 ( 3 8 ) , 1 7 , 3 6- 3 7 ; 19 , 19-21 ; 21 , 13-1 7 ; 2 2 ; 2 3 , 1 ; 2 4 ; 
36. For helpful additional explanation of VI, 7 (38), 15-
16, see Brehier, Enneades, Vol. 6, Part 2, pp. 53-54. 
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[52] As It [Nous] contemplated That [the One], It was 
indeterminate.--r53] [After] having looked There It 
[Nous] was determined, but That [the One] had no 
determination. [ 54] For something gazes directly at 
the One so as to be determined and so as to acquire 
boundary, limit and form for itself. [55] And [in this 
instance] the farm is in the shaped while the shaper 
lacks form. [ 56] And the limit is not from without, 
like something drawn around a mass. The limit was that 
of the totality of life There [and life] was diverse and 
infinite, as radiating from such a nature [ the One]. 
[57] Life was not of [some] particular kind, for [then] 
it would be defined, as already [the life of] an 
individual. [ 58] It [life] is nonetheless defined, 
[though not as an individual thing]. It is defined as a 
unity-in-multiplicity. [59] Each thing within the 
multiplicity is also defined [ 60] All of Nous is 
defined as multiple through the multiplicity ofTife, 
and still It [Nous] is a unity because of Its 
determination [limit]. 
17, 14-25: 
\ , A \ .,. Q\, 
1TpOS' EKELVO fJ,EV OVV fJ/\E-
' , J. Q \ ,.,. ~· ' A f ,, , , <f 
15 1TOVaa aopLGTOS' ,,v, fJ/\E.,,aaa O EKEL wpLt:,E'TO EKELVOV opov 
, ., '8 , ' ' • '~ ... r 'f , OVK EXOV'TOS'. EV VS' yap 1TpOS' EV TL Loovaa opLt:,E'TaL 'TOV'T<[J 
\# 1 t ""'fl \ I \ ~ \ \ ~ 
KaL LGXEL EV aV'TTJ opov KaL 11'Epas- KaL ELOOS'" Kat 'TO ELOOS' 
b -r<jJ µ,opq,w8lvn, -ro a; µ,opq,waav 1lµ,op</,ov -qv. o 8i opos-
' "i: 8 " '8 8 ' .2 \ \> .,_ ' ' ' OVK E~W EV, OLOV µ.EyE EL 11'EpL'TE ELS', a/\/\ ,,v 1TaG1JS' EKEL-
20 VTJS' 'T~S' {w~s opos- 1TOAA~S' Ka, 0.1TE{pov OVG1]S', WS' av 
\ , .I. , , \ ./, , r , J. ' A~ 1Tapa 'TOLaVT1]S' .,,vaEWS' EK11aµ,.,,aU1]S'. t:,W1] 'TE ,,v ov 'TOVOE" 
fl \ 'Ill f I I W~ '\\1 fl I :J.. II wptaTO yap av ws a-roµ,ov 17017· al\/\ wp,GTo µ,&-ro, · ,1v apa 
op,a8Eiaa ·ws EVOS' TLVOS' 1TOAAov-wpLGTO 8~ Ka, lKaa'TOV 
TWV 1TOAAwv-8,a µ,EV TO 1TOAV 'T~S' {w~s- 1TOAAa op,a8Eiaa, 
~ ' ~· .,. ' . ., 25 a,a oE av -rov opov Ev. 
176 
[ 61] What is this 'determined unity'? It is Nous. 
Determined life is Nous. [62] But what is Its 
'multiplicity'? ~ is the multiplicity of 
intelligences. All [ the contents of Nous] are 
intelligences. [ 63 I On the one hand the~is the 
totality of Nous, on the other hand there are the many 
individual intelligences. [64] But is Nous, as a whole 
and as having each intelligence [within Itself], 
identical with any one intelligence which It has [within 
Itself]? [65] [If It were] then It would just have one 
kind of being. [ 66] If they [ the intelligences] are 
many in number, there must be differentiation [in Nous]. 
[67] Once again, then, how does each intelligence have 
differentiation? It has differentiation because of what 
it is in itself and how it relates to the whole. [68] 
[Therefore] the All which is Intellect is not identical 
with any of the individual intelligences. 
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[ 69] The life of Nous was all power, and the vision 
which occurred There was the power of all beings, and 
Nous which thus arose is Itself the manifestation of all 
beings. [70] And Nous is positioned over the beings, 
not so that It may have a base, but so that [through Its 
vision] of that which is without form [the One] It may 
be the base for the form of the first forms. 1 3 [71] 
And Nous becomes a kind of light to the Soul, in the 
same way that the One is [ a kind of light] to Nous. 
[ 72] Whenever It determines the Soul It makesit 
rational, giving to it [the Soul] a trace of what It has 
Itself. [73] Thus Nous is a trace of the One. [74] 
And since Nous is a form and in going out [from the One] 
13Brehier's translation is helpful here: 
"L' Intelligence siege en eux, non pas pour y trouver in 
fondement, mais pour etre le fondemendt des etres premiers 
grace a la vision qu' elle a de ce qui est sans forme" 
(Enneades, Vol. 6, Part 2, p. 89). 
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is made multiple, the One is [and must be] without form 
and without snape, because in this way It makes form. 
[ 75] If the · One were form, ~ would be logos .14 
[ 76] It was necessary for the First to be entirely 
without multiplicity, for if It were multiple, It would 
depend on another and be from another prior to It. 
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14As we already noted in Text C (III, 8 [ 30]), the 
term logos is not without exegetical difficulties in 
Plotinus' Enneads. In order to understand its use in this 
passage we must distinguish the various ways in which 
Plotinus employs the term logos. In the broadest sense of 
the term, logos simply means a higher hypostasis on a lower 
level of reality. In this sense Nous may be said to be a 
logos since Nous is the One on a lowerlevel of reality. In 
a more strict sense of the term, logos is the manifestation 
of the divine intelligibles. That is, logos denotes a form 
on a lower level of reality. It is this meaning of logos 
which Plotinus has in mind here when he denies that Nous is 
a logos. In this sense Nous could not be a logos because 
there are no forms above Nous. In the strictest sense of 
the term, logos is the productive principle (or seminal 
reason) somehow intermediate between Soul acting as Nature 
and the sensible uni verse. For further explanation of 
Plotinus' use of logos, see Rist, Road to Reality, pp. 84-
85. 
In addition to these three ways of understanding logos 
"vertically" there is also the "horizontal" dimension of 
logos. Logos is the expression of the necessary 
interrelationship of all the intelligibles. As such, logos 
is understood through Plotinus' doctrine of sympathy. For 
valuable discussion of sympathy see Gi.irtler, "Human 
Consciousness," Ch. 8. 
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(77] But in what way are the contents of Nous formally 
good? Is it that each is a form or is beautiful or is 
something? [7&] If everything that comes from the Good 
has a trace or impression of It or from It, just as that 
which comes from fire has a trace of fire and that which 
comes from sweetness has a trace of sweetness; [ 79] 
[And if] life came into Nous from It [the Good] -- for 
[Nous] originated out of the act from It [the Good] 
and Nous exists because of It [the Good] and the beauty 
of the Forms is a 1 so from There, [then] everything 
formally good would be life and intelligence and form. 
(80] But what do they share in common? Simply because 
they come from the Good is not [reason] enough for there 
to be identity [declared among them]. (81] There must 
be something common in them. [ 82] What is produced 
from something may not be identical [with its producer] 
but rather [may be] diverse according as difference 
manifests itself in multiple recipients, since that 
which is given to the f~rst act is different from that 
which is given by the first act. And that which these 
[ the first act: life, the second act: intelligence, 
and the third act: form] produce here is also 
different. [ 83] But there is nothing to keep each 
thing from being formally good in a degree according to 
its own difference. (84] What explains the highest 
good? 
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[ 8 5] But first it is necessary to consider this: Is, 
then, life good, life in itself, life in its simplicity, 
that life which may be known when all else is absent 
[from it]? [86] And the life that results from life 
There, is it such as to be something different from it 
[life There]? [87] Again, what is [the goodness of] 
such life? It is the life of what is good. But it is 
not the life of the Good Itself, but rather the life 
from It. [ 88] But if in that life there is something 
from That [ the One] and this life is truly life and 
[because] we must admit that nothing valueless may come 
from That [the One], life in itself is truly good. [89] 
And [if] we are to speak about Nous accurately, we 
[must] say that It is good because It is from the First 
[the One]. [90] It is obvious that each form is good 
and is like the Good. [ 91] Every form must have 
something good, either as a [quality] common [to all the 
forms] or as [something] different, or as the first or 
as the second of things in a series. [92] We thus have 
demonstrated that each being here has in its ousia 
something of the Good and is itself good because of 
this. For life is not good absolutely but we say that 
life is genuinely what it is from the Good. This is 
also true of Nous and one must notice a certain sameness 
in them. 
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[93] When, with all their differences, we ascribe 
sameness to [the contents of] life and Nous, there is no 
impediment to ·our maintaining that sameness exists in 
their very ousia, and yet this similarity may also be 
considered and separated by thought. [94] Life [when 
separated in thought] from a man and a horse [for 
example] yields [ the concept of] animal. Likewise we 
may obtain [ the concept of heat] from water and fire. 
The genus ['animal' or 'heat'] belongs primarily [to the 
first term in the above examples] and secondarily [to 
the other terms]. Each part, [whether considered 
together] or separately, may thus be commonly called 
'good.' [95] But does this [argument] establish 
goodness in their very ousia? [96] Certainly, each as 
a whole is good, but its goodness is not like the 
goodness which belongs to the One. [97] How then are 
they good? As parts [ of the Good]? No, because the 
Good is partless. [98] The Good Itself is a unity, but 
each being only has unity according to its own manner of 
being. [ 99] For the first act is good and the limit 
associated with the first act is good, as well as the 
[resultant] union of the act and the limit. [100] The 
first act is good because it comes from the Good; the 
second [act is good] because it is an ordered All that 
comes out of the antecedent good; the third [ act is 
good] because it is a union of the [first] two. [101] 
[These subsequent goods] are derived and are not 
identical, just as from the same person speech, walking 
and other characteristics come forth; all of them 
properly [belong there]. 
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[ 102] Here in the sensible world goodness depends on 
order and rhythm. But what explains goodness There? 
[ 103] Someone, might say that here the good is derived 
from outside because what is ordered is different from 
what orders, but There they are identical [and thereby 
good in themselves]. [ 104] But why are they good in 
themselves? It is simply because they come from There 
that we must maintain that they are good. We must agree 
that beings [There] are good because they come from the 
Good, but we must also explain how they are good [ in 
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COMMENTS 
Let us now express the precise movement of thought in 
Text D. The first twelve chapters of VI, 7 are concerned 
with stating accurately the nature of Nous. In Chapter 13, 
which constitutes the first part of our key text), Plotinus 
shows how the four supreme genera of Plato's Timaeus 
(kines is, tau ton, heteron, and ousia) relate to zoe. He 
also notes there the primacy of kinesis in contributing to 
15The remaining chapters of this treatise (i.e., VI, 
7 [38], 19-42), though they do not contain new information 
on life, amplify several important notions subsidiary to 
life (e.g., the nature of the intelligible world, energeia). 
Accordingly, we will refer to them when necessary. 
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the explanation of life and of the other genera. Plotinus 
begins this chapte~ with a discussion of the simplicity of 
Nous. -
a. The multiplicity of every being, including Nous 
and Soul, is inversely proportional to its degree of 
simplicity. And since something can only be a principle by 
virtue of its simplicity and not its multiplicity, then the 
first and last of the intelligible beings are completely 
simple. The act of the last being is simple, however, only 
in the sense that it is a reduction of act or being. The 
act of the first being is simple in the sense that it is the 
totality of all acts (#1-#3).16 
b. But what sort of totality is Nous? The first 
being is a true unity and not merely a collection of 
something separable into an infinite number of genuinely 
distinct parts. It is a true unity precisely because Its 
movement [and, hence, Its life] is entirely within It (#4). 
c. However, Nous cannot remain perfectly the same, 
since Its movement must have a starting point and an end, 
between which there must be variety. If this were not the 
case, Its movement [and life] would have no distinct stages 
and, as a result, there would be no act. Furthermore, if 
Its movement were always the same, It would lack variety 
and, hence, would not involve all lives and all acts. Nous 
16see note 13, Text B (VI, 9 [9]). 
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~ould thus be only a single, non-multiple life. Therefore, 
so that there may be a totality of lives, Nous must 
eternally move through [and thereby animate] all beings (#5-
#10). 
d. If Nous is to comprehend the totality of lives It 
must advance into everything. For a simple being remains a 
unity either by advancing or by not advancing into anything. 
If it does advance it is a genuine duality because it moves 
through objects which are logically distinct from it. Thus 
it is a unity-in-multiplicity. In other words, it is one 
being comprehending many. If it does not advance, each 
member of the duality is really and logically indistinct 
from the other and thus it would make no sense to say that 
Nous comprehends all beings and all lives (#11-#12). 
e. If there is a genuine duality, sameness and 
difference must result from the epistrophe of Nous. Out of 
this sameness and difference a third unity originates [i.e., 
Soul; the first and second unities having been the One and 
Nous, respectively]. This third unity is a totality which 
involves both sameness and difference: it is a unity-and-
mul tiplici ty. Its nature [ like the nature of the second 
unity, Nous] is to introduce distinction among beings in a 
whole (#13-#14). 
f. Now the different beings which Nous embraces 
either existed before It or after It. But if they existed 
before It Nous would be influenced by them and they would be 
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1ts source. But it is impossible that what is multiple can 
cause what is simple. Hence, what is multiple cannot be 
explained except by Nous [and by what is higher] (#15-#16). 
g. Nous, then, is the principle of all beings [and 
thereby of all living things]. Its movement and act produce 
all [intelligible] beings, one after the other. Its 
movement is like that of one who travels to many locations 
and yet never goes outside of himself. 
with the locations to which It moves. 
Nous is identical 
It is the space for 
Its own movement. Because Nous never goes outside Itself, 
Its wandering is of a stationary sort, never straying from 
the "meadow" of truth (#17-#19). 
h. But the "meadow" of truth must have 
differentiation. Movement [ and life] would be impossible 
without differences. Furthermore, intellection would not be 
possible, and Nous and being would not exist. The movement 
of intellection must completely encompass every being. In 
this way all beings are produced and given life (#20-#24). 
i. Because Nous is a unity producing multiplicity It 
is a sameness-in-difference. Nous eternally differentiates 
all beings. Its act of differentiation is Its movement. 
Its movement through the totality of lives is like that of a 
traveler over the earth. He travels to many different 
lands, all of which are on the same earth. Likewise, Nous 
is the same as the many different beings [which It contains] 
to which It moves. There can be no act [ and no life] if 
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sameness is not present eternally to all different beings 
[within Nous] (#25~#27). 
j. All beings are truly identical with Nous because 
Its very nature is to be a sameness-in-difference and a 
unity-in-multiplicity. If Nous did not contain all beings 
It would by nature be incomplete (#28-#30). 
k. [ Chapter 14 continues this discussion by arguing 
that Nous is best understood when It is viewed as a giant 
unified organism. Chapter 15, which we take up next, 
initiates the second part of this long treatise. In this 
second part Plotinus attempts to explain how Nous is related 
to the One-Good.] Nous is the most desirable life because 
It is perfect life -- a life that encompasses all beings. 
All other lives are inferior to It.] These lives [share in 
some measure of unreality and, therefore,] are dark, little, 
imperfect and impure. If one contemplates only these 
inferior lives he will live imperfectly and share in evil; 
here [in this earthly realm] there is only a trace of Nous. 
Only by contemplating the true and perfect lives [which are 
the divine intelligibles] will he live the true life: life 
without evil (#31-#33). 
1. But the life of Nous is a true life: a life which 
consists in contemplation. By this contemplation Nous knows 
the Good and is formally good. The perfection of Nous 
consists in the unity of the intelligibles, each of which is 
a life. These lives are the objects of the contemplation of 
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Nous. They have the form of the Good and originate from the 
=----
original contemplation by Nous of the One-Good. Nous did 
not acquire the Good qua Good, but as It was best able to 
receive Him. For the Good is the principle from which Nous 
acquires Its being and dynamis. For it is absurd to think 
that It could contemplate the Good and think nothing. It is 
equally absurd to think that It could contemplate the One-
Good in Its complete perfection, for the product is always 
inferior to the producer. Thus, Nous is a separate and 
complete nature. It produces_ and fills Its own nature by 
becoming the universe of forms. This It becomes through the 
power which It receives from the Good Himself. Accordingly, 
the Good produces through emanation the realm of [life and] 
beings without Himself having the attributes of life and 
ousia. Thus, the Good [pure simplicity] gives what He 
Himself does not possess (#34-#40). 
m. In this way, the One produces that which is a 
multiplicity; this results not directly from His own power 
but from the power which He conveys to Nous, which is 
however inadequate to know the One-Good qua One-Good. For 
Nous, lacking the perfection of the Good, was only able to 
know the Good by fragmenting Him. It could possess the Good 
only as far as Its inferior nature would allow. Thus, the 
power of Nous depends on the power of the Good and thus Nous 
is formally good. Nous is constituted by a plurality of 
forms, each of which is formally good (#41-#42). 
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n. Thus, the universe of Nous is a plurality of 
beings, all of which are formally good. This universe might 
be compared to a living and multiple sphere. Since each of 
the forms which constitute the universe of Nous is a unique 
life that is formally good, that universe may be compared to 
a diamond or crystal, multi-faceted, colorful, and shining 
with living faces. Or it may be likened to a gathering of 
pure souls, none of which has any defect, each illuminated 
by the most perfect being, Nous Itself (#43). 
o. Of course, such analogies as these, while helpful, 
still mislead, for they help us to know Nous only 
externally, whereas we only truly know Nous when we become 
identical with It through contemplation (#44). 
p. [ In Chapter 16 Plotinus describes further the 
generation of Nous. Its first stage (indeterminacy) is an 
active power to behold two distinct objects: a) the light 
of the One-Good and b) the infinite multiplicity of 
intelligibles. Chapter 17 begins with the following 
objections, based on the assumption that "like produces 
like."] 
How can what is multiple and differentiated originate 
from what is completely simple [ the One]? Because the 
production of real beings entails that the producer be 
necessarily superior to the product. In this sense the 
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cause can indeed be different from the product it causes. 
(#45-#46). 17 
q. Accordingly, dynamis must always have act as a 
cause. But, if the product (i.e., that which is initially 
only dynamis) is first act (Nous) and its cause is both 
superior to and different from it, then that cause must 
transcend both act and life. Nous thus has life because It 
comes from what is even more perfect than life. Life, then, 
is different from, and a mere trace of, its source: the 
one-Good. Life, which was i~itially indeterminate, was made 
·determinate by contemplatively turning back to its source. 
Its source [the One] is without determination because It is 
superior to and different from Its products (#47-#55). 
r. What sort of limit or determination does Nous 
possess? It is obviously not any external sort of limit. 
The nature of the limitation that belongs to Nous would have 
to be purely internal and would not in any way have the sort 
of limitation that, for example, magnitude has. Nous, the 
totality of life, is intrinsically limited by the variety of 
differences arising from Its eternal attempt to contemplate 
and be an image of Its source, the One (#56). 
s. The differences cons ti tu ting Nous are Its lives 
and perfections, without which Nous would be incomplete. 
l 7For valuable explanation of the 
nature of Plotinus' line of reasoning here, 




Its limit or determination is thus not like that of a single 
defined life. Nous is Itself determinate [ a determinate 
unity] by being a unity-in-multiplicity and a totality of 
lives. Nous is determined because It is a universe of forms 
and Nous is a unity because It is an active dynamis [i.e., 
intelligible matter] (#57-#63}. 
t. While Nous comprehends all intelligences It is not 
identified with any single intelligence that It has. 
Otherwise It would be only one particular being and not the 
totality of them as is Its nature to be. In fact, every 
being is and lives precisely and only because of its 
relation to [the whole of] Nous. Nous became the sum total 
of lives by progressing from being indeterminate and active 
dynamis to being fully determined and act. It thus became 
the universe of forms, beings and lives and is prior to them 
because It is their principle [ through Its vision of the 
One-Good] (#64-#70}. 
u. As the first principle of reality the One 
illuminates and animates Nous, which, by contemplating the 
One, becomes determinate and act. But just as the One is 
the principle that produces and illumines Nous, so Nous is 
in turn the principle that produces and illumines the Soul. 
The Soul is like Nous because it too has intellection, 
although of a less perfect sort, because it is discursive 
and not intuitive. Nous, too, is like the One-






is good, although in a less perfect way 
· multiple]. The One-Good ultimately 
since the former is formless and 
indeterminate while the latter is formed and determinate. 
The One-Good cannot be a form since that would entail that 
~ be logos and that the One contain the reasons for all 
things and thus be multiple. Rather, the One-Good must be 
entirely undifferentiated. Otherwise, the One-Good would 
depend on something other than, and prior to, It for Its 
determination (#71-#76).18 
v. Nous, then, is like the One-Good because It is a 
trace of the One-Good. Accordingly, life, intelligence and 
form are also traces of the One-Good. What is it that makes 
life, intelligence and form good? The answer is that these 
distinct realities must have some one common and intrinsic 
characteristic which makes them good. Each of these three 
is good to the extent that it is a trace of the One-Good. 
The question remains: what is the good of these highest 
beings? (#77-#84) 
w. It must first be determined whether life itself is 
in fact good [before we can ask where its goodness comes 
from]. Life is good because its origin, the One, is Primal 
Goodness, from which nothing worthless can come. For this 
same reason intelligence and form are also deemed good, and 
18see note 9, above. 
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yet each also retains its own identity (#85-#92). 
x. Each of these intelligibles and lives has its own 
identity, which differentiates it logically from all other 
intelligibles and lives in Nous. But because Nous is a 
universe of lives and intelligences Its goodness must differ 
from the goodness of the One, even though Nous has the One 
as Its source. For Nous is good as a one-in-many whereas 
the One is Good as purely one. Thus, both the first act 
[life] and the second act, limit [Nous], are good, so too is 
the third act, namely, the completed entity [ the order of 
forms] resulting from these two. However, none of these 
three is identical with the One-Good, since each derives 
from and depends upon It (#93-#101). 
y. What, then, explains how these three 
[intelligible] beings [life, Nous and form] are good? 
Goodness in the sensible world depends upon order and 
rhythm. Goodness in the intelligible world, however, cannot 
depend upon order and rhythm, which presuppose no outside 
cause. But there is no such separation in the intelligible 
world. Hence, goodness must somehow be intrinsic to the 
members of the intelligible world. Thus, although it is 
obvious that the intelligibles are good, it is not yet clear 
what intrinsically makes them be good (#102-#104). 
[Plotinus' answer, found in Chapters 22 and 23, is that the 
One is present to life and to the other intelligible beings 
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as a kind of light, which is the irradiation of the One-Good 
Itself.] 
The following items must now be clarified in order to 
make more explicit the meaning of zoe in the key text: a) 
life as epistrophe: zoe as it relates to kinesis and to the 
other megista gene; b) life as prohodos: 
dynamis. 
Nous as active 
a) Life as epistrophe: zoe as it relates to kinesis 
and the other megista gene 
In Text D ( especially #4-#30), Plotinus employs the 
concept of kinesis or movement (in addition to the concepts 
ousia, tauten and heteron) to explicate how Nous is a one-
in-many and a life. Plotinus' usage of these concepts seems 
to be influenced by Plato's application of them in the 
Timaeus to explain the composition of the World Soul .19 
In addition to VI, 7 ( 38) Plotinus discusses the megista 
gene in VI , 2 ( 4 3 ) • 2 0 There he seems to be relying on 
19Four of the five megista gene of Plato's Sophist 
occur in VI, 7. Only stasis is not mentioned there. The 
reason for this omission seems to be that Plotinus must have 
had the Timaeus ( in which stasis likewise is omitted) and 
not the Sophist (in which stasis is discussed) in mind when 
writing this treatise. 
20This treatise, along with VI, 1 (42) and VI, 3 
(44), originally comprised one single work, which Porphyry 
entitled "On the kinds of being" and divided into three 
parts. See Porphyry, "Life," p. 21. 
What makes VI, 2 (43) the most valuable of the three 
is that it addresses directly Plotinus' own view on the 
categories of being. VI, 1 (42) and VI, 3 (44) are 
concerned chiefly with refuting the positions of the Stoics 
and Aristotle, respectively. 
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Plato's Sophist (25la-260a) since he includes his fifth 
megiston genos: rest (stasis). 21 By basing our study of 
the megista gene on both of these treatises we shall arrive 
at the fullest possible conception of them and of their 
relevance to zoe. 
But Plato applies these concepts to Soul, while 
Plotinus employs them to explain the nature of the 
intelligible world. Such a shift in application is 
justified by Plotinus' logos doctrine. As we have already 
seen in Texts A (VI, 7 [2]) ~nd C (VI, 8 [30]), an important 
-dimension of Plotinus' logos doctrine explains how a lower 
(and, hence, inferior) reality is constituted by the same 
factors ( only in a less perfect way) that constitute a 
higher (and, hence, superior) reality. Thus, for example, 
if Soul is a logos of (a less perfect instance of) Nous the 
characteristics of the former are more perfectly possessed 
by the latter. Plotinus' acceptance of Plato's account of 
the World Soul in the Timaeus makes it possible for him, by 
utilizing his logos doctrine in this way, to ascribe to the 
21In the Sophist Plato is concerned with defining 
fully the nature of a sophist and with distinguishing him 
from the statesman and the philosopher. It is in his 
explanation of how false statements (the sophist's "stock in 
trade", so to speak) are possible that he is led to take up 
the megista gene. 
Accordingly, he discusses the megista gene a) in order 
to counter the Parmenidean dictum that one cannot speak 
meaningfully about "that which is not" ( 241d-e) and b) in 
order to show that forms may themselves participate in other 
forms (251a-259d). 
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intelligible world (Nous) the four concepts Plato applied to 
the World Soul. 
Let us now return to Plato and briefly examine his use 
of these concepts in the Timaeus. The Demiurge produces the 
sensible universe as the image of the World of Forms and 
endows it with soul. Since soul is prior and superior to 
body, its task is to rule body. 22 But what does it mean 
to say that soul is prior and superior to body? It means 
that soul is a unity of three factors: intermediate ousia, 
intermediate tauten and intermediate thateron. These 
factors are termed "intermediate" because they lie between 
the eternal Forms and bodies. Plato's point here seems to 
be, then, that even in the realm of constantly changing 
being (the sensible universe) beings~, are identical with 
themselves and are different from all others, but they are 
so in a transient manner. That the disorder of the sensible 
universe is mastered (although not totally) by order is due 
to the World Soul's presence as intermediary between being 
and becoming.23 
The World Soul, too, is an ousia because it is a 
distinct being and has a definite nature, having been 
22see Timaeus 30a-34c. 
23such is the interpretation of F. M. Cornford 
(Plato's Cosmology, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1937, pp. 
60-66) and, as Philip Merlan points out (From Platonism to 
Neoplatonism, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960, pp. 13ff), 
of Proclus as well (see, for example, Platonic Theology, VI, 
9, 365). 
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patterned after the Forms themselves. The World Soul is 
constituted by an · inner circle of difference and an outer 
circle of sameness. The inner and outer circles are there 
because the World Soul is a tauton and a thateron ( the 
latter of which Plotinus refers to as heteron). 
Finally, the World Soul is a twofold kinesis. First, 
it is a self-moving principle and the circles of sameness 
and difference are its constituents and are the means 
(through efficient causality) by which it knows. Second, it 
is an intellection of both the intelligible universe and the 
sensible universe through the circles of sameness and 
difference.24 
Let us now examine each of these Platonic terms as 
they appear in Plotinus, in order to discern their 
relationship to zoe. In Text A (IV, 7 [2]) we noted that 
Plotinus' definition of life is based in part on Platonic 
arguments. If Soul is kinesis and, as logos of Nous, 
imperfect intellection, then Nous must be perfect kinesis in 
#4-#10 and #19-#26 of our current key text. 
The relationship of kinesis to zoe must therefore be 
understood in the same way that the relationship of 
intellection to zoe is understood. The emergence of 
24This explanation of 
is based on Leo Sweeney, 
Philebus: A Bibliographical 
pp. 89-140 (forthcoming). 
the World Soul in the Timaeus 
s. J., Infinity in Plato's 
and Philosophical Study, Ch. 4, 
196 
intellection, or Nous, was described in Text C (III, 8 [30]) 
as involving a two-:-moment process of prohodos (active 
avnamis) and epistrophe (act). Since intellection is -
kinesis, the emergence of kinesis may likewise be described 
as involving these two moments. 
We shall examine kinesis as prohodos (and, hence, as 
active dynamis, to which Plotinus alludes in #5) later in 
this chapter. This kinesis is not yet intellection, since 
intellection comes only in the second moment of Nous' 
production ( epistrophe), but is simply the overflowing of 
the One. Kinesis as epistrophe (i.e., as act) is explained 
in Text D in terms of ousia (#17 and #24). In this 
explanation Plotinus once again shows his debt to Plato by 
his frequent descriptions of the kinesis of Nous as a 
"wandering" in which It actuates and animates all ousiai. 
These ousiai are the acts which constitute the fulfillment 
of the kinesis (or "wandering") of Nous (#17).25 The 
kines is of Nous cannot, for Plotinus, occur simply during 
the moment of Nous' prohodos, since all beings would then 
remain indeterminate and in potency (#69).26 As 
determinate, then, kinesis is the actuation of every being 
and every life (#9-#10). 27 Furthermore, kinesis is 
25see Timaeus 38cff. 
26see also VI, 7 (38), 40, 13-20. 
27In VI, 2 (43), 7, 35-36; 8, 1-5 and 11-18 Plotinus 
notes that kinesis is the eternal intellection which 
actuates the intelligible realities. 
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related to the intelligibles themselves as well since every 
such Form is itself a noeton and hence contemplates from its 
own perspective the whole of the intelligibles.28 But, as 
we shall explain later in this chapter, even kinesis as 
indeterminate (i.e., as prohodos and active dynamis) is 
life. 
The explanation of tauton and heteron also requires 
that the two moments of Nous' production be distinguished. 
An earlier Plotinian text (i.e., II, [4] 12, 5, 28-39) 
argues that heteron (and not just kinesis) is necessary for 
explaining the production of any being because the product 
necessarily differs from the producer. For this reason, 
heteron in Text D (#25, #30, #52-#56) is said to be a 
characteristic of the first moment of Nous' production and, 
hence, of Nous' life as well. 
One may profitably argue that heteron is also a 
characteristic of the second moment of Nous' production, 
since the multiplicity of beings is necessarily other than 
their ultimate source, the One-Good. In fact, it is heteron 
that makes the multiplicity of being possible, since it is 
(logically) prior to them (#15-#16).29 
28see VI, 2 (43), 8, 14-18, 23-36, and 44-48. 
29In VI, 2 (43), 8, 31-43 Plotinus uses heteron to 
describe the variety in Nous (i.e., the differences among 
the Forms and the logical difference between intellection 
and its content). 
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Plotinus also notes (#26-#30) that tauton is a 
characteristic of · the second moment of Nous' production 
(and, hence, a characteristic of Nous' life). This 
conclusion is based on the fact that the eternal 
intellection of Nous is ever-present to all Its objects or 
acts (#26-#30). 
Tauton and heteron, when considered separately (i.e., 
as different dimensions of Nous) as well as together (i.e., 
as dimensions of one and the same reality: Nous) may be 
seen to contribute to our .understanding of zoe in the 
following way. Life on the level of Nous is both a tauton 
and a heteron, namely a sameness-in-difference. Sameness 
( tau ton) denotes the life of Nous mainly in Its second 
moment of production because it refers to the intellection 
present to and actuating all of the intelligibles.30 
Difference (heteron) denotes the life of Nous in both Its 
first and second moments of production because It is other 
than the One and because It is a universe of differentiated 
intelligibles. Each moment in its own right can be 
described as life. 
Kinesis in relation to tauton is the intellection 
generating and apprehending every intelligible. Kinesis in 
relation to heteron is the noesis that actuates all the 
different noeta and it is itself one of these noeta. 
30see also VI, 2 (43), 8, 34-43. 
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Finally, stasis, (though it is not mentioned here in Text D 
but only later in VI, 2 [43], 7, 30-31; 8, 23-27; 15, 11-12) 
depicts Nous insofar as the content of Its contemplation is 
a universe of permanent and eternal intelligibles (i.e., 
Forms). 
What Plotinus succeeds in achieving here ( in Text D 
and in VI, 2 [ 43]), then, is a further elaboration and 
interrelation of the most perfect aspects of Nous: the 
megista gene. Since each of the megista gene is perfect act 
each expresses in its own way the whole life and universe of 
Nous.31 Furthermore, our consideration of the five 
principles - kines is, tau ton, heteron, ousia and stasis -
corroborates what we have discovered in previous key texts, 
namely, that kinesis is of central importance to life. 
However, the full significance of kinesis to our study is 
grasped when we consider that there are at least three 
important conceptions of kinesis operative in Plotinus' 
thought. 
But what are these three conceptions of kinesis? 
Although distinct from one another they are also somewhat 
alike in that they all relate to intellection. The first 
sense of kinesis, discussed earlier in Text A (IV, 7 [27]), 
3lsee VI, 2 ( 43), 15, 4-12. Kines is denotes the act 
of Nous as intellection (VI, 2 [43], 8, 11-12); ousia as 
form(VI, 2 [43]; 8, 14-15); tauton as unity (VI, 2 [43], 
8, 36-38); heteron as multiplicity (VI, 2 [43], 8, 34-36); 
and stasis as eternity (VI, 2 [43], 7, 27-30). 
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describes both the human soul and the hypostasis Soul. As 
applied to soul it signifies intellection: a signification 
that Plotinus draws directly from Plato. This signification 
of kinesis is involved in Text D also since it is the 
Timaeus' conception of the kinesis of the World Soul as 
cognition that forms the background of Plotinus' treatment 
of kinesis in Text D. The important difference in Text Dis 
that Plotinus elevates this principle to the level of 
perfect life: to the level of Nous Itself. 
The second sense of kinesis applies to Nous. Kinesis 
is perfect intellection and, as such, describes the finished 
second hypostasis: Nous as epistrophe, life as fully 
realized. Nous considered as act is life because It has 
become determined by intellectively encompassing all the 
Forms (#41-#43). Nous as act actuates and animates the 
multiplicity of beings which are Its contents. In this 
sense Nous is not simply one single life but a multiplicity 
and totality of lives (#8).32 
Nous is likewise responsible for the life of all 
beings below It. All levels of reality below Nous, then, 
are alive precisely because and insofar as they are traces 
(and logoi) of Nous (#32-#33, #72). Accordingly, Nous may 
be said to be a totality of lives in a twofold way: a) as 
32p1otinus also appears to describe the intelligible 
world in this way in VI, 5 (23), 12, 9. 
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the multiple living content of Its contemplation of the One 
and b) as the sourc~ and cause of the life of every level of 
reality below It, since all beings below Nous are alive only 
because they are Its logoi (#31, #34). 
The life of Nous as a totality of lives is elaborated 
further in a later treatise: III, 7 (45), "On Eternity and 
Time," which A.H. Armstrong considers to be "one of the two 
major discussions of time in the surviving works of ancient 
philosophers; the other being that by Aristotle (Physics IV, 
10-14, 217b-224a)."33 Its Chapters Three and Eleven 
provide valuable data regarding the link between eternity 
and the life of Nous and between time and the life of Soul. 
Plotinus' own discussion of eternity and time in 
treatise III, 7 (45) is based on Plato's definition of time 
as a moving image of eternity (Timaeus 37d-38b), which seems 
to form the groundwork of his remarks about eternity (Chs. 
1-6) and time (Ch. 7-13). Plotinus, in the context of 
explaining the five megista gene of the Sophist ( 254d-e), 
concludes that the act of Nous is a life which comprehends 
all realities in a single and eternal moment.3 4 
of Nous, then, is an eternal 
intellection.35 
33Enneads, Vol. III, p. 293. 
Aristotle's position in III, 7 (45), 9; 
3 4 See I I I, 7 ( 4 5 ) , 3, 7-18. 








The life of Soul is also a kinesis, but on a lower 
(and, hence, less real and inferior) level of reality. 
plotinus explains that Soul, as logos of Nous, is 
contemplation but of an inferior sort. 36 This is due to 
the fact that Soul's intellection is merely discursive (and, 
hence, successive) and not intuitive (or immediate). 
As Soul presents one act after another, and then again 
another in ordered succession, it produces along with 
act, and goes on with another thought coming after that 
which it had before, to that which it did not previously 
exist because discursive thought was not in act, and 
Soul's present life is not like that which came before 
it.37 
Nous and Soul, then, are each a kinesis and an act. 
The life of Nous as act is identical with a comprehension of 
all things in one eternal moment or "now." Soul is alive, 
on the other hand, because it is a logos of Nous as a 
participant in the life of Nous. The life of Soul thus 
involves a temporal comprehension of all things (i.e., in a 
series of successive moments). In this sense, Plotinus' 
Soul may be said to be comparable to Plato's aforementioned 
"moving image of eternity~" 
To these two conceptions of kinesis (which apply to 
Soul and Nous, respectively) a third may be added. This 
third and somewhat elusive sense of kinesis will have an 
important bearing on our understanding of 
36see III, 7 (45), 11, 35-40. 
37see III, 7 (45), 11, 35-40. 
Plotinus' 
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conception of life. It is kinesis as prohodos -- the first 
stage of emanation of the second hypostasis out of the One 
(i.e., the second hypostasis understood as active dynamis or 
intelligible matter. )38 
b} Life as prohodos: Nous as active dynamis 
So far we have determined that Nous as fully realized 
contemplation is life. But there is an eternally prior 
moment constituting the nature of the second hypostasis. 
This is the stage of prohodos (active dynamis}, the potency 
for contemplation and not yet the full realization of 
contemplation. The presence of this eternally prior moment 
compels us here to ask the question whether Nous as 
indeterminate and unformed (as prohodos and active dynamis} 
is also life, and, if so whether this life is the more 
perfect. Since this first moment is described by Plotinus 
as intelligible matter perhaps we should begin our 
investigation there. 
Plotinus' treatment of intelligible matter throughout 
38These three senses of kinesis represent three 
different modes of intellection. The first two represent 
intellection as imperfect and perfect, respectively. The 
former is kinesis which is time, the latter is kinesis which 
is eternity. The third is intellection as potency (he 
dynamis}, understood as active power, not passive potency':" 
See, for example, II, 5 (25), 3, 22-28. Whether there seem 
to be elements in Plotinus' thought which indicate that life 
may also be defined as active dynamis (and not simply as 
energeia} is the issue we shall take up in the next section 
of comments. 
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the Enneads makes it clear that primarily we are to 
understand intelligible matter as active dynamis.39 In 
the first moment of its existence, intelligible matter is 
undefined and shapeless. It receives shape and form when it 
turns back to contemplate the One and remains as the 
substrate of the intelligible realities. As a dynamis 
intelligible matter receives content (the Forms or acts) and 
it really unites itself with these acts in order to form a 
single nature. 
Intelligible matter is genuinely real because it is 
·the first emanant from (or product of) the One. As such, it 
may be said to be more real than any being below it. 
although intelligible matter is indeterminate, 
And, 
this 
indeterminacy is not a sign of its imperfection and 
unreality, but is an indication of its similarity with the 
Primal Reality, the One.40 
In II, 4 (12), 4, 7-8, Plotinus explains the necessity 
of intelligible matter by noting that each Form must have a 
characteristic distinguishing it from other Forms and each 
39see, for example, II, 4 (12), 1-5 and II, 5 (25), 
3. 
40The chief reason that sensible matter is 
indeterminate is that it is below being and perfection. It 
is, in fact, devoid of form and, as such, it is that which 
is the eternal darkness and nothingness against which being, 
form and perfection terminate. 
For further explication of this and related points, 
see J. M. Rist, "The Indefinite Dyad and Intelligible 
Matter in Plotinus," Classical Quarterly, 12 (1962), pp. 99-
107, hereafter Rist, "Dyad." 
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must have something in common with others.41 In the same 
treatise (II, 4 . [12], 5, 28-30), Plotinus notes that 
otherness (heteron) and movement (kinesis) are related to 
intelligible matter. The otherness which is a 
characteristic of all beings is what distinguishes each 
level of reality from the One.42 Otherness is both a 
movement away from and a return to the One. In moving back 
to the One intelligible matter receives diversity and 
thereby the plurality of beings is produced. This otherness 
41see II, 4 (12), 4, 7-8. Rist ("Dyad," pp. 104-
105) notes that, for Plotinus, the distinguishing 
characteristic of the Forms is 
the feature of shape ..••• And if they have shape ... There 
must be something to receive the shape --plainly this is 
the common element mentioned above --and this 
'something' must be matter or substrate. The conclusion 
is backed up by a second argument which suggests that, 
since the world of sense is an image of the Intelligible 
World and is based on matter, there must be matter in 
the Intelligible World likewise. A third argument holds 
that an ordered system involves both Form and a place 
wherein Form may be lodged,while a fourth most 
relevant to the present discussion --adds that, since in 
a sense the Intelligible World is diversified, there 
must be a basic shapelessness which can be the 'unity' 
which accepts diversification, and that this 'unit' must 
be Matter. 
For helpful remarks on this topic see John Fielder, 
"Chorismos and Emanation in the Philosophy of Plotinus," in 
The Significance of Neoplatonism, Vol. 1 of Studies in 
Neoplatonism: Ancient and Modern, ed. by R. Baine Harris 
(Norfolk, Virginia: Old Dominion University, 1976), pp. 
101-120. 
42For an explanation of how "otherness" denotes all 
matter, whether sensible or intelligible, see J. M. Rist, 
"Plotinus on Matter and Evil," Phronesis 6 (1961), pp. 154-
166. 
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accounts for the uni ty-in-mul tiplici ty, and the life, of 
Nous. 43 -
Finally, Plotinus sometimes refers to intelligible 
matter as the "indefinite dyad" and sometimes simply as 
"intelligible matter." The term "infinite dyad" refers to 
intelligible matter in the first moment of Nous' production. 
Intelligible matter in this case is not to be viewed as the 
substrate of the Forms but as the active dynamis which 
issues from the One and subsequently returns to It.44 The 
term "intelligible matter," on the other hand, in addition 
to denoting the active potency of prohodos also refers to 
that active potency persisting after the epistrophe of 
Nous. 45 
Plotinus explains (in II, 4 [12], 5, 28-39) that the 
first moment of Nous' production (prohodos) is a kinesis. 
But he is careful to distinguish (as we have already seen in 
earlier key texts) from this indeterminate kinesis the 
determinate kinesis which describes the fully realized Nous 
Nous in Its second moment (epistrophe). In any case, it 
is important to realize that life belongs to both moments: 
Nous as indeterminate and determinate. 
43For additional discussion of this point, see Deck, 
Contemilation, p. 116. 
4see II, 4 ( 12), 5, 30f f. 
45see II, 5 (25), 3. In fact, the unformed active 
power which is the second hypostasis in the stage of 
prohodos is the same self-existent once formed during 
epistrophe. 
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However, the life which is Nous in Its indeterminate 
moment ( as prohodos and active dynamis) may be seen as 
logically and eternally prior to the life which is Nous in 
Its determinate moment (as epistrophe and act). Why? 
Because, for Plotinus, dynamis itself is prior and superior 
to act in reality. 46 Life as active dynamis (or 
intelligible matter), then, is more perfect than the World 
of Forms (Nous as epistrophe) because it shares more 
intimately in the indeterminacy of the One. Intelligible 
matter really denotes a greater perfection than do the 
forms. Consequently, it is kinesis as the first moment of 
Nous' production, insofar as it manifests active dynamis, 
intelligible matter and not form, that may be called primal 
life. 
This is perhaps the most valuable insight with regard 
to the meaning of zoe in Plotinus for it illustrates the 
richness of his conception of life and brings into focus how 
life is operative in both moments of Nous' emanation from 
the One. Kinesis explains the energeia of Nous (Nous as 
epistrophe). As such, kinesis is the actuation of all the 
megista gene, which define and constitute the nature of 
Nous. Thus, Nous as energeia and life, is the megista gene, 
the forms which exist on the level of epistrophe. 
But kinesis is also a power (active dynamis) for 
46on this point, see Rist, "Dyad," pp. 105-106. 
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intellection which is present so as to distinguish Nous (in 
Its first moment of emanation) from the One. Furthermore, 
not only kinesis but otherness (heteron) is there also. In 
the stage of prohodos, kinesis is the potency for 
intellection and is not yet intellection. It is an active 
power for movement, for separation, from the One, a 
separation which the term heteron conveys. To sum up, in 
Nous as energeia (epistrophe) kinesis and heteron are acts 
while in Nous as active dynamis (prohodos) kinesis 
heteron are active potencies only, not acts. 
and 
It is precisely this latter realization (i.e., that 
primal life is active dynamis and prohodos), which Plotinus 
seems to hold only implicitly, that later Neoplatonists made 
explicit. Let us briefly examine how one such thinker, 
Proclus, makes the point that life is the dynamis of 
Nous.47 
He describes the process of emanation on the level of 
Nous as unfolding in three stages. Each of these stages 
47It was in the thought of Iamblichus the Syrian 
(fl. 300 A.O.) that the desire to interpret Plotinian 
logical distinctions as also necessarily ontological was 
first applied to Nous. Beginning with Iamblichus, the Nous 
of Plotinus was broken up into a triad of Being, Life and 
Intelligence, although this was prepared for in some 
passages in the Enneads (e.g., V, 4 [7], 2 and VI, 8 [39], 
8). See Proclus, Commentary on the Timaeus, transl., Thomas 
Taylor (London, 18 20), III, 4 5, 5f f. See also Wallis, 
Neoplatonism, pp. 129-134. 
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corresponds to one of the three parts of the triad of Being, 
Life and Intelligence. The three steps of the process (as 
outlined in Proposition 35 of the Elements of Theology} are 
immanence ( in which the ef feet still exists in the cause, 
but with the capacity to flow out}; procession (the actual 
act of emanation}; and reversion (in which the effect turns 
back to its cause as its final and perfecting goal}. 
The immanent stage is Being, the widest and most 
perfect category ( after unity}. The second is Life, the 
movement of the second hypos~asis away from the One (hence, 
-1ife is the principle of all self-movement}. The final 
stage is Intelligence, in which the second hypostasis 
contemplates Itself and the One and becomes filled with 
content (see Propositions 102 and 138}. 
Are each of these stages just steps in the development 
of the second hypostasis, or are they unique in themselves? 
For Proclus they are both. While they are successive and 
each is predominant at a certain stage of the procession, 
they still imply each other as cause or consequent. This 
may be expressed by saying that the triad is mirrored within 
each of its terms, so that while, for example, the first 
term has Being as its predominant character, it is at the 
same time Life and Intelligence as well (Proposition 103}. 
Life, then, is the movement of the second hypostasis 
out of the One. For Proclus the second hypostasis may be 
considered the exemplary principle of movement because its 
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movement is primal. The choice of zoe as a description for 
the middle term of the triad Being-Life-Intelligence, the 
movement of thought which links object to subject, is 
suggested by Plato, Sophist 248eff (Proposition 102). But 
it is the procession (zoe) and reversion (~) of the 
second hypostasis which together constitute a single 
movement, the life of the universe (Proposition 102).48 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Let us briefly summarize how this key text has 
enhanced our understanding of zoe in Plotinus' system. 
Ennead VI, 7 ( 38) is an elaborate and involved treatise 
which consists of two parts. Part One (Chs. 1-14) examines 
the nature of Nous while Part Two (Chs. 15-42) explicates 
the relationship of Nous to the Primal Reality, The One-
48For additional helpful information, commentary and 
analysis see E. R. Dodds, Proclus: The Elements of Theology 
(Oxford, England: The Clarendon Press, 1963), especially 
pp. 252-272, and A. H. Armstrong, "Eternity, Life and 
Movement in Plotinus' Account of Nous," Le Neoplatonisme, 
Royaumont 9-13 juin 1969, Editions du Centre National de la 
Recherche Scientifigue, 1971, pp. 67-74. 
Behind this equation of life and dynamis there are 
several triads in the religious literature of the time. The 
most illuminating of these triads is presented by various 
Barbeloite tractates of the Nag Hammadi corpus (among them 
Allogenes, zostrianos and The Trimorphic Protennoia) which 
identify a supreme dynamis called the Triple Power with 
life, intelligence and being (see, for example, Allogenes 
XI, 47, 7-25 and 48, 19-25). For references to the Nag 
Hammadi tractates, see The Nag Hammadi Library in English, 
ed. James M. Robinson (San Francisco: Harper & Row and E. 
J. Brill, 1977). 
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Good. The key text (Chs. 13, 15, 17 and 18) overlaps these 
two parts. 
Our first task is to 
precede our key text. In 
summarize those chapters which 
Chapters One through Twelve 
Plotinus shows that Nous is a perfect knower and that Its 
nature consists of the infinite multiplicity of Forms. 
~' then, is a single nature that comprehends the reasons 
for all beings, both intelligible and sensible. Plotinus 
shows this by interpreting Plato to be saying (in the 
Timaeus) that the Divine Intelligence, or Craftsman, knows 
and embraces all of the Forms (i.e., the reasons for all 
beings). From this interpretation he infers that the world 
of sensible being must first somehow exist in the 
intelligible world. In other words, Nous must be the cause 
of all sensible beings. 
But if this is so, how can sense knowledge exist in 
the intelligible realm and how can the Forms of individual 
animals, plants and elements exist there also? To the first 
question Plotinus responds that sense knowledge as such does 
not (indeed, cannot) exist in the intelligible world. 
However, sense knowledge can exist There insofar as that 
which makes sense knowledge possible (namely, the sum total 
of the principles of knowledge) does exist in the 
intelligible world. To the second question he replies that 
insofar as the Forms of all things are perfections they are 
compatible with the nature of Nous. In addition, all Forms, 
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when considered as such, are themselves intelligences, 
irrespective of tne qualities or deficiencies they have in 
their participants. Hence, they are all one in nature with 
Nous. -
In the present key text (VI, 7 [ 38]) Plotinus is 
concerned with two main objectives. First, he seeks to 
explain further life as epistrophe by examining zoe as it 
relates to the Platonic megista gene, especially kines is. 
Second, he gives some indications concerning life as 
prohodos or the life of Nous as active dynamis. 
In attempting to achieve the first of these objectives 
Plotinus relies on Plato's Timaeus (and Sophist) in order to 
explain how the five Platonic megista gene (kinesis, stasis, 
tauten, heteron and ousia) relate to zoe. In the Timaeus 
Plato uses four of these notions (omitting stasis) to 
explain how the Demiurge formed the World Soul. In order 
that the World Soul should be the best of all sensible 
beings, the Demiurge blended tauten, thateron (for which 
term Plotinus substitutes heteron) and ousia into a whole. 
Next, this unity was cut into strips and these were bent 
into circles (an inner circle of difference and an outer 
circle of sameness). These circles were then put into 
cognitional motion, producing the cyclical movement of the 
celestial bodies. For Plato, it is through the motion of 
these circles of sameness and difference that the World Soul 
knows both the Forms and all sensible existents. In the 
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Sophist Plato employs all five of these notions to help him 
to determine the precise difference between the sophist, the 
statesman and the philosopher. In his discussion of the 
chief feature of the sophist, namely, his ability to employ 
false statements, Plato introduces the megista gene. They 
serve a dual purpose: a) to show that it is possible 
(contra Parmenides) to speak meaningfully about "that which 
is not" and b) to further explain the science of Dialectics 
by showing that true knowledge must consist in understanding 
how Forms relate to other Forms (and not just in 
understanding how sensible things relate to Forms). 
By emphasizing an important dimension of his logos 
doctrine (i.e., that a lower reality is a less perfect 
instance of a higher reality) Plotinus transfers these 
notions to Nous. Thus, kinesis, tauton, heteron, ousia and 
stasis are constitutive not only of Soul but, in a more 
perfect way, of Nous as well. 
How, then, is z6e to be understood in relation to 
these notions? To understand the connection between kinesis 
and z6e it is necessary to note that Nous is produced in a 
twofold process of prohodos (active dynamis) and epistrophe 
(act). Each moment is indeed a kinesis and a life. Kinesis 
as prohodos is not yet intellection, but it is life as sheer 
active power for intellection and, hence, is the 
indeterminate principle of all living beings and acts. 
Kinesis as epistroehe is explicable in terms of ousia. 
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Here, too, Plotinus employs Platonic terms when describing 
the kinesis of Nous as a "wandering" within Itself in which __,....__._ 
It animates all ousiai. This we may take as further 
justification of our inference, made earlier in this key 
text and in Text A (IV, 7 [2]), that by life Plotinus means 
a kind of kines is. These ousiai are themselves the acts 
which constitute the fulfillment of the kines is of Nous 
(Nous in Its determinate state). As determinate or act, 
then, Nous is the actuation of every being and every life. 
To explain how tauten and heteron relate to zoe it is 
necessary to refer again to the two moments of Nous' 
production. Plotinus argues (in II, 4 [12], 5, 28-39) that 
a proper explanation of the production of any being must 
ref er not just to kines is but to heteron as well. Why? 
Because any product is necessarily different from, by being 
less perfect than, its producer. Hence, heteron in our key 
text is a significant characteristic of the first moment of 
Nous' production and also of Nous' life. Heteron in the 
moment of prohodos is consequently identical with 
intelligible matter and active dynamis. Furthermore, it may 
also be said that heteron is a characteristic of the second 
moment of Nous' production, since the plurality of 
intelligible beings is necessarily other than their original 
source, the One-Good. Tauten also is a characteristic of 
the second moment of Nous' production and, hence, of Its 
life as well. Why? Because the eternal intellection of 
Nous is ever-present to all of Its objects or acts. 
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This 
factor is the trace of the One common to all beings and is 
life. Elsewhere in the Enneads {VI, 2 [43]) Plotinus, 
relying on Plato's Sophist, speaks further about the megista 
gene, this time bringing in the fifth genos, stasis {rest) 
as well. There he notes that even stasis applies to Nous 
because the content of Its contemplation is a universe of 
permanent and eternal forms. 
What may we conclude regarding zoe in light of its 
connection with the concepts tauton, heteron, ousia, kinesis 
and stasis? First, life on the level of Nous is both a 
tau ton and a heteron, that is, a sameness-in-difference. 
Sameness denotes the life of Nous mainly in Its moment of 
epistrophe and difference denotes the life of Nous in Its 
moments of prohodos and epistrophe. Second, each moment of 
Nous' production may be termed life. Nous in Its first 
moment is life as pure active dynamis, as the indeterminate 
principle for all living beings and acts. Nous in Its 
second moment is life as the actuation and determination of 
all living intelligibles. 
How might we better understand the life of Nous in the 
first moment of Its production? We notice that in Its first 
moment Nous is intelligible matter, which is first emanant 
from, or product of, the One. But intelligible matter is 
life as active dynamis. Hence, life as active dynamis may 
be said to be more real than any being subsequent {logically 
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and otherwise} to it. Intelligible matter, precisely as 
indeterminate and µnformed, is more like the One than it is 
when it becomes determinate and formed ( in the moment of 
epistrophe}. 
We may say, therefore, that life as active dynamis is 
Primal Life because it is more real than life as act. What 
would lead us to such a conclusion? Careful consideration of 
certain fundamental Plotinian principles, namely, "to be 
real is to be one" and "dynamis is more perfect than, 
because it is prior to, act. n49 Life as active dynamis 
may be said to be more perfect than life as act and 
intelligible matter (which is identified with life as active 
dynamis} may be said to be more perfect than the World of 
Forms precisely because intelligible matter, for Plotinus, 
shares more intimately in the indeterminacy of the One than 
does the World of Forms. 
49This latter principle is derived from Rist ("Dyad," 
pp. 105-106} who states that intelligible matter, 
.•• the first effluence from the One, possesses by its 
very indeterminacy a kinship with the One which the 
Forms do not possess. As we read in Enn. 2.4.3, Matter 
'there' is everything at the same time:- It has nothing 
into which it can change, for it already possesses 
everything. This indeterminacy which can, on its return 
to its Source, yield any one of the eternal Forms, has 
of itself something more akin to the One than have these 
later determinations. The Forms are perfectly what they 
are; they are perfect being. Intelligible Matter has a 
shadow of the superiority of To hsxava in its 
potential of becoming all Real Beings. 
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Reflection on this problem led later Neoplatonists to 
posit additional . hypostases. Proclus, for example, 
describes the process of emanation as involving three 
stages, each of which represents a separate hypostasis: 
first, the immanent stage (Being), second, the stage of 
prohodos (Life), and third, the stage of epistrophe (Nous). 
While these stages are logically) successive and each 
predominates at a certain point of the process, they 
nevertheless imply each other as cause or consequent. 
Accordingly, the triad is reflected in each of its terms. 
Life, then, is the movement of Nous from immanence in the 
One to determination and actuation. 
Finally, we have learned something from our current 
key text about the life of Nous as a totality of lives. To 
the brief discussion of this point in Text B (VI, 9 [9]) the 
following discoveries from our current key text may be 
added. Nous as act (epistrophe) actuates and animates the 
multiplicity of beings which are Its contents. Nous in this 
sense is not simply one single life but a multiplicity and 
totality of lives. Furthermore, all levels of reality 
subsequent to, or below, Nous are alive precisely because 
they are Its traces and logoi. Nous is a totality of lives 
both as the multiple living content of Its contemplation of 
the One and also as the source and cause of the life of 
every being on every level of reality below It. 
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Furthermore, the life of Nous may be seen to be 
identical with the'intellection of all things in one eternal 
moment or "now." The life of Nous is eternity. The next 
level of reality, Soul, is alive (because it is a logos of 
~) but, involves temporality, because its intellection is 
successive. The life of Soul is time.SO 
50one may say that Nous, as eternity, is the 
Neoplatonic equivalent of what Plato (Timaeus 37c-d) calls 
the "eternal living being." Furthermore, the life of Soul, 
since it is an intellection that is successive and, hence, 
temporal, may be said to be the equivalent of what Plato 
(Timaeus 37d-e) calls the "moving image of eternity." 
CHAPTER VI 
TEXT E: ENNEAD I, 4 (46), 3-4 
The last key text that we will examine is found in 
Chapters Three and Four of treatise I, 4. Let us first 
describe the treatise in general. This late treatise 
{forty-sixth chronologically) is one of several written near 
the end of Plot in us' life .1 It is entitled "On the Good 
State of One's Inner Reality" because it is concerned 
·primarily with the way in which man should live in order to 
attain his true good.2 In other words, one's true good is 
1In fact, it is the first of the final nine 
treatises written by Plotinus, whose "power was already 
failing, and this is more apparent in the last four than in 
the five which precede them" {Porphyry, "Life," p. 25). The 
lack of power which Porphyry mentions here is the result of 
Plotinus' failing physical health. There would seem to be 
no good reason, however, for assuming from this that his 
intellectual powers suffered similar deterioration. Thus, 
we may, and shall, assume that even these final treatises, 
of which I, 4 is a member, represent Plotinus' mature 
thought. 
2we shall interpret E:u6aL,µovLa , which is a 
composite of di {meaning "well" or "good") and 6aLµov 
{meaning "genius," "spirit" or "inner reality") as "the good 
state of one's inner reality." Interpretations such as 
"well being" or "happiness" do not accurately express what 
Plotinus here means by E:u6aL,µovLa and, therefore, are 
misleading and inadequate. For additional discussion of the 
meaning of E:u6aL,µovLa see John M. Cooper, Reason and 
Human Good in Aristotle {Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard 
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attained by living the life of eudaimonia.3 
In order to. introduce effectively this key text, we 
shall briefly survey those treatises preceding it which 
provide subsidiary information on zoe. Eight treatises 
intervene between Text D (VI, 7 [ 38]) and Text E (I, 4 
[46]). Three of these require attention in preparing our 
context: VI, 8 (39), VI, 2 (43) and III, 7 (45). The other 
treatises in this group, while interesting in their own 
right, concern issues peripheral to "life" in Plotinus. II, 
1 (40), "On the Heavens," and IV, 6 (41), "On Sense-
Perception and Memory," mention zoe in passing but without 
advancing our knowledge of the subject beyond what we 
discovered in earlier treatises. VI, 1 (42) and VI, 3 (44), 
along with VI, 2 (43), initially comprised a single work, 
entitled "On the Genera of Being." Although VI, 1 and VI, 3 
mention "life" they are primarily polemical in nature 
(against the Stoic and Aristotelian views of the genera of 
being) 4 and hence not helpful to our study. Only VI, 2 is 
(2continued) 
University Press, 1975), pp. 89ff and W. Himmerich, 
von der Eudaimonia: Die Lehre des Plotins 






and elsewhere I transliterate, rather than 
su6aLµov~a in its various forms in order to avoid 
translation of this key text unnecessarily 
4But see Steven K. Strange, "Plotinus' Treatise 'On 
the Genera of Being' : An Historical and Philosophical 
Study" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 
1981), who modifies the polemic charge. 
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a clear statement of Plotinus' own position on the subject. 
Hence, we shall confine our attention to VI, 2 (43), along 
with VI, 8 (39) and III, 7 (45), in the following 
paragraphs. 
VI, 8 ( 39) is a complex treatise which in its early 
chapters merely repeats principles which we have already 
discovered in earlier texts of zoe. In particular, they 
reiterate that man's life becomes more perfect as it comes 
to resemble Nous and ultimately becomes identified with It 
(i.e., perfect life).5 These relatively uninformative 
chapters, however, are followed by several extraordinary 
chapters in which Plotinus suspends his negative theology so 
far as to attribute ousia, energeia and even zoe to the One. 
The significant remark about life occurs at the close of 
Chapter Sixteen. "This awakening is beyond being, before 
Intelligence, before rational life. Even so He is these. 
He is thus an act above Intelligence and consciousness 
(phronesis) and life. 11 6 
In spite of Plotinus' willingness here to ascribe life 
to the One and in spite of the treatise's general 
willingness to depart from negative theology, VI, 8 does 
not, in the final analysis, contradict our conclusion that 
life (and by association energeia and ousia) belongs 
5see VI, 8 (39), 4-5, especially. 
6 See VI, 8 ( 3 9 ) , 16, 3 4-3 7 . 
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properly only to Nous, not the One. That VI, 8 does not 
force us radically to reassess these conclusions follows 
from the exceptional nature of the treatise, the unusual 
purpose behind its composition. Plotinus here seems to be 
willing momentarily to part with his general position 
regarding the One (a position which forbids ascribing life 
to the One) in order to refute what he considers to be an 
unacceptable interpretation of the Primal Reality.? If 
?Evidence of the exceptional nature of VI, 8 is 
brought out in its chapter seven, lines 12-15. There 
Plotinus refers to the tolmeros logos or "bold discourse" of 
an unnamed school of thought ( hipw0E:v orn:\E: L<; ) , which, as a 
forthcoming article by A. H. Armstrong suggests, "Two views 
of Freedom. A Christian Objection in VI, 8 (39), 7, 11-15," 
is orthodox Christian, and not Gnostic in nature. Although 
interesting in its own right, the question of the precise 
nature of this unacceptable school of thought is not one 
that concerns us directly. What is valuable is that 
Plotinus apparently finds this tolmeros logos so disturbing 
that in order to prevent it from confusing his own students 
he is willing to address it as if it were a respectable 
philosophical position. This fact alone would seem to 
explain why he considers it at such length in this treatise 
when elsewhere he might easily dismiss it by an appeal to 
his negative theology. 
This "presumptuous discourse" takes the form of a 
dilemma: either the One has a cause or does not have a 
cause. If the One has a cause, then the One is being and 
would have a definite nature. If the One does not have a 
cause, then It is without explanation and thus exists merely 
by chance or accident. 
Plotinus wants to reply to this misconception. He 
clearly understands that it is based on a mistake because it 
tries to look at the One from the vantage point of 
categories that would apply only to the order of beings. 
Hence, it is a mistake to apply any affirmative predicate to 
God within a negative theology. In other words, it is a 
violation of the principle of negative theology to say what 
God is instead of what God is not. 
-Because he is motivated by pedagogical and polemical 
considerations, then, Plotinus is willing to violate his own 
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this is so, then VI, 8 does not entail any reconstruction of 
our interpretation,of Plotinus' position on life. 
In treatise VI, 2 ( 43), "On the Genera of Being," 
Plotinus notes (Ch. 7) that life and ousia are both in the 
Soul. As perfections these must belong to every soul. And 
if they belong to Soul, which is a logos of Nous, they must 
belong to Nous as well. But if life belongs to Nous and 
Soul, and if life is a kind of kinesis (i.e., self-kinesis) 
it follows that kines is as a genus belongs to all life. 
Since kinesis presupposes ousia, Plotinus argues that two 
genera, ousia and kines is, must be posited in Nous ( as 
distinguishable, though not actually distinct, parts of It). 
However, ousia and kines is are, to a degree, really 
distinct on levels of reality below Nous because reality 
here below is less perfect because more multiple. The 
sensible world compares to the real (i.e., intelligible) 
world as the image of a man does to an actually existing 
man. Just as the image of a man omits many of his 
perfections (among them, life), so sensible-being omits many 
(?continued) 
negative theology and apply terms to the One he would 
ordinarily forbid. Plotinus notes in at least one instance 
(Ch. 13, lines 1-5) that he is not speaking accurately but 
is willing to do so in the present context in order to 
refute his enemies. Although he has terms like energeia 
explicitly in mind here (i.e. , terms which he will use 
inaccurately here), we may infer that he here uses "life" in 
this way also. For additional helpful commentary on this 
treatise see BrJhier, "Notice," Vol. 6, Part 7, pp. 119ff 
and Hancock, Energeia, pp. 220ff. 
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perfections of true being. Hence, to try to understand life 
solely by examining its function in the sensible universe is 
to fail to understand life truly. 
In addition, life on the level of Nous entails some 
Forms, the supreme genera, which are at once perfect acts, 
perfect intelligibles and perfect lives. These acts, 
identified with the life of Nous, are the five genera of 
Plato's Sophist (i.e., ousia, kinesis, tauton, heteron, 
stasis). These are the supreme categories, of which the 
Aristotelian categories are mere shadows, and are the 
-supreme objects of episteme. 
On the level of Nous, then, the various genera are not 
actually or materially distinct as such. However, they are 
of such a nature as to be capable of being distinguished 
when one reflects on Nous. Hence, nothing in the contents 
of Nous is really distinct per se but only distinguishable 
in thought. Of course, the genera do exist on the level of 
Nous, but in a way that does not involve the sort of 
distinction and separation found in the sense world. 
Based on this conception that the constituents of Nous 
are only separable in thought one must conclude that Nous is 
true life. Where there are, to a degree, material 
distinctions, such as between ousia and accidents in 
sensible existents, there is only the appearance of life 
(Chs. 14-15). 
In III, 7 (45), "On Eternity and Time," Plotinus again 
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expresses the life of~ in terms of Plato's megista gene. 
Perfect life is pure act, and pure act can be regarded from 
five different points of view: ousia, kinesis, tauten, 
heteron and stasis. Whether taken individually or 
collectively, each megiston genes represents the whole 
reality which is the second hypostasis, which, by virtue of 
having Its life realized in a single moment, is eternity. 
In other words, where there is such a great unity that 
the constituents of Nous are distinguishable in thought 
only, life is eternity. Elsewhere (on the level of Soul, 
for example) life is time. 8 Thus we find III, 7 further 
endorsing Plotinus' conclusion in VI, 2 that the absence of 
real priority and posteriority in the nature of Nous makes 
It perfect life: a life meriting the description "eternal." 
Following his conclusions in VI, 2 (43), 14-15, 
Plotinus here (III, 7 [45], 3) repeats that the Soul 
contains real priority and posteriority, bringing 
fragmentation and diminution of being, and thus is not 
eternity but time. The sense world, then, is not life per 
se but only the shadow and appearance of life, because the 
separation is spatial and temporal making the genera more 
distinct and less real. 
We may now elucidate I, 4 itself. In the first four 
8This and related relevant aspects of treatise III, 
7 were discussed in Text D: VI, 7 (38). 
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chapters Plotinus attempts to establish that the truly good 
life, which is the genuine human good, is the highest and 
most perfect life, the life of Nous. The truly good human 
life (like the life of Nous) should be focused on the One-
Good and should be independent of all external and sensible 
concerns, which are manifestations of man's lower nature. 
Only then is it a life of eudaimonia. In the last twelve 
chapters he focuses his attention on the nature of 
eudaimonia itself. Since our key text consists of Chapters 
Three and Four we shall first summarize the chapters which 
precede them. 
If one says, as Plotinus claims that Aristotle does, 
that the good life (eudaimonia) is identical with the 
performance of one's proper functions and with the 
attainment of one's proper end, then one would be compelled 
to say that non-human living beings, including plants, are 
capable of attaining this good life as well.9 If 
Plotinus' claim is correct (and we shall argue later in this 
chapter that it is not) then one must conclude that 
Aristotle would seem to be inconsistent when he views 
eudaimonia as an achievement restricted to human beings 
while at the same time apparently defining it in so general 
9This is in fact what Plotinus seems to be saying in 
I, 4. Whether his assessment of Aristotle is accurate or 
fair is another matter. There seems to be no evidence in 
the Nicomachean Ethics that eudaimonia can properly be 
applied to non-rational beings. 
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a fashion that it appears to apply to any living being, 
whether human or non-human (Ch. 1). 
Similarly, both the Epicurean and the Stoic views of 
eudaimonia are unacceptable when studied carefully and 
critically. The view of the Epicureans is too narrow, since 
it equates the good life with a life of pleasure and 
serenity. Eudaimonia, however, is more than mere pleasure 
or the conscious experience of tranquility or peace of mind. 
The Stoic position, while more accurate because of its 
identification of eudaimonia with the life of reason, 
nevertheless is also unsatisfactory because of its 
unexplained reference to the satisfaction of primary natural 
needs. The difficulty here is that, although the Stoics are 
quite correct in what they say, they do not satisfactorily 
explain how the good life is possible for the beings which 
are capable of it. They cannot explain why they hold their 
position (Ch. 2).10 We now turn to the key text, Chapters 
Three and Four. 
Text E: I, 4 ( 4 6 ) , 3-4 
[l] We, however, express from the start what we 
understand by eudaimonia. Let us suppose that we assume 
that eudaimonia [is found] in life. [2] If we make 
"life" apply in the same sense [to all living beings], 
lOp1otinus' reaction to the positions of Aristotle, 
the Epicureans and the Stoics on eudaimonia will be taken up 
in greater detail later in this chapter. Against Aristotle 
he will argue that he seems to make eudaimonia rely on 
externals; against the Epicureans that they limit their 
concern only to the sense world; and against the Stoics that 
they do not portray accurately human nature and destiny. 
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and allow that all living beings are able to acquire 
eudaimonia, then (we must conclude that] those (beings] 
live well in .actuality who possess one and the same 
thing, [something] which all living things naturally may 
acquire. [ 3] And for this reason we would not give 
this power to rational beings on the one hand but not to 
irrational beings on the other. [4] For life is common 
[to both], and it is life which, [when] received, tends 
towards eudaimonia, if eudaimonia is brought about by a 
kind of life. [ 5 J So I think that those who say that 
eudaimonia is to be found in rational life are unaware 
that, since they do not place it in the life which 
living things have in common, they are really assuming 
that it is not [associated with] life at all. [6] They 
would have to say that the rational power on which 
eudaimonia depends is a quality [other than life]. But 
the foundation [of their argument] is rational life. 
3, 1-15: 
'Hµ,Eis OE Alywµ,Ev E~ cipx~s -rl 1ro-rE To Evoa,µ,ovEiv 
{J1T0Aaµ,/3&.voµ,Ev Elva,. T,8lµ,Evo, o~ 'TO Evoa,µ,ovEiv EV {wfi ,. 
, \ , ' y- , , (J .... ' "" "" 
Et µ,EV uvvwvvµ,ov -ro ..,71v E1Totovµ,E a, 1rao-, µ,EV av 'TOtS--
{wu,v a.1rlooµ,Ev OEK"TtKois Evoaiµ,ovlas Elva,, EO OE {~v 
, ' , ,.. f' ..... f!f \ , , ... ' .J..' 
5 EVEpyn<t, EKuva, ot~ r.apTJl' EY n Kat -rav-rov, ov E7TE..,.,VKEL 
,;:, ' , ' Y- ' ' ' "' - ' \ -OEK'TLKa 1TaV'Ta 'Ta ..,q,a uva,, KaL OVK av 'TqJ µ,EV I\OytK~ 
w,;:, I:, , (} - - ,;:, ' .! \ , ' , • Y \ ' ~ ' 
Eooµ,EV ovvao- a, 'TOV'TO, 'TqJ OE at\O)'qJ OVKE'T£ ..,wTJ yap ,,v 'TO 
I ft I:, \ - t - \ I 11:, - W \ \ ICOLVOV, 0 OEK'TLKOV 'TOV av-rov 1rpos 'TO EVoa,µ,ovEW Eµ,EI\/\EV 
f W t y - I t <;' - f - "0(} Ewa,, ££1TEp EV ..,wn 'T£V£ 'TO EVoa,µ,ovEW V1T11PXEV. EV, 
l \ f t \ - y - \I \ t<;' -0 µ,a,, ,ca, o, EV I\OYLKTJ ..,wn /\EYOV'TES 'TO Evoa,µ,ovEW 10 
ylvEo-0ai ov,c EV Tfj ,coivfi {wfi n8£V'TES ,jyv671aav 'TO 
,,;:, - .... \ y \ • 8 I TT , ... \ \ EVoa,µ,ovELV OVOE ..,w71v V1TO'T£ Eµ,EVOL. .I..J.0£0'T7]'Ta OE 'T7]V 
\ \ <;' I \ ft f ti:, I I > I 
/\OYLK71V ovvaµ,w, 1TEPL 71v 71 Evoaiµ,ov,a <TVVtO"Ta'TaL, avayKa-
Y "' \ I 'A'\ \ \ . I • - \ I ' ..,o,v'To av /\EYELV. 1\1\a 'TO V1TOKELf.l.EVOV a.vTo,s I\OY£K7] EO'n 
y I \ \ I "\ - f t <;' / / -=,w71 · 1TEpt yap 'TO OI\OV 'TOV'TO 71 E voa,µ.ov,a <TVVLO''Ta'Tat · 
[7] Eudaimonia is connected with this [life] as a 
whole, that is, with another kind of life. I do not 
mean "another kind" in the sense of a distinction in 
thought, but in the sense in which we speak of one 
thing as prior and another as posterior. [8] The term 
"life" is used in many ways, differing according to the 
ordering of the things to which it is applied, first, 
second, and so on; and "living" means different things 
in different contexts. [9] It is applied in one way to 
plants, in another to irrational animals, in various 
ways [ to things] distinguished from each other by the 
clarity or dimness of their life; so obviously the same 
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applies to "[living] well." [10] And if one [thing] is 
an image of another, obviously its good [life] is the 
image of another good [life]. 
3, 15-24: 
• W<TTE 15 
'TTEpt llio El8os {wijs. Alyw 8£ ovx ws avT"81.71P71µ.lvov 
- \ I ~\\> < < - ,I. I \ ~\ -rep I\O'}'<p, al\/\ ws 7Jµ.us .,,aµ.EV 'TTpoTEpov, To oE 
vu-rEpov Elva,. lloMaxws Tolvvv Tijs {wijs AEyoµ.wr,s Kat 
'~,I.',, '' - ·~, ' TTJV O1.a.,,opav EXOVUTJS KaTa Ta 'TTpwTa Kai. CJEVTEpa Kai. 
J.¢,Efijs Kat &µ.wvvµ.ws TOV {ijv AEyoµ.lvov lliws µ.& TOV 20 
<pvTov, lliws 8£ TOV d.,\&yov Kat TpavbTTJTI. Kat 
> ~ I \ ~ ,1,._ \ > I > ~\ ~ \ I \ aµ.vapOTTJTI. TTJV O1.a.,,vpav EXOVTWV, aVal\O'}'OV CJ'T]I\OVOTI. Kai. 
TO EO. Ka, El Ei'8w,\ov llio lliov, 87],\ov6T1. Kat To EO ws 
Et8wAov ao TOV EO. 
[11] If eudaimonia belongs to that which has a 
superabundance of life -- to that which is in no way 
deficient in life -- it will belong only to the being 
which lives superabundantly .11 [ 12] Such [ a being] 
will have the best [life], if the best among beings is 
the truly alive and perfect life. [13] So its good 
will not be something brought in from the outside. Nor 
will the basis of its goodness come from somewhere else 
and [thereby] bring it into a good state. [ 14] For 
what could be added to the perfect life [in order] to 
make it into the best life? If anyone says that [it is] 
the nature of the Good, that is our own way of speaking, 
but for now we are not looking for the cause, but for 
what is within. [ 15] It has often been said that the 
perfect life, the true [and] real life, is in that 
intelligible nature, and that other lives are incomplete 
[and mere] appearances of life, not perfect or pure and 
no more [real] lives than its opposite. [16] But now, 
briefly stated, as long as living things proceed from a 
llRist (Road to Reality, p. 142) translates 
,6 ayav c;;nv as "excess of life." This translation, however, 
seems to carry with it a certain negativity since the word 
"excess" frequently denotes an additional and unwanted 
quantity while, for Plotinus, life is never possessed so 
fully that a portion of it would be unwanted. Al though 
MacKenna' s rendering, "fullness of life," is more to the 
point, we shall use Armstrong's version, "superabundance of 
life," since it most faithfully seems to rend~r the 
contextual meaning of this Greek phrase. 
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single principle but do not have life to the same degree 
as It, the principle must be the first and most perfect 
life. 
3, 24-40: 
E• I:' ' • ., • , ' ,. - -LOE a-rep ayav V1Tapxn TO ':,T}V - TOVTO 
I:' ' • " I:' ' - ,. - ., \ ' ' • I:' -OE EU'TLV O JJ,TJOEVL TOV ':,T}V EI\I\Et.1TEt. - TO EVoa,µ,ovEw, 25 
I " ..., II/ y.-. \ I~ ..., f I I \ 
JJ,OV'f> av -rep ayav ":,WVn 'TO EVoaLJJ,OVEW tnrapxo,· 'TOVT'f> yap 
' \ ,, 'ti t ... .,. \ JI ' ,, , 
,ca, 'TO ap,c:rrov, ELTTEP EV 'TOLS' ovu, 'TO ap,crrov 'TO OV'TWS' EV 
y - \ f I\ y I fl \ .. >1:' \ t \ \ 
':,W'!J Ka, 7J TEI\ELOS' ':,WT}" OV'TW yap av OVOE E1TaK'TOV 'TO 
t 0 \ f I t \:'t ..!'\ \ \ f I _! \ \ '0 
a.ya 01' V1TapxoL, OVO al\/\0 'TO V1TOKELJLEVOV aN\axo EV 
I . Ii:, t \ t > 0 - j'. 'f11 \ - \ I 
j!EVOJLEVOV -rrap£,;EL av-ro EV aya 'f> Ewa,. .J. L yap T'!J 'TEI\Et.f!- 30 
y - .. I • ' ' , ?__ E' I:' , ' ':,W'!J av 1rpouy010,-ro Et.S' TO ap,c:rrr, EWO.l. ; L OE 'TLS' 'TT}V 
'TOV a.ya0ov tf,vu,v EpEi, ollcEWS' µ,~ & .\oyos- ~µ,iv, ov µ,71v 
' ., ..! ' ' ' ' • , ,. - "O I:'' • ' , 'TO 0.L'TLOV, al\l\a 'TO Oltnrapxov ':,'1}'TOVJL£V. 'TL o ·TJ 'TEI\ELa. 
y \ \ f _!\ 0 \ \ II t t I - - ,/..I 
':,WT} ,ca, 7J OJ\'1} LVTJ ,ca, OV'TWS' EV EKEW'!J 'T'!J VOEpf!- y,VO'EL, 
' • • ..!'\ \ , \ - ' • I:'_!\ y. - ' • 
35 ,ca, o-r, a, a.1\/\aL a'TEI\ELS' ,ca, WOOJ\f'O.TO. ':,WT}S' KaL ov 
\ I >\:' \ 0 - \ > ,-.\ \ y \ " t 
TEI\ELWS' OVOE Ka apws KO.L ov JLal\l\OV ':,WaL 7J 'TOVVav-
, \\ I \ II \ - \:'\ \ \ I 0 I 
TLOV, 1TOl\l\aKLS' JLEV E LPTJTO.L · ,ca, vvv oE I\EI\EX w O'VVTOJJ,W~ 
WS', EWS' av 1TCl.VTa Ta {wv-ra EK µ,,as a.pxfjs 'll, /LT/ £1Tl0"1JS" 
I:'' ' ..!'\ \ ,. - , , ' , ' ' , ,. ' ' 
OE Ta al\l\a ':,'!J, avayKT} TTJV apxTJV TTJV 1TpWT7JV ':,WT}V KQ.L 
"° TTJV TEAELO'TCl.TTJV Elva,. 
[ 17] If, then, man can have perfect life, the man 
having this life is eudaimon. lZ If not, one would 
have to attribute eudaimonia [only] to the gods, if 
among them alone this kind of life is to be found. [18] 
But since we maintain that this eudaimonia is to be 
found among men, we must consider how it is so. [19] 
What I mean is that, as is clear from what has been said 
elsewhere, man has perfect life by having not only 
sense-life but reasoning and true intelligence [as 
well]. [ 20] But is it as being different, that he has 
this difference? No, for he is not a man at all unless 
he has this [ reasoning and true intelligence] either 
potentially or actually and such a one we say is 
eudaimon. 
12Eudaimon here and elsewhere in this 
refers to the person who possesses eudaimonia 
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231 
[21] But shall we say that he has this perfect kind of 
life as [an intrinsic] part of himself? The other man, 
we hold, has this potentially, having some part, but the 
man who is eudaimon already is this, who obviously both 
is this actually and has passed over into identity with 
it. [ 22] Everything else is just something he wears. 
You could not call it [a genuine] part of him because he 
wears it without wanting to. It would be his if he 
united it to him by an act of the will. [ 23] What, 
then, for him is the good? Rather, he himself is the 
good that he has. That which transcends him is the 
cause of whatever he has in him. And it is good in one 
way, [and] in another way, it is present to him. [24] 
The evidence for this lies in the fact that the man in 
this state [of eudaimonia] does not seek to have 
anything else. What [ else J could he seek? Certainly 
not anything worse, and he has the best joined to him. 
[the man] who has a life like this has all that he needs 
in life. 
4, 11-23: 
'AAA' ws- µlpos- av-rov 'TOV'TO ¢,~uoµEv iv av-rt.p 
'TO ElSos- rijs- {wijs- 'TO 'T£AELOV Elva, ; "H 'TOV µ.cv a'.Mov 
"0 I .,. ti ~ I r# \ ~\ av 'PW7TOV µ.Epos- TL -rovro EXEtv ovvaµE, EXOVTa, -rov oE 
t~ I .,~ f\ ~ \ \ t I ' .,. \ EVoa,µova 71v,1, os- 071 Ka, EVEPYEL<f EUT, -rovro Ka, µE-ra-
Q IQ \ \ t I t' - - 0 ~· t - \ 15 ,-,E,-,71KE 7rpos- 'TO av-ro, ELva, 'TOV'TO" 7TEp,KHU a, O avrcp Ta. 
~\ \ -~ c, ~ \ t ~ \ I t - " 0 - t '0 I\ al\l\U 71071' a OTJ O VOE /J,EP7J a V'TOV av 'TLS- E ,-ro O VK E E/\OV'TI. 
I J. ~· " t - \ Q I\ I TTEp,KE,µEva· ,1v o av avrov Ka'Ta ,-,0Vl\7J<ltv UVVTJfY"l/J-EVa. 
,,, ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 0' "H • ' • l ovrcp 'TOLVVV 'T' 7TO'T EU'TL 'TO aya OV ; avros- av'Tt.p 
• ,,, • ' ~' , , ., ..... , , ... ' ..!'\ \ OTTEP EXEL -ro oE ETTEKELva a,-r,ov -rov EV avrcp ,ca, al\l\W> 
dya06v, av-r<F, TTapov at\t\ws-. Map-rvpwv Si 'TOV 'TOV'TO Elva, ;!v 
, ' "\ \ r ... , ,, ., ,.,.., , " , 
TO 1'-71 UI\I\O .,,71'TELV 'TOV OV'TWS" EXOV'Ta. l, yap av Kat 
{71-r~UELE ; Twv µiv yap XELp6vwv ou8iv, 'T(p Se dpiu-rcp 
, A' , .,. , IJ' - ,, r , ,,, UVVEU'TLV. v-rapKTJS" ovv O ,.,,os- Tep D V'TWS" .,,w71v EXOV'TL. 
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[ 25] If he is serious, he has all that he needs for 
eudaimonia and for the acquisition of good. There is no 
good that he does not possess. [26] What he seeks he 
seeks as a necessity, not for himself but for something 
that belongs to him. That is, he seeks it for the body 
which is joined to him. [27] And even though it is a 
living body, he seeks the things [needed] for this 
living [body] of his, not the things needed for the 
[serious] man. [28] And he [the serious man] knows its 
[true] needs, and gives it what he gives it without 
taking away anything from his own [true] life. [29] 
His eudaimonia will not be diminished in times of bad 
fortune. Such a [good] life remains even so. When his 
family and friends die he knows what death [really] is, 
in the same way that serious people who die know [what 
death is]. [ 30] Even when the death of family and 
friends causes him grief, this does not grieve [what is 
most real in] him, but only that in him which has no 
intelligence; and he will not allow this grief [to 
affect him]. · 
4, 23-36: 
K .. av 
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<71TOVoa LOS' r,' a v-rapK1JS' ELS' E voaLfLOVLav KaL ELS' K-rii<7LV 
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f ' - y - \ 1 f..., _!\\I "' f .-
WS' avayKaiov 1:,1]T££, Ka, ovx avT<.p, =a TLVL Twv av-rov. 
{"I \ I y • .. Y• s'\ I \ 
"-WfLaTL yap rrpO<77JfYTTlfLEV<.p 1:,TJTEL" KaV 1:,WVTL OE awµ.aTL, Ta 
, - r- , , " , - '8, , , 
av-rov 1:,WVTL TOVT<.p, ovx a TOLOVTOV TOV av pwrrov E<7TL. 
K ' , - \ ~ ,~ " ~ ,~ '~ \ - • -a, YLVW<7KEL ravra Ka, OLOW<7LV a OLOW<7LV OVOEV T71S' aVTOV 
rrapaipouµ.n·os- {w.;;s-. Ov8' EV TUXaLS' -rolvvv ivav-rla,s- 3•> 
,, , , ' , ~ .... , ' ' " f 
E"aTTW<7ETat ELS' TO E vqa,µ.ovE LV" fLEVEL yap Ka, WS' 1J 
' y ' , 8v , ' ' \ J.. ,, ·~ TOLatrn] 1:,WTJ" arro rJ<7KOVTWV TE OLKELWV KaL "f''"wv OLOE 
\ 0, fl , , ., ~' ' f , "' "" 
TOV avaTOV O TL £<7TLV, ,uau, OE Kat OL 1T'1<7XOVT£S' <71TOVOaLOL 
OvTES". OlKE io, SE' Kai 1TpOCT1JKOV'TE) ,oU-ro -rrci.uxov'TE) 1eav 
.\ - t 1 I \ ~t t t ,.. - 1 ti 1"' \ 
"U1TW<7LV, OUK av-rov, TO O EV aUT<.p vouv OUK £XOV, ov TaS' JS 
Al.nTaS' OU 0E,£Ta,. 
COMMENTS 
Let us now present the movement of thought in Text E. 
In the first two chapters of I, 4 (46) Plotinus aims to show 
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that the Aristotelian, Epicurean and Stoic positions 
regarding the natu~e of perfect human life are unacceptable. 
He criticizes Aristotle for an apparent inconsistency. He 
claims that Aristotle both identifies a being's eudaimonia 
with tfie performance of its proper function (and the 
achievement of its natural end) and denies eudaimonia to 
non-rational beings (Ch. 1, lines 1-26 and Ch. 2, lines 1-
31). He also rejects the Epicurean identification of 
eudaimonia with the life of pleasure or tranquility (Ch. 1, 
lines 26-30). Finally, he criticizes the Stoics for their 
·irreconcilable identification of eudaimonia (and the life of 
reason and virtue) with the view of the importance of the 
primary natural needs (Ch. 2, lines 31-55). 
In Chapters Three and Four Plotinus presents his own 
view of eudaimonia. As a pref ace to this, however, he 
examines what he considers to be some erroneous conceptions 
of eudaimonia. 
a. Some philosophers (e.g., Aristotle) suppose that 
eudaimonia belongs to anything that has life. For them, 
rational and irrational living things, to the extent that 
they are able to live fully in the way that is proper and 
natural to them, are capable of achieving eudaimonia ( #1-
#4). 
b. Other thinkers (e.g., the Stoics) argue that only 
those beings endowed with rational life are capable of 
achieving eudaimonia. But they do not realize that in 
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denying eudaimonia to some kinds of life they really do not 
attribute it to l~fe at all. They obviously would have to 
say that the "rationality" on which eudaimonia depends is a 
quality other than life (#5-#6). 
c. But [Plotinus begins] merely being alive cannot be 
an adequate condition for eudaimonia. There are many types 
of living beings but each of them is different by the 
degree, or "brightness" or "dimness," of its life. What is 
required for eudaimonia is that the living being have a 
superabundance of life; that is, that it have the best life, 
namely, the life of pure intellection (#7-#11).13 
d. Thus, eudaimonia is found in the "intelligible 
nature" or Nous and in human beings, who through their 
possession of intellect are able to attain the One-Good by 
contemplation. The One-Good in this context functions as 
the underlying foundation of this superabundant life because 
It is the intelligible content of the contemplation of Nous 
and of human beings. Accordingly, if Nous is the 
superabundance of life and if only beings which are endowed 
with Nous ( or rationality) can attain this superabundance 
and, hence, eudaimonia, then irrational animals, plants (and 
13Aristotle would not disagree with this last point, 
namely, that the human activity of intellect (i.e., pure 
thought) represents perfect human eudaimonia. Hence, the 
life of intellect, as it contemplates knowledge possessed 
and pursues further knowledge, fulfills the conditions 
necessary for eudaimonia. See, for example, Nicomachean 
Ethics, Bk. 10, Ch. 6, 1177bl9-26. 
certainly non-living things) can neither 
superabundantly no+ enjoy eudaimonia (#12-#16). 
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live 
e. [ In Chapter Four Plotinus continues his analysis 
of human life. He begins by asking what must be the case in 
order for man to have perfect life. ] Man is one of the 
logoi of Nous, so he is life too. Men are capable of 
eudaimonia (experience tells us that); hence, eudaimonia 
does not apply (as the Epicureans seem to imply) to the gods 
only (#17-#18). 
f. How then does it manifest itself in man? It 
clearly does so because man, as logos of Nous, is an 
intelligence he has reason in addition to his sense 
knowledge. Without intelligence a man is not truly a man. It 
follows from this that his eudaimonia is actualized to the 
extent that his intelligence is actualized. This means that 
the more he is like Nous, the more he has eudaimonia (#19-
#20). 
g. To have eudaimonia in potency is to have it "in 
part." But a man who has realized his intelligent nature, 
who has become identical with Nous, has completely realized 
his eudaimonia, so that he does not have it but is it (#21). 
h. Hence, his good is not something he pursues 
extrinsically; it is himself, when completed as being and as 
Nous. Everything else is some accident to his nature. By 
his willing to be only what he is and not what is 
accidentally attached to him, he remains detached from 
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external things (#22). 
i. He has the good life by the presence of the Good 
in him. His possession of the good renders it needless for 
him to look outside of himself for the good. If a man has 
the good, why need he seek the good? To look outside of 
himself would be to look to what is worse (#23-#24). 
j. Such a man as this has all that he needs in life. 
He is the truly serious man. For to be serious is to be 
virtuous, which means that one has the good. If he seeks 
something, then, what he seeks he does not seek as a good 
for himself but for another, the body. He gives to the body 






he can have eudaimonia in spite of 
him. This much the Stoics and 
Epicureans saw. Whether he might lose a fortune or friends 
and relatives or anything else, he (i.e., his inner reality) 
is unaffected and his eudaimonia undiminished. Only that 
which is not identical with Nous (i.e., the outer man) is 
affected. His grief originates from here [the earthly life 
and its concerns] and not from There [the life of the 
serious man] (#29-#30). 
To understand fully life in this key text we must make 
explicit the following issues: a) eudaimonia in 
Aristotle, the Epicureans and the Stoics; b) the relation of 
Plotinian eudaimonia to the life of the serious man. 
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a) Eudaimonia in Aristotle, the Epicureans and the Stoics 
i) Eudaimonia and Aristotle. What, then, is 
Aristotle's position on eudaimonia? He does not reduce his 
theory to a single principle, nor does he approach it from a 
purely abstract viewpoint. Rather he starts from experience 
and seeks to keep room for as many aspects of this issue as 
are necessitated by experience. To begin with, he asks the 
question of man's proper end and concludes that it is the 
same as the end for the state. The only difference is that 
he conceives the end of the state as more noble, for it 
involves the final perfection of many people, rather than of 
a single individua1.14 
But what is this end which each man seeks for himself 
(and the statesman for all the citizens)? It is happiness, 
eudaimonia, which Aristotle defines as that quality which 
makes a human life complete. 1 5 This happiness is based on 
man's possession of certain goods which both fulfill his 
potentialities and satisfy his wants. These goods are for 
Aristotle divided into three categories: goods of the soul, 
goods of the body and external goods .16 While all three 
are regarded as true goods (not just neutral "things 
14w. F. R. Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory, 2nd 
Edition (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 17-
19. Hereafter, Hardie, Ethical Theory. 
15Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1, Ch. 7, 
1097bl5. 
16rbid., Ch. 8, 1098bl0-20. 
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preferred") and as relevant to happiness, they are not 
considered equal: , the good of the soul is held to be most 
essential for happiness.17 
This good "turns out to be activity of soul in 
accordance with virtue, and if there is more than one virtue, 
in accordance with the best and most complete •.• in a 
complete life." 18 It is not one activity but many, which 
have a place in the good life.19 But one of these is best 
and most complete, and this is the activity which most fits 
with man's ergon (i.e., his ?nique and proper function).20 
-This unique activity is contemplation. Hence, living 
rationally will, when given preeminent position in a 
complete life, bring true happiness to man.21 
On this point Plotinus would be in agreement (at least 
nominally) with Aristotle, but his reasons for doing so 
would differ from Aristotle's. Aristotle, who regards the 
human soul as an entelechy and, hence, considers the living 
human being as a composite of matter (body) and form (soul), 
would argue that if eudaimonia is an activity according to 
virtue, then it must be in accordance with the highest of 
virtues, the virtue of man's best part, intellect. 
17Hardie, Ethical Theory, p. 20. 
18rbid., p. 20. 
19--Ibid., p. 22. 
20Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1, Ch. 7, 
1097b25. 
21Hardie, Ethical Theory, pp. 25-26. 
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Plotinus, who considers the human soul not as an 
entelechy but as an independent and complete existent in 
itself which makes use of the body as though the latter were 
an instrument, would argue that it is the soul as 
intellectual that is the true man and that lives the true 
life. 22 
Aristotle's position, accordingly, seems to suffer 
from one significant difficulty. Since he argues that 
bodily and external, as well as moral, goods are necessary 
for happiness he cannot regard virtue alone as sufficient 
for eudaimonia. Hence, for Aristotle (but not for Plotinus, 
at least not in the same way and not for the same reasons) 
friends and external goods are necessary accompaniments of 
eudaimonia.23 And since deprivation of health, 
prosperity, family and reputation would reduce or even 
destroy a man's happiness, his state of eudaimonia cannot 
exclude good fortune and the actions of others rather than 
merely relying on the state of his own mind or sou1.24 It 
seems obvious, then, that the fullest happiness and the 
highest human life are possible only rarely and briefly 
22see, for example, I, 1 (53), 3, 
does Plato before him, seems to regard the 
as a natural but regrettable necessity. 
23Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 
1099bl-10. 
24Hardie, Ethical Theory, p. 26. 
3. Plot in us, as 
soul's embodiment 
Book 1 , Ch . 8 , 
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owing to the demands of the composite nature of man. 25 
Plotinus also seems to raise a second difficulty with 
Aristotle's position on eudaimonia. Because, in Plotinus' 
estimation, Aristotle sometimes defines eudaimonia in such a 
way that it could be regarded as the accomplishment of any 
being's proper or natural tasks, Plotinus concludes that 
such a state of eudaimonia would have to be possible for any 
living being, not just humans and gods. Such a view, of 
course, would be incorrect according to Plotinus since 
eudaimonia is something which applies only to beings which 
can enjoy the life of intellect superabundantly. However, 
it is not at all clear that there is any textual basis in 
Aristotle for such an allegation by Plotinus. In the 
Nicomachean Ethics, for example, Aristotle repeatedly argues 
that eudaimonia is an achievement of beings who are rational 
or human. He never seems to indicate that sub-human forms 
of life would be capable of achieving eudaimonia (since they 
could possess neither the moral nor intellectual virtues). 
What, then, is Plotinus getting at with this sort of 
criticism? Perhaps he intends to point out a much more 
basic weakness in Aristotle's system, namely his view that 
the human soul is an entelechy. It may well be the case 
25see Nicomachean Ethics, Book 10, Ch. 7, ll 77b34, 
where Aristotle notes that man's duty is to make himself, so 
far as he can, immortal. 
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that he is interested in showing the full implication of 
holding the Aristotelian view of eudaimonia.26 
ii) Eudaimonia and the Epicureans. In treatise I, 4 
(46), Plotinus pays less attention to the Epicureans and to 
the relationship between pleasure and eudaimonia than one 
might expect. This would seem to be so because, as Rist 
notes, "the treatise is aimed at those at least partially 
converted and aware of Plotinus' view on Epicureanism. 11 27 
But what is the position of the Epicureans regarding 
eudaimonia? Let us briefly examine its chief features. 
In examining their position it is necessary to keep in 
mind that the Epicureans were essentially materialistic in 
their conception of man and the universe. Hence, they 
understood eudaimonia exclusively in physical terms. And 
since the only good and evil that the body knows is pleasure 
and pain, they are the only good and evil for man. 28 
26A related difficulty is noted by Whitney Oates 
who, in Aristotle and the Problem of Value (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 3-17), argues that 
Aristotle is not consistent in relating being and value. In 
other words, although there seems to be an objective 
dimension to Aristotle's ethical thought, in the final 
analysis he does not provide any definite guides regarding 
the nature and structure of that objective dimension. 
27Road to Reality, p. 139. 
28cyril Bailey, The Greek Atomists and Epicurus, 
(New York: Russel and Russel, Inc., 1967), p. 486. 
Hereafter, Bailey, Atomists. Useful explanation of the 
Epicurean position is also provided by John Rist, Epicurus: 
An Introduction (Cambridge: University Press, 1972)~ 
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Accordingly, the way for man to achieve eudaimonia is 
to live in such a. way as will maximize his pleasure and 
minimize his pain. And the best way to do this is to learn 
to distinguish between negative and positive desires, 
thereby guaranteeing a stable condition in the body. This 
distinction between negative and positive desires stems from 
Epicurus' conviction that not all pleasures are worthy of 
human pursuit, since some of them might lead to pain in the 
long run. 29 Why so? Because the body's capacity for 
pleasure is limited. The point of satiety is also the point 
at which freedom from want is achieved. To go beyond this 
point is to experience pain. Hence, a rationally lived life 
is the best, for it enables man to live in such a way as to 
avoid pain.30 
In his analysis of pleasure, Epicurus distinguishes 
three kinds. First, there are those natural and necessary 
pleasures whose chief purpose is to relieve pain, such as 
the consumption of food and drink, enjoyment of shelter, 
relief from anxiety, etc. This kind of pleasure is most 
basic, and of these the most fundamental of all is the 
pleasure of the stomach.31 The second type is that which 
is "natural but not necessary." This includes a variety of 
29George Panichas, 
Publishing, Inc., 1967), 
Epicurus. 
30Bailey, Atomists, 








physical pleasures and some luxury. 
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The final type of 
pleasure is that which is "neither natural nor necessary." 
This type includes things such as honors and social status 
and is considered by Epicurus to be actually destructive. 
Why would Epicurus consider any pleasure to be 
destructive? Because he sees pleasure as usually associated 
with some pain, either antecedent, accompanying or 
resultant. The life of greatest pleasure is that of 
greatest equilibrium and of least pain.32 Hence, any 
individual pleasure which involves a great deal of mental 
unrest or eventual discomfort is to be avoided. 
The wise man for Epicurus is "most free from 
trouble."33 He avoids any external checks or ties, such 
as family, political life, etc., and lives in total self-
sufficiency and self-centeredness. This is man's "inner 
life," a life free from mental strain and excessive 
lust.34 
Eudaimonia, then, involves a constant possession of 
the necessary pleasures. Some of these are necessary for 
life (food and drink), some for repose of the body (shelter 
and clothing) and some for happiness.35 The third are the 
32rbid., pp. 491-92. 
33panichas, Epicurus, p. 104. 
34rbid., p. 109. 
35Bailey, Atomists, p. 493. 
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pleasures of the mind, which lie in contemplation of past, 
present and future·pleasures of the body. 
There are special types of pain for the body and the 
mind. One of those belonging to the mind is fear, which can 
lead one to lose hope for pleasure in the future. The two 
greatest fears concern death and intrusion by the gods into 
the natural order. The reason for fearing the former is 
obvious. The reason for fearing the latter is that if the 
laws of nature may be broken at any time, then nothing in 
the natural order can be depended upon, and the 
philosopher's peace will be broken.36 The way to overcome 
these fears is by taking up philosophy, which teaches that 
the gods are totally disinterested in man and nature and 
that death, since it is the complete annihilation of the 
person, involves no pain. Accordingly, there is nothing to 
fear.37 
Because it is instrumental in helping man to overcome 
fear and to understand which pleasures are worth pursuing, 
philosophy is essential to his "blessed life," Epicurus' 
name for the final goal of man, which involves the health of 
the body and the tranquility of the mind.38 
Of course, what Plotinus finds most objectionable in 
the Epicurean view is precisely its exclusive concern for 
36rbid., p. 501. 
37rbid., p. 501. 
38rbid., p. 505. 
the sense world and for sensation. 
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Such a life, one which 
is limited entire~y to sensation and to untroubledness, 
cannot be the life of the serious man. His life, the truly 
good life, is different from the life of plants or brute 
animals and, hence, cannot depend on any faculty possessed 
by either of these lower forms. Hence, any position that 
limits the good life to pleasure, sensation, or even 
untroubledness (ataraxia) must be eliminated from 
consideration by Plotinus.39 
iii) Eudaimonia and the Stoics. With the Stoic view 
we encounter a very austere approach to human life, one 
calling for complete self-control and holding only the 
noblest and most arduous values as worthwhile. Where it can 
be seen most perfectly is in their conception of eudaimonia, 
that condition which is best for man and which will make him 
happiest. 
First, let us briefly look at the typically Stoic 
moral judgment in general. This involves classifying things 
according to three categories: morally evil, morally good 
or morally indifferent. Evil is obvious, at least to the 
Stoics, since it consists of all those vices men normally 
find repugnant: dishonesty, injustice, treachery, wanton 
cruelty, etc. 
39see Rist, Road to Reality, p. 141. 
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indifference, however, is slightly more Moral 
complicated. It · does not mean that a thing is morally 
valueless but only that good or evil are not necessarily 
involved in it. It can be used for either end, 40 which 
then determines whether the user was acting badly or well. 
For this reason intention is more important to the Stoics 
than to many ancient philosophers, most of whom regard good 
or evil as objective and as belonging to the act itself. 41 
These indifferent things are conceived as having 
varying values, and the evaluation and choice of these 
unequally valued things form a large part of man's moral 
activity.42 
While many different things fall into this category of 
the indifferent, some of which are evil, the good is limited 
to virtue ( arete in the narrow sense), that is, virtuous 
acts and persons. It consists only of those things which 
are good in themselves and could not be used for evil. 43 
And only in possession of this true good is eudaimonia 
40F. H. Sanbach, The Stoics (London: Chat to and 
Windus, 1975), p. 29. Hereafter, Sandbach, Stoics. For 
valuable additional discussion see John Rist, Stoic 
Philosophy (Cambridge: University Press, 1969) and Andreas 
Graeser, Plotinus and the Stoics: A Preliminary Study 
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972). 
41I. G. Kidd, "Moral Actions and Rules in Stoic 
Ethics," in The Stoics, John Rist, ed. ( Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1978), 
p. 242. 
42sandbach, Stoics, p. 29. 
4 3 Ibid. , p. 2 8. 
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achieved. One's happiness does not depend on anything but 
moral virtue.44 · Obviously, however, a virtuous man 
deprived of other things (health, wealth, reputation, 
family) would feel unhappiness, and possession of these or 
other indifferent things would bring feelings of pleasure 
and satisfaction. To overcome this apparent difficulty the 
Stoics do not attempt to describe eudaimonia as a subjective 
feeling, but identify it with such things as "living a good 
life" and being virtuous.45 The Stoics, then, do not 
worry about whether possession of primary natural things 
(those indifferent things most necessary to health and 
survival) is relevant to one's eudaimonia. While these 
things make life more pleasant, they do not affect man's 
virtue and so do not increase his perfection and 
happiness.46 
But while the possession of indifferent things does 
not make one more virtuous, the correct attitude toward it 
does.47 Thus one's virtue is intimately bound up in the 
world of indifferent things. The proper attitude concerning 
them is described as "life according to nature," a criterion 
44rbid., p. 29-30. 
45rbid., p. 41. 
in w. J. 
(New York: 
Hereafter, 
46Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, reprinted 
Oates, ed., The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers 
Randon House, 1940), Ch. 8, Section 1, p. 544. 
Aurelius, Meditations. 
4 ?Epictetus, Discourses, reprinted in The Stoic and ------=---Epicurean Philosophers, Ch. 6, p. 290. Hereafter, 
Epictetus, Discourses. 
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for choosing indifferent things according to their relative 
values and appropriateness to given circumstances.48 
By "life according to nature" the Stoics mean life 
according to human nature. Plants and animals have certain 
activities which are proper to them by their natures and so 
does man. The way to determine this life is by right reason 
and philosophy, which is not only theoretical but practical 
as well, since it attempts to show by what actions man could 
exercise his proper faculties and be a true and wise 
man. 49 
In determining what actions are proper to himself, 
however, the wise man does not ref er only to himself but 
also to other men and to the cosmos as a whole. When reason 
shows a conflict between self-interest and the good of the 
whole, nature demands that man choose the latter. Also, 
since the cosmos is determined by God, no one should refuse 
to acquiesce in what is obviously His will (i.e., the 
ultimate good). Man would be guilty of vice if he hoped for 
a "good" contrary to what was ordained by Divine 
Providence.SO 
The end and goal of human life, then, is a) to live 
48rt is by going 
acting properly that one 
of happiness" (Aurelius, 
524). 
"the right way" and thinking and 
can pass "life in an equable flow 
Meditations Ch. 5, Section 34, p. 
49Epictetus, Discourses, Ch. 9, p. 297. 
50rbid., Ch. 6, p. 291. 
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consistently with nature and with the rule of Providence, b) 
to choose indifferent things according to true philosophical 
principles and c) to concern oneself only with what is truly 
one's virtue. In doing this man could not help but achieve 
eudaimonia. 
Obviously, the position of the Stoics regarding 
eudaimonia is not entirely at odds with that of Plotinus. 
They both agree that the eudaimon (i.e., the man who has 
eudaimonia) is one who leads a life governed by reason and 
virtue. Such a person is likewise unperturbed by bodily 
concerns or external predicaments ( as is obvious in his 
remarks in I, 4 [ 4 6 ] , 5, 1-1 7 ) . In fact, concerns and 
circumstances of this kind are entirely irrelevant to the 
achievement of eudaimonia. 
The Stoic view is not without its difficulties, 
however. The Stoics view the nature of man as single and 
simple, while Plotinus regards it as involving two facets: 
the lower or outer man (i.e., that part which can be, and 
frequently is, affected by external concerns and which is 
the soul-in-body) and the higher or inner man (i.e., that 
part which always remains unperturbed and within itself and 
which is the soul as intellect). Plotinus effectively 
illustrates his point by noting (I, 4 [46], 13, 5-12) that 
unless one distinguishes between these two aspects of man it 
will be unintelligible how one can have eudaimonia while at 
the same time enduring the many difficulties of the earthly 
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life. In other words, the man of eudaimonia can 
legitimately be said to suffer happily even while being 
tortured (e.g., by literally being roasted alive in a 
mechanism called the "bull of Phalaris "51) only if it is 
the "outer" man (or his lower half) who suffers the physical 
pain while the "inner II man ( or his higher half) remains 
undisturbed and happy in his contemplation of the Good. 
It seems, then, that although the Stoics value the 
life of reason and virtue they do not, and perhaps 
ultimately cannot, adequately explain why such a life is 
desirable and why external concerns are inconsequential to 
eudaimonia. 
b) The relation of Plotinian eudaimonia to the life 
of the serious man 
In a previous key text ( Text C: I I I, 8 [ 3 0 ] ) we 
pointed out that the chief characteristic of the serious man 
is the unity he achieves through contemplation and 
intuition. The present key text focuses on Plotinus' 
discussion of the good state of the serious man's 
or inner reality (i.e., on his ) . If all 
living things could be said to have life in exactly the same 
51phalaris, tyrant of Acragas (c. 570/65 554/49 
B.C.), became legendary for his ingenious cruelty, 
especially for the hollow brazen bull in which his victims 
were roasted alive. For further information see The Oxford 
Classical Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. "Phalaris," by Arthur G. 
Woodhead, p. 809. 
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way, then Plotinus could allow that all of them were capable 
of achieving a good state in their inner reality. But such 
is not the case. Although many kinds of beings are living, 
each kind is different by virtue of the brightness or 
dimness of its life (#9). Life, for Plotinus, is an 
analogous notion, since its meaning is both similar and 
diverse at the same time through his system. Life always 
involves intellection in some form, although in varying ways 
and to different degrees from one level of reality to 
another. 
Merely to be 
eudaimonia (#2-#4). 
living, then, is not a guarantee of 
A good state of inner reality belongs 
only to that which has a superabundance of perfect and true 
life ( #11). And as long as living things proceed from a 
single origin (Nous) but do not have life to the same degree 
as It, that origin must be the first and most perfect life. 
But man, too, is capable of having this perfect life. 
Consequently, he is capable of achieving the good state of 
his inner reality. But what is this "good"? It is what he 
has. The One or Good is the ultimate and extrinsic cause of 
the good in him. The fact that It is good is different from 
the fact that It is present to him. The man who has 
achieved the good state of his inner reality actually is 
that state; he is identical with it. 
just something he wears, so to speak. 
has all that he needs for the good 
Everything else is 
If he is serious, he 
state of his inner 
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reality and for the acquisition of the good, for then there 
is no good which he does not possess. The things which he 
does seek are, out of necessity, not for himself but for the 
body which is joined to him. He knows its needs and 
fulfills them without taking anything away from his own true 
life. Thus neither pain nor sickness nor anything else of 
this sort can reduce the good state of the serious man's 
inner reality. 
Such things as good health and good fortune (Plotinus 
goes on to point out in Chapters Five through Eight) have no 
attraction for the serious man because they do nothing to 
enhance his good state. But he seeks them nonetheless since 
they contribute to his being. And he rejects their 
opposites because they move him towards non-being and away 
from true life and because their presence is an obstacle to 
his goal. But even if such opposites are present they do 
not diminish his good state at all. Thus, while the serious 
man does not actively desire misfortune, he sets his 
excellence52 against it and thus overcomes it if it should 
52we shall translate apnn as "excellence" or 
"perfection" (rather than "virtue"), because it refers 
primarily to the excellent state or perfection of the 
serious man's inner reality, not solely to his moral virtue. 
For Plotinus, as we shall shortly see, a serious man is good 
or achieves apETTl only by becoming unified within himself 
and with the One. This is not to say, however, that 
apETn excludes entirely the notion of moral virtue. It is 
the serious man who alone has gained the true vision of 
reality by becoming unified within himself and with the One 
and who thus has the excellence of knowing how to treat his 
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come. In general, the serious man does not look at reality 
as others do. ije holds his reality within and allows 
nothing, not even personal pain or bad fortune, to penetrate 
there. 
Plotinus' procedure, unlike that of his above-
mentioned opponents, is to start with the serious man and to 
ask whether his inner reality is in a good state as long as 
he is serious. Plotinus also asks what factors, if any, 
militate against the presence of this good state ( #18). 
These questions, which are the concern of treatise I, 4 as a 
-whole, come to greater focus in the passages which comprise 
our current key text. What if the serious man is 
unconscious or is not acting according to his excellence53 
can he even then be in a good state?54 Plotinus' 
answer is both clever and novel. To be unconscious or to be 
(52continued) 
fellow men properly and fairly. In another treatise (I, 2 
[19], 7), Plotinus describes the life of the serious man in 
terms of apon . All excellences of the soul are related 
to intellect. The soul's sight directed toward intellect is 
wisdom, both theoretical and practical, which is the 
excellence belonging to the soul. All excellences are 
purifications in the sense that they are the results of a 
completed process of purifying unification. Thus, the 
serious man leaves everything behind in favor of the life of 
the gods, because he wants to become similar to them. Only 
in likeness to the gods -- i.e., in unity with the One --can 
he achieve the purification or unity which characterizes 
seriousness. 
53see note 52, above. 
54see I, 4 (46), 9, 7-8. For Aristotle's rather 
different view on these points consult, for example, 
Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 10, Ch. 6, 1176a33-35. 
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unaware of something does not automatically eliminate the 
object of which one happens to be unaware. For example, the 
man who does not know that he is healthy is healthy all the 
same. So too with the man who is wise: even if he does not 
know that he is wise, he will be no less wise as a 
result. 55 
But does wisdom not require awareness and 
consciousness of its presence? Furthermore, is not the good 
state of one's inner reality to be found only in actual 
wisdom?56 To these objections Plotinus answers that the 
underlying reality of wisdom consists in the very being of 
wisdom, and this does not cease in someone who is asleep or, 
in any sense of the term, unconscious. This means that the 
very being and reality of the serious man must be 
55see I, 4 ( 46), 9, 8-11. Here Plotinus seems to be 
arguing against the Aristotelian distinction (De Anima, 
412a) between the first actuality of a living body (e.g., a 
man possessing knowledge) and the second actuality (e.g., a 
man exercizing his knowledge). Plotinus, Rist contends, 
"refuses to recognize the different actuality of virtue and 
happiness in the man awake and the man asleep. If a man is 
unconscious of the fact that he is healthy ..• this does not 
prevent him from being heal thy; if he is unaware of his 
personal attraction, that does not mean that he is not 
personally attractive; similarly he argues that if he is 
unaware of his wisdom, surely he must be equally wise" (Road 
to Reality, p. 147). --
However, Aristotle could well counter with his own 
notion of a habit or state as something permanent and which, 
like Plotinus' eudaimonia, is present even when one is not 
conscious of it. For a discussion of the status and result 
of the good man's awareness of his goodness see John M. 
Rist, "The One of Plotinus and the God of Aristotle," The 
Review of Metaphysics 27 (1973): 75-87. 
56see r, 4 (46), 9, 11-14. 
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independent of his consciousness of it. It is a constant 
state of actuation.and is not affected by sleep, sickness or 
even magic.57 Only a part of the serious man will be 
unaware of this actuation. Similarly, when he undergoes 
physical growth it is only a part of him -- the outer, less 
real part -- which grows and changes. But that is not what 
he really is. The truly real part of man is within: the 
intellect and its potential and actual operation. He is the 
actuation of the intellect, so much so that when it is in 
act he is in act also.58 
In other words, since wisdom is itself a kind of ousia 
it can neither cease nor change. The serious man's wisdom 
(i.e., the Nous within him) is itself unceasing and 
unchanging and, hence, is unaffected by the absence or 
57see I, 4 (46), 9, 17-25. In VI, 4 (38), 43, 1-11, 
Plotinus also discusses whether the serious man can be 
affected by magic. He concludes that the soul or the 
rational part of the serious man cannot be affected by magic 
and other such distractions because they only affect his 
lower and irrational part. Therefore, IV, 4 presents 
essentially the same position as I, 4: the life and good 
state of the serious man's inner reality is not affected 
even if he is driven out of his senses by illness or magic 
arts. In short, the serious man is one who lives the life 
of Intellect. His II inner reality" or oa~wov is never turned 
away from the One. But Nous and the One are far beyond the 
influence of magic. Likewise the truly living and real part 
of the serious man, since it is unified with Nous and the 
One, is not affected by magic. For further discussion of 
Plot in us and magic see E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the 
Irrational (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1951), pp. 286-89; Philip Merlan, "Plotinus and Magic, 11 
Isis 44 (1953): 341-48; and A. H. Armstrong, "Was Plotinus 
a Magician?" Phronesis 1 (1955): 73-79. 
58see I, 4 (46), 9, 25-30. 
presence of consciousness. Plotinus can argue this 




there is a part of the human soul which always remains on 
the level of Nous, where it contemplates the Forms 
perfectly. The man who has achieved seriousness ( as we 
noted in Text C: III, 8 [30]), is one whose whole being or 





the concerns of the lower part of his 
insignificant. This higher part, 
identified with Nous, contemplation and, hence, true life, 
continues to function, so to speak, in spite of any external 
problems or pains that may befall the serious man. 
Plotinus notes in another treatise that it is man's 
disposition (i.e., what he has within the good state of 
his inner reality) which makes his actions excellent.59 
Thus someone who is not active can have his inner reality in 
a good state, because actions do not produce goodness of 
themselves. It is the serious man who gets the benefit of 
goodness in his action, not from the fact that he acts nor 
from the circumstances of his action, but from what he has 
achieved: true life in unity with the One or Good. Thus, 
his pleasure in the fact that, for example, his country is 
saved will be there even if it is a bad man who saves it. 
It is not the saving itself but one's own inner reality 
59see I, 5 (36), 10. See also note 51, above. 
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which causes the pleasure of its good state. To place the 
good state of one's inner reality in actions is to locate it 
in something outside excellence and the sou1.60 The 
actuation of the soul (i.e., its true life) lies in 
intellect and thought and this is the good state of one's 
inner reality.61 
Thus, the inner reality of the serious man is always 
in a good state precisely because it consists of his always 
actuated intellect, which is true life, even though another 
part of him, his outer aspect, is not always aware of this 
actuation. A man's inner reality, then, is always actuated 
regardless of the state of his outer aspect. His other and 
outer aspect consists of the physical body and its sensory 
functions and is subject to various distractions such as 
sleep, unconsciousness, sickness, magic, and the like.62 
60of course, the serious man's indifference to 
misfortune (both his own and that of others) and, in 
general, to all outer or sensory experiences, Plotinus would 
argue, serves to emphasize the true source of his 
eudaimonia. Plotinus, however, does not seem to be 
concerned with completely negating the significance of outer 
experiences. See, for example, Gurtler, "Human 
Consciousness," pp. 265ff. 
6l1t is possible that Aristot1e's view might 
harmonize with Plotinus' here. After all, both Plotinus and 
Aristotle would agree (albeit for rather different reasons) 
that it is the life of philosophic thought that is 
fundamental to eudaimonia. 
621n I, 9 (16), 13ff, Plotinus makes a similar point 
when he asks us to imagine a man who is aware that he is 
beginning to go mad. Such a thing, he says, is not likely 
to happen to a serious· man. Even if it should happen to 
him, however, the serious man will consider it as something 
inevitable but will not allow himself to be disturbed by it. 
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This outer and inferior part of man is often unaware 
of its counterpart's intellectual actuation and life and 
thus assumes that in the absence of such consciousness this 
actuation and life are likewise absent. But the inner and 
real and truly living part of man does not merely have the 
actuation of intellect: it actually is this actuation. The 
very nature, reality and life of the serious man is unity 
achieved through intellect. 
We saw in an earlier key text (Text C: III, 8 [30]) 
that unity, the hallmark of s€riousness, is achieved in part 
through the intellect as it journeys towards identification 
with Nous and ultimately with the One. The inner reality of 
a serious man, then, will always be in a good state because 
his life is that of intellect. His intellect has as its 
object and end the One-Good, with which it achieves initial 
contact through contemplation and ultimate contact through a 
mystical union. But in what does this earthly intellectual 
life consist? What does the serious man do and how does he 
act, given this desire ultimately to achieve unity with the 
One? For an answer we must look to a later portion of I, 4, 
namely, Chapter 11. There Plotinus again takes the serious 
man as his starting point and considers him as a whole being 
(62continued) 
In other words, his becoming mad will disturb only his outer 
aspects but not his inner reality, which will remain 
unperturbed in its good state. 
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and not piecemeal as his opponents often did. 
Plotinus arg,ues that if we investigate in what the 
good state of the serious man's living inner reality 
consists, we shall find that his attention is directed 
inward and that external activities do not interest him. 
The inner life of intellect, characterized by a turning 
inward towards unity, is of utmost interest to the serious 
man. It is folly to look for him in external activities or 
to seek the object of his contemplation or desire in outward 
things. His inner reality achieves its good state through 
intellect, specifically through his contemplation of the 
levels of Soul and Nous (thereby leading him to unity within 
himself) and ultimately through a mystical union with the 
One-Good. This good state would not even be possible "if 
one said that outward things were to be desired and that the 
serious man desired them."63 
His good state does not prevent the serious man from 
wishing that all men (including himself) were prosperous and 
not subject to evil and suffering. But if these latter 
should be present, the good state of his inner reality will 
be unaffected. But would not the serious man be essentially 
63see I, 4 ( 46), 11, 3-12. Plotinus does not mean 
that the serious man must deny himself any reasonable 
comforts, but only that he knows their proper value and 
function and thus can appreciate them simply for what they 
are: necessary but ultimately worthless concerns of earthly 
life. See I, 4 (46), 16, l0ff; II, 9 (33), 9, 3-8; and I, 6 
(1), 11-13. 
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selfish and without compassion for his fellow man? Plotinus 
might respond as follows. The good state of the serious 
man's inner reality is not affected by the rise and fall of 
his neighbors' {or his own) good fortune precisely because 
such fluctuations belong to the outer aspect of man while 
the serious man's attention is turned inward to a region 
unaffected by fortune, sickness, magic, death and the like. 
Thus, while he would not deny himself or his fellow man any 
of the material comforts of life, the serious man's own life 
{i.e., his inner reality, the life of intellect) does not 
depend on such comforts for the maintenance of its good 
state.64 
So it is that only when man turns to the life of 
intellect, and thus comes to unity, does he become serious. 
In this way his inner reality comes to be in a good state. 
When he achieves seriousness and this good state, he is no 
longer subject to the distractions of everyday living, which 
affect his outer half. He sees that they are neither truly 
real nor valuable. "His light burns within, like the light 
in a lantern when it is blowing hard outside with a great 
fury of wind and storm. 1 "65 
64see r, 4 {46), 11, 12-17. 
65see r, 4 {46), 8, 4-6. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
It is obvious from our analysis of this key text that 
Plotinus' position on eudaimonia (and its relation to 
seriousness and true life}, while profiting from 
Aristotelian and Stoic insights, is an original one. 
Basically, perfect (or superabundant} life is to be found in 
Nous and in the intelligible nature of man. Both Nous and 
human beings (i.e., the inner man in each human being} are 
life, while all other living things merely have life, 
precisely because they are less perfect and dimmer versions 
of Primal Life, the life of Nous. Hence, eudaimonia, the 
good state of one's inner reality, is identical with the 
attainment of the One-Good by any being which has life 
super abundantly, namely, to the degree that such a being 
possesses an intelligible nature, or Nous. 
As we turn specifically to human life it is important 
to note briefly in what ways Plotinus' position is at 
variance with the otherwise valuable views of the 
Epicureans, Aristotle and the Stoics. Plotinus' rather 
terse rejection of the Epicurean view of eudaimonia is not 
surprising. As Rist argues, the brief treatment of pleasure 
as the operative factor in eudaimonia in treatise I, 4 may 
profitably be explained by the fact that Plotinus' arguments 
there are "aimed at those at least partially converted and 
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aware of Plotinus' views on Epicureans. 11 66 The brevity of 
his remarks notwitbstanding, it is obvious that the argument 
that physical pleasure is the sufficient and necessary 
condition for true life and, hence, eudaimonia runs 
significantly counter to Plotinus' view of the good and true 
life as the life of intellect -- the life of the inner man. 
Against Aristotle Plotinus argues that it is a mistake 
to say that human eudaimonia is in many ways genuinely 
dependent on, and affected by, the presence of external 
factors and bodily necessities. Not only does this view 
ignore the valuable Plotinian distinction between the inner 
(intellectual and, hence, real and genuinely alive) and 
outer (earthly and bodily and, hence, unreal) man, but it 
seems to make the enjoyment of perfect eudaimonia ultimately 
available only to those in heaven. What Plotinus seems to 
have the greatest difficulty with is Aristotle's view of the 
human soul as an entelechy. To view the soul as the form of 
the body is necessarily to involve oneself in 
difficulties67 of the sort that Plotinus claims exist in 
Aristotle's position on eudaimonia. 
The Stoic position, for Plotinus, encounters a similar 
difficulty. Although their emphasis is on virtue as the 
necessary and sufficient condition for eudaimonia ( rather 
66Road to Reality, p. 139. 
67see above, pp. 237-241 and Chapter Two, pp. 43-48. 
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than on virtue supplemented by various external conditions), 
it is likewise difficult to see how, in all but a few 
exceptional instances, human beings could ever achieve 
genuine eudaimonia.68 
It is obvious from the above comments that, as far as 
the serious man is concerned, the body is for Plotinus a 
mere addition .to his inner reality (#26), while his inner 
reality is united to him by an act of the will ( #22). 69 
What might be called the serious man's inner reality does 
not really need the various bodily necessities (#26). Their 
presence or absence does not contribute to his eudaimonia or 
true life but merely to the continuation of his bodily 
existence.70 Plotinus is able to hold this view primarily 
because he believes that part of the soul always remains 
with Nous, constantly living in perfect contemplation of the 
divine intelligibles and unspoiled by the earthly life. The 
serious man is fully integrated within himself, so much so 
that the lower part of him has become irrelevant. Thus, the 
higher soul is continuously operative within the serious 
68There is no man, Plotinus argues in I, 4 ( 46), 4, 
10-12, who does not possess eudaimonia either actually or 
potentially. Not all men actually become serious, of 
course, but all are capable of such an achievement if they 
choose it. 
69At this juncture of his discussion of this passage 
Rist notes that it is good to "recall the use of cruvap,civ 
with reference to the 'sympathy' of the universe, that is, 
to the fundamental nature of the world, at 2.3.7.16" (Road 
to Reality, p. 145). --
JOsee for example I, 4 (46), 15, 1-12. 
man. Why? 
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Because for Plotinus the soul of the serious 
man, as logos of Nous, is itself eternal and unchanging and, 
hence, unaffected by the presence or absence of 
consciousness, pain, pleasure and other concerns. 
In this way Plotinus' henological perspective (i.e., 
that to be real is to be one) can also be seen to be a 
theory of morality. When the serious man achieves unity, he 
actually has the good within himself: he is the good. The 
unity in the serious man is identical with goodness (the 
unity is the good state of his inner reality) because the 
Primal Reality, the One-Good, which unifies man, is also the 
Supreme Good, the primal and emanative cause of his 
goodness. Just as the One and the Good are identical, so 
too unity and goodness are one and the same state in man and 
consist of his seriousness. 
As noted elsewhere, a man achieves proximate unity 
(with Nous) and true life by purely intellectual means, 
contemplation and intuition. But practically he also 
achieves this unity by detaching himself from the concerns 
of the universe in which he lives. He is free from 
everything and everybody. With the achievement of the good 
state of his inner reality, the serious man has the proper 
perspective with which to view and to evaluate the people, 
things and events around him. He knows that the real man is 
other than his outward parts. Hence, any pursuit that 
involves those outward parts will only prove to be a 
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distraction from what is his real and true life. 
This, however, does not mean that the serious man has 
no regard for other persons. While it is true that he does 
not allow their everyday interests and activities (which are 
mere decorations) to overwhelm him, he does strive, insofar 
as he is able, to help others achieve the same state of 
seriousness he already enjoys. Accordingly, his life serves 
as a model for those who are not yet serious, so that they 
might learn from it and thus come to unity themselves.71 
The serious man, then, takes as good not the merely 
apparent goods of this world but the One or Good of the 
highest realm, with Whom he eventually becomes identified. 
This type of unity is his ultimate goal and is achieved by a 
mystical contact. Such mystical union, Plotinus argues, 
involves going beyond Nous and is akin to taking a leap into 
the unknown.72 When one has made this "leap" he has 
achieved a kind of "contact" with the One and a certain 
"vision" of It.73 This contact is by likeness and it is a 
71As Armstrong notes in the Preface to his 
translation of the Enneads, "the primary object of all 
Plotinus' philosophical activity is to bring his own soul 
and the souls of others by way of Intellect to union with 
the One" (Vol. 1, p. xxv). Even Plotinus' reputed last 
words seem to bear this out: "Try to bring back the god in 
you to the di vine in the All! 11 (Porphyry, "Life, 11 Ch. 2, 
lines 26-27). 
7 2 See V, 5 ( 3 2 ) , 4 , 8 . 
73As Rist (Road to Reality, p. 222) points out, 
cognates of the word "contact" (hapto) are found in various 
treatises: VI, 9 (9), 11, 24 and V, 3 (49), 10, 42; 17, 34. 
That Plotinus employs terms such as "vision" and "seeing" 
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grasp of the One-Good by a power in us that is like the 
Primal Reality. 74 , At this point all differences seem to 
cease and the human soul has become "blended" or "mixed" 
with the one-Good.75 
Al though such an approach is helpful, perhaps the 
metaphor of the converging centers of two circles is a 
better Plotinian description of the human soul's union with 
the One. 76 In any case it seems apparent that the human 
soul in its mystical union with the One is enraptured, 77 
filled with God,78 has abandoned itself,79 and is not 
wholly itself. 80 Rist seems to argue plausibly that all 
of these descriptions suggest that the human soul has 
achieved its highest state when it has isolated itself from 
the finite realm and surrendered itself and become fully 
(73continued) 
to describe this sort of contact is confirmed by Porphyry 
("Life," Ch. 23). It must be remembered, however, that 
words such as "vision" are ultimately insufficient and 
unsatisfactory descriptions of man's ultimate contact with 
the One since the aim of Plotinian mysticism is not mere 
seeing or vision of the Primal Reality but union with It. 
See, for example, VI, 9 (9), 11, 22. 
7 4 See VI, 9 ( 9 ) , 4, 2 7 and I I I, 8 ( 3 0 ) , 9, 2 2-2 3. 
75see I, 6 (1), 7, 13; VI, 7 (34), 34, 15. Rist 
points out that it "is not a question of a literal blending 
of such a kind that there is no distinction but an 
association of such a kind that the metaphor of blending is 
the most appropriate description" (Road to Reality, p. 223). 
76see VI, 9 (9), 10. 
77see VI, 9 (9), 11, 13. 
78see VI, 9 (9), 9, 21. 
79see VI, 9 (9), 11, 24. 
80see VI, 9 (9), 11, 12. 
267 
receptive to the infinite realm.Bl 
Does the human soul live at this level of mystical 
union with the One? And does it enjoy eudaimonia there? 
These questions are difficult to answer owing to Plotinus' 
obvious reluctance to describe non-metaphorically the nature 
of the mystical union itself. This much we may be able to 
venture, however. If eudaimonia is achieved only by those 
who enjoy a superabundance of life, because they alone are 
endowed with intellect, and if the One-Good is above life 
(insofar as It is the source of life, presumably even 
superabundant life), then what the human soul enjoys in its 
mystical union with the Primal Reality must be a state 
beyond life and beyond eudaimonia. Why? Because eudaimonia 
is dependent on intellect, while the mystical union is 
supra-intellectual (since such mystical union no longer 
involves a duality of knower and known). 
But the serious man has a proximate goal as well 
ascent to and identity with Nous -- which is a necessary 
preparation for his eventual mystical union with the One. 
This proximate goal he achieves by an intellectual contact 
with the One, in which the Primal Reality is understood as a 
multiplicity of Forms82 
81Road to Reality, p. 224. 
82That this goal is proximate is obvious, Rist 
argues, because Nous "is not pre-eminently simple, pre-
eminently all-embracing. Likeness to God in the full sense 
must mean an ascent beyond the realm of the finite Forms to 
268 
It is obvious, then, why non-intellectual concerns 
seem so insignific;:ant to the serious man. He recognizes 
that some things contribute to his good inner state while 
others only belong to his outer and inferior half, the 
body.83 To the latter he gives only what it needs in 
order to exist because he realizes that it makes no 
contribution to his state of seriousness and true life and, 
hence, must be ignored and eventually discarded. Because he 
has achieved proximate unity with the One through 
contemplation and intuition he therefore understands the 
·true nature of the All in which he lives his everyday life. 
This, he sees, is merely a reflection of the true All of 
Nous and, as such, is less perfect, less unified and, 
therefore, less real. Thus the activities, problems and 
events which occur in it are only imitations and are only 
as real as the actions and events on a stage, which belong 
only to the outer part of man. Only by refusing to be 
distracted by such external activity can the real part of 
man, the inner part, achieve unity, true life and 
seriousness. And only then is his ultimate and mystical 
(82continued) 
the realm of the infinite One whose dominant character of 
simplicity ( anAwaL~ ) is emphasized throughout the whole 
of the Enneads" (Road to Reality, p. 217). See also Wallis, 
Neoplatonism, pp. 88-89. 
8 3 See I I I, 4 ( 15) , 2, 6-16. If man 
salvation and purification he must "escape" 
world and rise to what is intelligible, 
eventually to God, the One-Good. 
is to achieve 
to the upper 
to Nous and 
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union with the One possible. The human soul, Plotinus 
urges, must not actively pursue this union but rather should 
wait quietly for its arriva1.84 
84see V, 5 ( 32), 8, 4. We are in agreement with 
Rist on this point, who notes (Road to Reality, p. 225) that 
if we "pursue" the One "of course we shall always tend to 
specify it, to see it under some particular aspect. We must 
learn instead to be passive, to let it come, as it will come 
if we take away our own restlessness, that very restlessness 
which prevents us from being like it." 
What Plotinus seems to be making here is primarily a 
psychological, not an ontological, remark. One's 
psychological disposition should be one of patience and 
passivity when awaiting union with the One. Thus, while 
union with Nous is, in a sense, automatic, or at least 
predictable, union with the One is not. The serious man 
must wait for it to occur. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this final chapter we shall present a brief resume 
of the insights Plotinus has provided on zoe in the five key 
texts we examined. Subsequently we shall offer some 
preliminary conclusions regarding Plotinus' overall position 
on life. 
SUMMARY 
Fortunately, our very first key text (IV, 7 [2], aS-
11) provided one of the central insights necessary for an 
accurate understanding of life: self-motion. Since motion 
primarily is cognition, Plotinus argues, self-motion is 
self-cognition, a cognition which the being itself (e.g., 
Nous or an individual human soul) causes. To be alive, 
then, is to be efficiently causing one's own cognition. 
Every living existent possesses a soul, which is the 
principle of these operations. Accordingly, soul's very 
nature is to be self-moving and self-acting. Thus, if self-
kinesis is the very ousia or nature of soul, then soul qua 
soul must be deathless. 
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Furthermore, self-motion and immortality belong to the 
individual soul ~s well as to World Soul, since the 
individual soul participates, by being a logos of, the World 
Soul, which in turn is a logos of Nous .1 Plotinus here 
shows his indebtedness to Plato, for whom the life of the 
soul is self-motion, the prime manifestation of which is 
intellection.2 
Plotinus further argues that life is linked with soul 
with an intimacy akin to that between heat and fire. Such 
an analogy is useful because it offers an additional and 
-very vivid way of viewing the nature of the necessary 
connection between soul and life. In both cases heat and 
life intrinsically (and, hence, necessarily) belong to fire 
and to soul, respectively. Each of the latter is an ousia 
and by its very nature is constantly present to the former. 
Plotinus argues next that it is necessary to isolate 
that component in man which lives in itself and, hence, is 
the human soul. That there must exist a first principle of 
lin the first five treatises, chronologically taken, 
Plotinus does not refer to the Soul (i.e., the All Soul) as 
a separate level of reality. As we have argued earlier in 
our study (Text A: IV, 7 [2], note 8), in treatises prior 
to IV, 8 (6) he seems unaware of the All Soul as such and, 
accordingly, utilizes Nous to vivify the World Soul and 
individual souls. --
2This point Plato presents clearly in the Phaedrus 
(245c5-e6) and in the Timaeus (36b-37c). He argues that all 
souls are immortal or ever-living because they are ever-
moving. Furthermore, because what moves itself is ever-
living the very ousia of soul must be self-kinesis. 
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life in human beings is obvious from the fact that the only 
alternative to such a principle is an infinite regress of 
caused causes. Accordingly, the composite which is man must 
be examined and dissected until the one element which is the 
source of his life (i.e., the soul) is discovered. When 
this component is found it will be seen to be immortal, 
because it is self-living and self-moved. 
Furthermore, it is inadequate and even misleading to 
speak of life as merely a passive quality or condition of 
matter. If this view were correct, it would be necessary 
even then to isolate the ultimate cause of such a quality or 
condition. And unless that cause was itself self-living the 
investigation would have to continue until just such a cause 
was found, for only the self-living can be soul. In short, 
the soul is immortal because it has life as its very ousia 
and because this life is actual (i.e., energeia). 
The second key text (VI, 9 [ 9], 9) furthered our 
understanding of zoe by focusing on its prime possessor, 
Nous. Since Nous is primal life, everything subsequent to 
It must be alive also. But in what sense is Nous perfect 
life? 
Nous is perfect as mind or knower because intellection 
(noesis) is Its very nature (ousia) and essential act 
( energeia). It is Itself what It knows because It is both 
knower and known. Its knowledge is not discursive but 
intuitive and, hence, It knows eternally and completely. 
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Nous, then, may be said to be life because Its life is Its 
energeia and self.;.'.kinesis. Through Its self-kinesis Nous 
causes Its own reversion (epistrophe) towards the One (and 
this reversion is the energeia of Nous). 
Nous, then, moves Itself intellectually to know the 
One. And this self-originated movement of Nous from active 
dynamis (Nous in the first moment of emanation from the One: 
prohodos) to energeia likewise marks the generation of the 
content of Its intellection: the world of intelligible 
Forms. In this way several Platonic and Aristotelian 
elements are combined to describe the life of Nous more 
fully. From Aristotle3 he receives the notion of Nous as 
noesis noeseos, although Plotinus does not agree that It is 
akinetos. From Plato he accepts the notion that 
intellection is a kind of kinesis (i.e., a self-kinesis) and 
applies it to Nous. 4 Plotinus also locates the Platonic 
World of Forms within Nous as Its intelligible content. The 
result of this combination is a self-moved and self-living 
Intelligence, whose contents are the Forms and whose life is 
energeia, which is precisely Its self-kine sis of 
intellection. 
Through Its life and intellection Nous is necessarily 
productive. Its principal products are the intelligibles, 
3see Metaphysics, Book. 12, Ch. 8, 1074a35-37. 
4see Timaeus, 30cff and Sophist, 248e-249d. 
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which It contains and which represent Its best grasp of the 
Primal Reality. Further, each intelligible Form is itself a 
knower and a known and is alive. In this way Nous is a unity 
which is multiple, a one-in-many. The other beings Nous 
produces (e.g., Soul and Nature) have intelligence, but only 

















intelligence and life only because they participate in (by 
being logoi of) the primal intellection and life of Nous.5 
The life of Nous is further explained by reference to 
the role of er5s. Nous, the first emanant of the One, is a 
reality whose determination ( in the moment of epistrophe) 
results from Its self-kinesis of intellection. 
initiates its kinesis out of love for its source. 
But Nous 
In other 
words, Nous turns to the One and is filled by It because the 
One is the object of Its desire of love. The very 
motivation of Nous' self-kinesis is the One's supreme 
goodness, to which Nous, and any being for that matter, is 
inexorably attracted. 
5participation in Plotinus consists in the fact that 
a lower reality is imaged not through a higher reality's 
exemplarity nor through a Demiurge but by the fact that the 
lower reality is a higher reality on a lower level (i.e., by 
the fact that the lower is a logos of the higher), as the 
being of the other on a lower level. A logos, then, is the 
very reality of a lower being, in relation to a higher level 
of reality. · 
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In this way eros applies to the life of Nous, insofar 
as It lives fully only through turning to the One-Good, the 
source of Its life and the object of Its desire. Love of 
the One-Good likewise helps to explain more fully the life 
of soul, especially as it ascends first to Nous and then to 
its ultimate source, the One-Good. 
The third key text (III, 8 [30], 8; 10) contributed to 
our understanding of zoe especially in its relation to logos 
and to contemplation. Each level of reality below the One 
is real because it emanates from, and thus is a more or less 
multiple manifestation (or logos) of, the Primal Reality. 
Any existent (whether Nous, Soul, an individual human being, 
a brute animal, a plant, or even a lump of coal) is what it 
is insofar as it is a logos i.e., insofar as it 
participates in what is higher by actually being the higher-
on-a-lower-level.6 Furthermore, since Nous is primal life 
(by being a self-kin~sis which is intellection), each level 
of reality below Nous is an active power (dynamis) identical 
with the being of the hypostasis in which it exists and is 
ordered to the production of some reality lower than itself. 
6In general, every being is a life because every 
being is ultimately a logos of Nous. Accordingly, all 
beings in varying and diminishing degrees entail cognition 
(and hence are alive), except for the lowest level of life, 
which is cognition only in the sense that it is the content 
of the contemplation of a higher reality. 
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From this perspective Nous is alive because out of 
desire for the Ult1mate Good (i.e., the One) It moves Itself 
to contemplate the One-Good. In doing so It produces the 
content of Its contemplation, namely, the entire complex of 
living intelligibles or Forms. These are the One inasmuch 
as Nous is able to know It (the One). 
Next, Soul is alive because it is Nous-on-a-lower-
level-of-reality. Hence, Soul is fully animated when it 
turns back to its source (Nous) in contemplation of the 
multiplicity of intelligibles There. Specifically, Soul 
lives because it, too, is a self-kinesis which is 
intellection, but of a weaker and more multiple sort than 
that of Nous. In short, all life below Nous is logos of 
Nous. All products of Nous are alive precisely because they 
are Its images or logoi. Hence, all things ( from the 
hypostasis of Soul downwards) live to a greater or lesser 
degree depending upon their contemplative closeness to, or 
remoteness from, the primal life of Nous.7 
7 Contemplation, for Plotinus, involves an operative 
state and a content. Nous, for example, is a combination of 
an operative state and an intelligible content. This 
content is itself, when found on the next lower level of 
reality, identical with Soul (i.e., All-Soul), which in turn 
is an operative state with a content. The content of its 
contemplation is the World Soul, individual human souls, 
brute animal souls, and Nature. The content of Nature's 
contemplation is vegetal life, either in plants as such or 
in human and animal bodies. Individual human souls both 
actively contemplate and have a content. Animal souls do as 
well, although their "contemplation" is of a very weak sort, 
namely, sensation rather than intellection as such. Both 
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Furthermore, life on the human level also admits of 
degrees and may be expressed in terms of its two extreme 
manifestations. The life of the serious man involves 
identification between his intellect and Nous. Accordingly, 
his is a life of contemplation rather than of action. He 
concentrates on intellection rather than on external 
activity. He has become increasingly unified within himself 
(and in this way with the One) and no longer needs to turn 
to what is outside (i.e., the sensible universe). The man 
of action (praxis), on the other hand, embodies a dichotomy 
between knower and known. Although he too contemplates (and 
thus lives, albeit imperfectly), he does so weakly and 
incompletely. His soul, accordingly, must still console 
itself with various sorts of artifacts and external 
activities rather than with the genuine objects of 
contemplation (Nous and ultimately the One). 
The fourth key text (VI, 7 [38], 13; 15; 17; 18) 
contained further elaboration of two key points. First, 
Plotinus seeks further to explain life as epistrophe ( in 
relation to the Platonic megista gene, especially kinesis) 
(?continued) 
human beings and brute animals produce cognitive products as 
well as produce biological offspring. Finally, plants may 
be said to contemplate only in a purely passive sense, 
namely, as the content of the contemplation of a higher 
reality. 
278 
and life as prohodos (i.e., the life of Nous as active 
dynamis). 
In explaining life as epistrophe Plotinus relies on 
the five megista gene of Plato ( kinesis, stasis, tau ton, 
heteron and ousia). Plotinus' use of these categories comes 
from the Timaeus (in which Plato uses only four of the five, 
omitting stasis) and from the Sophist (in which he employs 
all five). In the Timaeus Plato uses the categories to 
explain how the Demi urge formed the World Soul. In order 
that the World Soul should be the best of all sensible 
beings, the Demi urge blended tau ton, thateron ( for which 
term Plotinus substitutes heteron) and ousia into a whole. 
Next, this unity was cut into strips and these were bent 
into circles ( an inner circle of difference and an outer 
circle of sameness). These circles of cognitional motion 
produced the cyclical local movement of the celestial 
bodies. For Plato it is through these circles of sameness 
and difference that the World Soul knows both the Forms and 
all sensible existents.a 
In the Sophist Plato investigates the precise 
difference between the sophist, the statesman and the 
philosopher. In his discussion of the chief feature of the 
sophist, namely, his ability to employ false statements, the 
megista gene serve a dual purpose: a) to show that it is 
8see Timaeus, 35a-38b. 
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possible (contra Parmenides) to speak meaningfully about 
"that which is not~ and b) to explain further the science of 
dialectics by showing that true knowledge must consist in 
understanding how Forms relate to other Forms (and not just 
in understanding how they relate to sensible things).9 
Plotinus transfers these categories to Nous by 
emphasizing an. important dimension of his logos doctrine, 
namely, that a lower reality is a less perfect instance of a 
higher reality. Accordingly, if the five categories apply 
to the World Soul (for Plato as well as for Plotinus), then 
they apply, for Plotinus, all the more perfectly to the next 
higher level of reality, Nous. 
How, then, does each of the five categories apply to 
zoe? The all-important connection between kinesis and zoe 
may be made clear by noting that Nous is produced by the 
twofold process of prohodos (active dynamis) and epistrophe 
(act). Each of these two moments is indeed a kinesis and a 
life. Although kinesis as prohodos is not yet intellection, 
it is life as sheer active power for intellection and, 
hence, it is the indeterminate principle of all living 
beings and acts. Kinesis as epistrophe is best understood 
in terms of ousia. Here, too, Plot in us employs Platonic 
terms when describing the kinisis of Nous as a "wandering" 
9see Sophist, 237a-24la. 
within Itself in which It animates all ousiai .10 
280 
These 
ousiai are themselves the acts which constitute the 
fulfillment of the kinesis of Nous in Its determinate state. 
As determinate act, then, Nous is the actuation of every 
being and every life. 
How heteron and tauton relate to zoe is also explained 
in reference to the two moments of Nous' production. 
Plotinus argues ( in II, 4 [ 12], 5, 28-39) that a proper 
explanation of the production of any being must ref er not 
just to kinesis but to heteron as well. This is so because 
any product is necessarily different from, by being less 
perfect than, its producer. In this sense heteron is a 
significant feature of the first moment of Nous' production 
and also of Nous' life. Heteron in the moment of prohodos 
is identical with intelligible matter and active dynamis. 
Furthermore, heteron is in a sense a characteristic of the 
second moment of Nous' production, since the plurality of 
intelligible beings is necessarily other than their original 
source, the One-Good. Tau ton also is a characteristic of 
the second moment of Nous' production and, hence, of Its 
life as well because the eternal intellection of Nous is 
ever-present to all of Its objects or acts. This factor is 
the trace of the One common to all beings and is life. 
Elsewhere in the Enneads (VI, 2 [ 43]) Plotinus relies on 
l0see Timaeus, 39d. 
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Plato's Sophist to bring in the fifth genes as well: stasis 
(rest). There he: notes that even stasis applies to Nous 
because the content of Its contemplation is a universe of 
permanent and eternal Forms. 
The fifth and final key text (I, 4 [46], 3-4) provided 
valuable information on eudaimonia (the good state of man's 
inner reality) and its relation to seriousness and true 
life. Plotinus' basic position is that perfect life on the 
human level is to be found in the intellectual nature of man 
and that all other, lesser lives are lives precisely because 
they are less perfect and dimmer versions of primal life, 
the life of Nous. Hence, eudaimonia, the good state of 
one's inner reality, is identical with the attainment of the 
One-Good by those beings which have life to the fullest 
degree (i.e., superabundantly), namely, Nous and human 
beings (as well as, of course, the All Soul, World Soul and 
astral souls). 
In turning specifically to human life it is important 
to note that Plotinus' position is somewhat at variance with 
the views of the Epicureans, Aristotle and the Stoics. It 
is obvious, for example, that the Epicurean view that 
physical pleasure is the sufficient and necessary condition 
for true life and, hence, for eudaimonia is incompatible 
with Plotinus' view of the good and true life as that of 
intellect -- the life of the inner man. 
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Against Aristotle Plotinus argues that it is a mistake 
to say that human eudaimonia is in many ways genuinely 
dependent on, and affected by, the presence of external 
factors and bodily necessities. Not only does this view 
ignore the valuable Plotinian distinction between the inner 
(intellectual and, hence, real and genuinely alive) and 
outer ( earthly and bodily and, hence, unreal) man, but it 
seems to make the enjoyment of perfect eudaimonia ultimately 
unavailable in this earthly life. He also takes exception 
to Aristotle's view that eudaimonia is the accomplishment of 
any being's proper or natural task. If this were true, 
Plotinus contends, eudaimonia would be achievable by any 
being, not merely humans and gods. However, eudaimonia 
applies only to beings which can enjoy the life of intellect 
superabundantly. 
The Stoic position, for Plotinus, encounters a similar 
difficulty. Al though the Stoics emphasize virtue as the 
necessary and sufficient condition for eudaimonia ( rather 
than virtue supplemented by various external conditions) it 
is likewise difficult to see how, in all but a few 
exceptional instances, human beings could ever achieve 
genuine eudaimonia. 
Obviously for Plotinus, as far as the serious man is 
concerned, the body is a mere addition to his inner reality, 
which does not really need the bodily necessities. Their 
presence or absence does not contribute directly to his 
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eudaimonia or true life but merely to the more or less 
pleasurable continuation of his bodily existence. Why? 
Because the intellectual part of the soul always remains 
with Nous, constantly living in perfect contemplation of the 
divine intelligibles and unspoiled by the earthly life. The 
serious man has integrated himself to the extent that the 
lower part of him has become irrelevant. For Plotinus the 
soul of the serious man, as logos of Nous, is itself eternal 
and unchanging and, hence, unaffected by the presence or 
absence of consciousness, pain, pleasure and other concerns. 
In this way Plotinus' henological perspective (i.e., 
that to be real is to be one) also affects his theory of 
morality. When the serious man achieves proximate ( or 
intellectual)unity, he actually has the good within himself: 
he is the good. This unity in the serious man is identical 
with moral goodness because in intellectually grasping the 
Primal Reality he also grasps the Supreme Good, the primal 
and emanative cause of his goodness and the final cause of 
his moral behavior. Just as the One and the Good are 
identical, so too unity and goodness are one and the same 
state in man and thus constitute his seriousness and moral 
goodness. 
Man achieves this proximate unity, and thereby enjoys 
true life, by purely intellectual means. He paves the way 
for this achievement by detaching himself from the concerns 
of the uni verse in which he lives. He becomes free from 
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everything and everybody. With the achievement of the good 
state of his inner reality, then, the serious man has the 
proper perspective with which to view and to evaluate the 
people, things and events around him. He knows that the 
real man is other than his outward parts. Hence, any 
pursuit that involves those outward parts will only prove to 
be a distraction from what is his real and true life. 
However, while he does not allow the everyday 
interests and activities (which are ultimately mere 
decorations) of others to overwhelm him, he does strive, 
insofar as he is able, to help them achieve the same state 
of seriousness he already enjoys. Accordingly, he tries to 
live an exemplary life so that those who are not yet serious 
might learn from him and thus come to seriousness 
themselves. 
But man also achieves an ultimate sort of unity with 
the One-Good. This unity, however, is no longer effected by 
intellectual means but by a mystical contact. It is a union 
with the One that the serious man is prepared for, precisely 
by having 
patiently.11 
led a life of contemplation, and awaits 
It is not a union whose achievement he can 
llp1otinus describes the mystic's journey as one 
which requires that he strip away everything, put away all 
shape and let every Form go. See, for example, VI, 7. (38), 
3 4 , 4 and V, 3 ( 4 9 ) , 1 7 , 3 8 . 
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fully control or predict, but rather is something that comes 
upon him suddenly and totally.12 
CONCLUSIONS 
What, then, may we conclude about Plotinus' conception 
of life? Let us begin by noting what life in itself (i.e., 
the life of Nous) consists of. Next, it will be worthwhile 
to explore the connection of life with its ultimate source-
the Primal Reality (i.e., the One-Good). Finally, we will 
comment on the nature of human life. 
Perfect life ( or the life of Nous) is self-kinesis, 
ousia and energeia, and is identical with a noetic awareness 
of the One, which Itself cannot be known in Its perfect 
simplicity and unici ty but rather must be understood as a 
plurality of Forms or intelligibles. 
Life on the level of Nous, then, is both a tauton and 
a heteron, that is, a sameness-in-difference. Sameness 
denotes the life of Nous mainly in Its moment of epistrophe, 
whereas difference denotes the life of Nous in Its moment of 
prohodos and epistrophe. Furthermore, each moment of noetic 
production is a kinesis and, hence, also may be termed life. 
Nous in Its first moment is life as pure active dynamis, as 
the indeterminate principle for all living beings and acts. 
Kinesis as prohodos is not yet intellection, but it is life 
12 See VI , 9 ( 9 ) , 8 , 2 2-4 3 ; 11 , 15-16 • 
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as sheer active power aimed at intellection. Nous in Its 
second moment is l,if e as the actuation and determination of 
all living intelligibles. Noetic kines is as epistrophe is 
profitably explained in terms of ousia. Here, likewise, 
Plotinus reverts to Platonic terminology in describing the 
kinesis of Nous as a "wandering" within Itself in which It 
animates all ousiai. These ousiai are themselves the acts 
which constitute the fulfillment of the kines is of Nous 
(i.e., Nous in Its determinate state). Accordingly, as 
determinate act Nous is the. actuation of every being and 
every life. 
How might we better understand the life of Nous in the 
first moment of Its production? We notice that in Its first 
moment Nous is intelligible matter, which is the first 
emanant from, or product of, the One. But intelligible 
matter is life as active dynamis. Hence, life as active 
dynamis may be said to be more real than any being 
subsequent to it. Intelligible matter, precisely as 
indeterminate and unformed, is more like the One than when 
determinate and formed (in the moment of epistrophe). 
Accordingly, we may say that life as active dynamis is truly 
Primal life because it is more real than life as act (since 
it shares more intimately in the indeterminacy of the One 
than does the World of Forms).13 
13on this point see Rist, "Dyad," pp. 105-6. 
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Finally, the life of Nous is a totality of lives. Nous 
as act in Its moment of epistrophe actuates and animates the 
multiplicity of beings which are Its content. Nous in this 
sense is not a simple and single life but a multiple and 
total life. Furthermore, all levels of reality subsequent 
to and below Nous are alive precisely because they are Its 
traces and logoi. Nous is a totality of lives, then, both 
as the multiple living content of Its contemplation of the 
One and also as the source of the life of every being on 
every level of reality below It. 
Nous, since It is identical with the intellection of 
all things in one simultaneous moment (or "now"), is 
eternity. The next level of reality, Soul, is alive 
(because it is a logos of Nous) but involves temporali ty, 
since its intellection is successive. For this reason, the 
life of Soul is time. 
The relationship between life and logos reminds us 
once again that life is intellection, which is a self-
kinesis. Every being has life precisely and only because it 
is a logos of some higher reality, which itself is a logos 
of a still higher reality ( until we come to the highest 
reality, the One, of which everything else is a logos). 
Each of these beings lives to the extent that it is 
intellective, that is, to the extent that it contemplates 
the One as multiple. It is precisely this auto-kinetic 
intellection which is identical with the life of any being, 
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except for those at the lowest level of reality. For 
Plotinus, even the' physical universe is good and alive to 
the extent that it has some trace of being (i.e., some trace 
of Nous or intellect) or logos. The visible universe is 
produced by logos and its very reality is, in fact, a 
spreading out of the various logoi which are the content of 
the contemplation of Nature. The coming of these logoi upon 
matter is, among other things, a coming to life .14 But 
some of these logoi (i.e., plants) are so diminished in 
their intellectuality that they do not actually contemplate 
and hence do not produce a content. They themselves are 
alive merely as the content of Nature's contemplation, which 
is ultimately a logos of Nous. Of course, individual human 
souls both contemplate and have a content. So too do 
animal souls, although their so-called contemplation is 
really sensation.15 Both humans and brute animals produce 
cognitive products and biologically generate offspring. 
Thus, no being can be cognitive in some sense unless it 
somehow ultimately is related to Nous, which is pure 
intellection and hence life par excellence. In any event, 
the only way in which something lives is by being the logos 
of Nous 
reality. 
by actually being Nous on a lower level of 
14consult IV, 7 (2), 2, 22-25. 
15see, for example, III, 8 (30), 8, 13-17. 
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Accordingly, Plotinus' logos principle may be seen to 
express two important dimensions of life. Logos as 
extensive shows that beings are ordered as products and are 
a gradation of diminishing lives. This is logos in its 
"vertical" dimension. Logos as intensive, on the other 
hand, shows that 
multiplicity, is a 
of living beings. 
dimension. 
each hypostasis, because a unity in 
single reality encompassing a plurality 
This is logos in its "horizontal" 
Furthermore, this relation of lower to higher may also 
be described in terms of eros. Genuine love, for Plotinus, 
involves neither the production of an artifact nor the 
establishment of a physical or sensual liaison with another 
being. Its true aim is union with the ultimate object of 
desire: the One-Good. Accordingly, what genuine love 
motivates in any being is precisely its self-kinesis. The 
highest manifestation of self-kinesis is intellection which 
ultimately has as its object the One as intelligible, and 
this is the very life of that being. Thus, Plotinus' theory 
of life, from its highest manifestation to the lowest trace, 
involves a rationally appetitive dimension. 
But what is the nature of the ultimate object of this 
rational appetition? The Primal Reality -- the One-Good --
is the supreme and undiminished source of all other 
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realities because It is perfectly unified and simple. 16 
As such, It is other than all other realities (precisely 
because It is simple and they are multiple) and yet not 
entirely other than any of them (since they are all logoi of 
the One and, hence, they are the One-on-a-lower-level-of-
reality). In addition, the One is both the source of life 
and above life. It is the source of all life because Nous, 
Its first product, lives only by Its self-initiated 
contemplation of the One as multiple. Yet the One Itself 
must be above life since Its very nature precludes 
contemplation or self-kinesis, which would involve It in a 
duality of knower and known, mover and moved. The Primal 
Reality's products flow out from It as water from a spring 
which is itself unoriginated and undiminished.17 This 
sort of causality may be characterized as "emanative." The 
One-Good in causing other realities Itself remains perfect 
and undepleted. Emanative causality occurs spontaneously, 
automatically and necessarily. The One produces because It 
is totally perfect and not because It freely chooses to 
produce. Emanative causality safeguards the transcendence 
of the One in particular and the nature of Plotinus' monism 
in general. What overflows from the One the intelligible 
16see I, 6 (1), 7, 9-10; VI, 9 (9), 3, 14-16; and 
III, 8 (30), 8, 1-12. 
1 7 See I I I, 8 ( 3 0 ) , 10, 1-10. 
otherness, matter, operative power 
(i.e., the One-on~a-lower-level). 
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is logos of the One 
Finally, what is human life? Life on the level of an 
individual human soul is both a praxis and a poiesis (though 
Plotinus never makes it entirely clear how it is the 
latter). A human soul's life is apparently a praxis because 
it is capable of acting according to correct rational rules 
or logoi of conduct. Its life is also a poiesis, since the 
human soul animates and moves a body, as well as produces 
and makes various artifacts. These products may be 
evaluated as to their beauty or usefulness, for example, by 
assessing the extent to which their production was carried 
out in conformity with correct logoi. 
The key component of the human soul's life, however, 
is to be found in another aspect of its relationship to 
Nous. The human soul's pure and good life is achieved when 
it has become actually intellectual and thereby purified of 
external concerns and associations with physical matter. 
The human soul truly lives when it becomes bodiless~ when it 
is unified with Nous and leads the purely intellectual life 
of knowing the One as Nous is able to know It, as a 
multiplicity of perfect and eternal Forms. 
What are the characteristics of the best human life as 
it is lived in the sense world? In other words, to what 
extent can the human soul live truly in this world? The 
serious man, he who lives truly, is one who takes as good 
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not the merely apparent goods of this world but the One-Good 
of the highest r'ealm, with Whom he initially becomes 
intellectually acquainted and ultimately mystically united. 
Such ultimate mystical unity is his only goa1.l8 
Accordingly, some things contribute to his good inner 
state while others only belong to his outer and inferior 
half, the body. To the latter he gives only what it needs 
to exist because he realizes that it makes no contribution 
to seriousness and true life and, hence, must largely be 
ignored and eventually fully discarded. 
The concerns of body and the events of daily life seem 
insignificant to the serious man because he has achieved 
proximate unity with Nous through contemplation and 
therefore understands the true nature of the physical world 
in which he spends his everyday life. He recognizes this 
universe as merely a reflection of the true All of Nous and 
thereby less perfect, less unified and less real. The 
18such proximate (i.e., intellectual) unity with the 
Primal Reality is his only deliberate goal. It alone 
constitutes true life and the good state of his inner 
reality. But mystical union with the One is the ultimate 
human achievement. It seems, however, not to be entirely 
predictable and automatic and, hence, appears to be somewhat 
beyond the scope and control of even the serious man. At 
best he can only prepare himself properly, by becoming as 
much like Nous as possible, for that ultimate moment. 
Accordingly, the human soul's mystical "return" to the One 
seems to be the result of careful preparation and patient 
waiting. Its achievement is a perfect stillness which is a 
supra-life and a supra-eudaimonia, if indeed it is even life 
and eudaimonia at all. See, for example, VI, 9 (9), 8, 22-
43: 11, 15-16. 
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activities, problems and events which occur in it are only 
imitations and have only the reality and worth of actions 
and events in a theatre. For this reason they are not to be 
taken seriously. Only by refusing to be distracted by such 
external activity can the real part of man (the inner man) 
achieve seriousness, true life and eudaimonia and thus 
prepare himself for the ultimate and mystical union with the 
Primal Reality, in which he is alone with the Alone.19 
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